Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Gayen Hancock, David Cross, Montez Mutzig, and James Bollinger sought to represent a class of customers dissatisfied with "U-verse," a digital telecommunications service offered by Defendants AT&T and several of its subsidiaries. The Oklahoma federal district court dismissed their claims based on forum selection and arbitration clauses in the U-verse terms of service. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their claims. Finding no error in the district court's interpretation of the terms of service, and finding no abuse of the court's discretion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims. View "Hancock v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case a corporation abruptly cashiered a member of senior management, which prompted the employee to file suit for age discrimination and retaliation. After a protracted trial, the jury found the employer guilty of retaliation and returned a seven-figure verdict in the employee's favor. The district court allowed the liability finding to stand, trimmed the damages but doubled what remained, refused to grant either judgment notwithstanding the verdict or an unconditional new trial, and awarded the prevailing plaintiff attorneys' fees and an equitable remedy. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment below except vacated the previously remitted award of emotional distress damages and directed the district court to order the plaintiff either to remit all of that award in excess of $200,000 or else undergo a new trial on that issue. The Court also directed the district court to adjust its award of multiplied damages to reflect the plaintiff's response to this remittitur. View "Trainor v. HEI Hospitality, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2008, plaintiffs were inmates at the Indianapolis jail, which was operated by CCA under contract with the Marion County Sheriff’s Department. They claimed that the jail provided inadequate medical care and exposed inmates to inhumane living conditions so egregious that they amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court certified a class, but dismissed claims that the jail failed to provide adequate medical care, that the conditions of confinement inside the jail were inhumane, and that the procedures in the jail violated inmates’ rights under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and later entered summary judgment for CCA on the remaining issues. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that CCA had produced an affidavit indicating that complained-of problems had been resolved. View "Kress v. CCA of TN, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the common pleas court appropriately decertified a class based on its conclusion that a necessary element of the plaintiffs' proof (the presence of a confidential relationship) was not amenable to class treatment. In 1993, Sandra J. Basile commenced a civil action against H&R Block, Inc., H&R Block Eastern Tax Services, Inc. and Mellon Bank. She alleged, among other things, that the Block companies maintained maintained and breached fiduciary duties in connection with their "Rapid Refund" program. Basile sought to assert claims on behalf of herself and others who were similarly situated. However, summary judgment subsequently was awarded in Block's favor on the ground that it had no fiduciary relationship with the plaintiffs. The common pleas court's conclusion, in this respect, was based on the premises that Block was not the plaintiffs' agent and that no confidential relationship otherwise existed between the parties. In the ensuing appellate litigation, the court's decision on the agency score ultimately was conclusively sustained. In 2001, the Superior Court overturned the common pleas court's summary-judgment award, finding that Ms. Basile had proffered sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of a confidential relationship. In 2003, upon consideration of the appellate rulings, the common pleas court determined that class treatment was no longer appropriate. The common pleas court found that the need for individualized inquiries on the dispositive question of trust precluded a finding that common issues predominated. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that that the common pleas court did not err in decertifying the class based on its conclusion that the presence of a confidential relationship was not amenable to class treatment. The order of the Superior Court was reversed, the common pleas court's decertification order was reinstated, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Basil. v. H & R Block, et al." on Justia Law

Objectors appealed the district court's approval of a class action settlement. The underlying case involved allegations that Disney violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12182 et seq., by implementing a policy that banned the use of two-wheeled vehicles, including Segways, by customers within its park and hotels, without exception. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class and in approving the settlement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the settlement orders. View "Ault, et al. v. Walt Disney World Co., et al." on Justia Law

This was an interlocutory appeal from a Superior Court order that certified a class represented by the plaintiff, Karen L. Lawrence, consisting of "all individuals who purchased Marlboro Lights cigarettes in New Hampshire from January 1, 1995, until the date of trial." The superior court transferred a single question for the Supreme Court's review: :Did the Superior Court err in its application of New Hampshire law when it granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification?" The Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative and reversed the trial court’s certification order. View "Lawrence v. Philip Morris USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Hecht sued UCB, a debt collector alleging violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by placing telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity, 15 U.S.C. 1692d(6), and by failing to disclose in its initial communication that the debt collector was attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained would be used for that purpose. The district court dismissed, finding that the suit was precluded under the doctrine of res judicata because Hecht alleged facts and violations already litigated, settled, and disposed of by a final judgment. The Second Circuit reversed. The prior judgment does not bar Hecht’s claims because she had a due process right to notice of that suit and the manner of providing notice, publication of the notice in a single issue of USA Today, was inadequate.View "Hecht v. United Collection Bureau, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs filed this action against Cox Enterprises, Inc., on behalf of themselves as well as a putative class consisting of all persons in the United States who subscribe to Cox for so-called premium cable and who paid Cox a monthly rental fee for the accompanying set-up box. In order to receive full access to Cox’s premium cable services the plaintiffs had to rent the set-up box from Cox. The plaintiffs alleged that this constituted an illegal tie-in in violation of the Sherman Act. The case came before the Tenth Circuit on the district court's denial of their request for class certification. Upon review of the materials filed with the Court and the applicable law, the Tenth Circuit concluded the case was not appropriate for immediate review, and denied plaintiffs' request. View "Gelder, et al v. CoxCom Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Defendant, Law Offices of Sidney Mickell, sent a debt collection letter addressed to Plaintiff, Catherine Evon, in "care of" her employer. Evon filed a class action lawsuit alleging (1) Mickell's act of sending letters "care of" the class members' employers violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act's prohibition on communication with third parties, and (2) the contents of the letter violated the Act's prohibition against false, deceptive, or misleading misrepresentations. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (1) held Mickell's act of sending "care of" letters constituted a per se violation of the Act, and reversed the district court's denial of Evon's class certification motion on that issue; and (2) held that the contents of the letter did not violate the Act, and therefore affirmed the district court's denial of Evon's class certification motion in that regard. Remanded. View "Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney Mickell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were automated teller machine (ATM) cardholders, who alleged horizontal price fixing of fees charged to the ATM owners by the banks when cardholders retrieve cash from an ATM not owned by their bank. Plaintiffs did not directly pay the allegedly fixed fee. The district court entered summary judgment against Plaintiffs and dismissed the suit for lack of antitrust standing. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) as indirect purchasers, Supreme Court precedent established in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois prohibited Plaintiffs from bringing this suit; (2) Plaintiffs did not qualify for the narrow exception to the Illinois Brick rule; and (3) Plaintiffs did not have standing under the Clayton Act to proceed with their Sherman Act suit. View "Brennan v. Concord EFS, Inc. " on Justia Law