Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

A publicly traded company, CoreCivic, which operates private prisons, faced scrutiny after the Bureau of Prisons raised safety and security concerns about its facilities. Following a report by the Department of Justice's Inspector General highlighting higher rates of violence and other issues in CoreCivic's prisons compared to federal ones, the Deputy Attorney General recommended reducing the use of private prisons. This led to a significant drop in CoreCivic's stock price and a subsequent shareholder class action lawsuit.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, early in the litigation, issued a protective order allowing parties to designate discovery materials as "confidential." This led to many documents being filed under seal. The Nashville Banner intervened, seeking to unseal these documents, but the district court largely maintained the seals, including on 24 deposition transcripts, without providing specific reasons for the nondisclosure.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court emphasized the strong presumption of public access to judicial records and the requirement for compelling reasons to justify sealing them. The court found that the district court had not provided specific findings to support the seals and had not narrowly tailored the seals to serve any compelling reasons. The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's order regarding the deposition transcripts and remanded the case for a prompt decision in accordance with its precedents, requiring the district court to determine if any parts of the transcripts meet the requirements for a seal within 60 days. View "Grae v. Corrections Corp. of Am." on Justia Law

Petitioners, representing a class of current and former Cornell University employees, participated in two defined-contribution retirement plans from 2010 to 2016. They sued Cornell and other plan fiduciaries in 2017, alleging that the plans engaged in prohibited transactions by paying excessive fees for recordkeeping services to Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America-College Retirement Equities Fund and Fidelity Investments Inc., in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) §1106(a)(1)(C).The District Court dismissed the prohibited-transaction claim, requiring plaintiffs to allege self-dealing or disloyal conduct. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal but on different grounds, holding that plaintiffs must plead that the transaction was unnecessary or involved unreasonable compensation, incorporating §1108(b)(2)(A) exemptions into §1106(a) claims.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and remanded the case. The Court held that to state a claim under §1106(a)(1)(C), a plaintiff need only plausibly allege the elements contained in that provision itself, without addressing potential §1108 exemptions. The Court determined that §1108 sets out affirmative defenses, which must be pleaded and proved by defendants. The Court emphasized that the statutory text and structure do not impose additional pleading requirements for §1106(a)(1) claims and that the burden of proving exemptions rests on the defendants. View "Cunningham v. Cornell University" on Justia Law

Jina Garcia received treatment from St. Anthony North Hospital, operated by Centura Health Corporation, following a motor vehicle accident. Garcia informed the hospital that she had Medicare and Medicaid coverage and that her automobile insurance carrier was Progressive Insurance. Centura asserted a hospital lien against Garcia for $2,170.35 without billing Medicare first. Garcia filed a class action lawsuit against Centura, alleging violations of the hospital lien statute by filing liens before billing Medicare, seeking damages of twice the amount of the asserted liens.The District Court of the City and County of Denver certified a class and ordered Garcia to respond to substantial discovery requests from Centura. Garcia objected, arguing the requests were irrelevant, overbroad, and violated her privacy. The district court required Garcia to provide much of the requested discovery. Garcia sought relief from the Colorado Supreme Court, which issued an order to show cause and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to determine the relevance and proportionality of the discovery requests.The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the case again and concluded that the district court abused its discretion in ordering Garcia to respond to the discovery requests. The court found that the discovery sought by Centura was not relevant to the claims or defenses in the case and was not proportional to the needs of the case. The court emphasized that the principal factual issues were whether Centura asserted liens without billing Medicare and the amount of those liens. The court made its order to show cause absolute and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Garcia v. Centura Health Corp." on Justia Law

Michael Salazar filed a class action lawsuit against Paramount Global, alleging a violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA). Salazar claimed that he subscribed to a 247Sports e-newsletter and watched videos on 247Sports.com while logged into his Facebook account. He alleged that Paramount had installed Facebook’s tracking Pixel on 247Sports.com, which enabled Paramount to track and disclose his video viewing history to Facebook without his consent.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed Salazar’s complaint. The court found that Salazar had standing because the alleged disclosure of his video viewing history to Facebook constituted a concrete injury. However, the court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under the VPPA, concluding that Salazar was not a “consumer” under the Act. The court reasoned that Salazar’s subscription to the 247Sports e-newsletter did not qualify him as a “consumer” because the newsletter was not “audio visual materials.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Sixth Circuit agreed that Salazar had standing but held that he did not plausibly allege that he was a “consumer” under the VPPA. The court interpreted the term “goods or services” in the context of the VPPA to mean audio-visual materials, and since Salazar’s newsletter subscription did not involve audio-visual materials, he was not a “consumer” under the Act. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice, as Salazar had not filed a formal motion to amend his complaint. View "Salazar v. Paramount Global" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case are four Oregon residents who filed a putative class action against Tillamook County Creamery Association (Tillamook) under Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA). They allege that Tillamook falsely represented the nature and origin of its dairy products, claiming they were sourced from small, family-owned farms in Tillamook County, while most of the milk actually came from a large factory farm in eastern Oregon. Plaintiffs argue that these misrepresentations led consumers to suffer economic harm by purchasing products they otherwise would not have bought or by paying inflated prices.The Multnomah County Circuit Court partially granted Tillamook’s motion to dismiss, ruling that plaintiffs must plead that Tillamook’s false representations were observed and relied upon by anyone seeking recovery. The court dismissed the claims based on a price-inflation theory and a prohibited-transaction theory, reasoning that the class must be limited to consumers who purchased Tillamook products in reliance on the marketing representations.The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that plaintiffs’ UTPA claim required them to plead reliance on Tillamook’s representations. The court rejected the price-inflation theory, likening it to the fraud-on-the-market theory used in securities fraud cases, and found it inapplicable to consumer goods. The court also determined that the prohibited-transaction theory required proof of reliance, as the claimed loss was the purchase price resulting from misrepresentations.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, holding that plaintiffs’ premium-price theory and prohibited-transaction theory do not require pleading reliance. The court explained that the premium-price theory alleges that Tillamook’s deceptive marketing inflated the market value of its products, causing all purchasers to pay higher prices, regardless of individual reliance. Similarly, the prohibited-transaction theory claims that plaintiffs suffered loss by purchasing misbranded or falsely advertised products, which does not depend on consumers’ awareness of the misrepresentations. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Bohr v. Tillamook County Creamery Assn." on Justia Law

A certified class of Ohio landowners alleged that a Colorado-based mining company, Antero Resources Corporation, underpaid them $10 million in natural gas royalties. The landowners claimed that Antero improperly deducted costs for processing and fractionation from their royalties. Antero counterclaimed, seeking authority to deduct additional costs related to gathering, dehydrating, compressing, and transporting the unrefined natural gas. The district court certified the class, denied Antero's motion for summary judgment, granted the landowners' motion, and entered a final judgment after the parties stipulated damages.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ruled in favor of the landowners, finding that Antero improperly deducted processing and fractionation costs from the royalties. The court determined that these costs were necessary to transform the gas into marketable form and thus could not be deducted under the lease agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Antero could not deduct the costs of processing and fractionation from the landowners' royalties. The court found that the lease agreement's Market Enhancement Clause allowed deductions only for costs that enhanced the value of already marketable products, not for costs required to make the products marketable. The court concluded that the gas products first became marketable after processing and fractionation, and thus, these costs were not deductible. The court also noted that the Fourth Circuit had reached a similar conclusion in a related case involving the same defendant and lease terms. View "The Grissoms, LLC v. Antero Resources Corp." on Justia Law

Lynwood Pickens worked for Hamilton-Ryker IT Solutions from 2018 to 2019, inspecting pipes at a natural-gas export terminal in Texas. He was paid $100 per hour but was guaranteed a weekly salary of $800, equivalent to eight hours of work. For any hours worked beyond the initial eight, he received additional hourly compensation. Pickens regularly worked over 50 hours per week but did not receive overtime pay, as Hamilton-Ryker classified him as a salaried employee exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).Pickens sued Hamilton-Ryker in 2020, claiming he was a non-exempt hourly worker entitled to overtime pay. Fourteen coworkers joined the lawsuit. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted summary judgment to Hamilton-Ryker, classifying Pickens as a salaried employee under the FLSA and dismissing the claims of his coworkers for not being "similarly situated."The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Pickens was not paid on a salary basis as defined by the FLSA regulations. The court emphasized that a true salary must cover a regular workweek, not just a portion of it. Since Pickens' guaranteed pay only covered eight hours, not his usual 52-hour workweek, he did not meet the salary basis test. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, leaving the determination of the collective action status and the claims of Pickens' coworkers to the district court. View "Pickens v. Hamilton-Ryker IT Solutions" on Justia Law

In this case, plaintiffs in a class action alleged that several corporations in the broiler chicken market violated antitrust laws by engaging in bid rigging and reducing the supply of broiler chickens. The plaintiffs claimed that these actions led to anomalous dips in sales, which they attributed to collusion on price and output. The class action was divided into two tracks: Track 1, which omitted bid-rigging allegations for faster discovery and trial, and Track 2, which included bid-rigging theories and state law claims by indirect purchasers.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois allowed the class to place claims against Simmons Foods, Inc. and Simmons Prepared Foods, Inc. on Track 1. Simmons settled for $8 million, but several class members, including the Boston Market group, objected to the settlement. They argued that the settlement was inadequate and that they should not be included in the class because they had filed their own antitrust suits. However, they missed the deadline to opt out of the class, and the district court approved the settlement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the settlement's release language was broad enough to cover bid-rigging claims and that the $8 million settlement was reasonable. The court noted that the Boston Market group did not provide evidence that the settlement amount was unreasonably low. Additionally, the court observed that the class had lost a related trial and that criminal antitrust prosecutions against some firms had ended in mistrials or acquittals, indicating uncertainty about the plaintiffs' prospects. The court affirmed the district court's approval of the settlement. View "Boston Market Corporation v Mountainaire Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

Paul Osheske, a Facebook user, purchased a movie ticket on Landmark Theatres' website. Landmark Theatres, operated by Silver Cinemas Acquisition Co., shared the name of the film, the location of the showing, and Osheske’s unique Facebook identification number with Facebook without his consent. Osheske filed a class action lawsuit against Landmark, alleging that this disclosure violated the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA).The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Osheske’s complaint, concluding that Landmark Theatres did not qualify as a “video tape service provider” under the VPPA. The court reasoned that the activities of selling tickets and providing an in-theater movie experience did not fall under the VPPA’s definition of “rental, sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the VPPA does not apply to businesses providing a classic in-theater moviegoing experience. The court determined that the statutory text and historical context of the VPPA indicate that the Act was intended to cover the rental, sale, or delivery of video products, not the provision of shared access to film screenings in a theater. Consequently, Landmark Theatres' conduct did not make it a “video tape service provider” under the VPPA. The court also noted that the district court’s dismissal without leave to amend was proper, as the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. View "OSHESKE V. SILVER CINEMAS ACQUISITION COMPANY" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Glacier County taxpayers, alleged that the County and its Commissioners unlawfully made expenditures or disbursements of public funds or incurred obligations in excess of total appropriations, violating Montana law. The case originated from a 2015 lawsuit by Plaintiff Elaine Mitchell, who claimed the County and State failed to comply with the Single Audit Act and the Local Government Budget Act. An independent audit revealed deficit balances in many county funds, prompting the lawsuit. The plaintiffs sought various forms of relief, including declarations of non-compliance with accounting standards and laws ensuring government financial accountability.The Ninth Judicial District Court granted partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs on the issue of the County's improper liquidation of a tax protest fund. Plaintiffs then filed a motion to certify Count II as a class action, which the District Court granted, defining the class as property taxpayers of Glacier County who paid taxes from 2012 to 2020. The County appealed the class certification order and the denial of its motion to dismiss for lack of standing.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decisions. The Court held that Plaintiffs had standing, as they alleged concrete economic injuries from the County's actions, such as increased tax obligations and loss of county services. The Court also found that the class met the prerequisites for certification under M. R. Civ. P. 23(a), including numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation. The Court ruled that common questions of law and fact predominated over individual questions, making a class action the superior method for adjudicating the controversy. The class certification was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Gottlob v. DesRosier" on Justia Law