Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Ohio
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In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Ohio State University suspended in-person instruction, transitioned to virtual learning, restricted campus access, and provided limited refunds to students. Brooke Smith, a student at the university, filed a class-action lawsuit against the university, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion. Smith argued that students had lost the benefits of their education without sufficient refunds.The Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether discretionary immunity, which shields the state from lawsuits for certain highly discretionary decisions, was a jurisdictional bar or an affirmative defense to suits brought against the state. The court held that discretionary immunity was indeed a jurisdictional bar, not an affirmative defense. This means that when the state makes highly discretionary decisions, such as its response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction as the state has not waived its sovereign immunity for those decisions.However, the court noted that discretionary immunity is not absolute and does not extend to the negligent actions of the state's employees and agents in the performance of these activities. The court reversed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which had found that discretionary immunity was an affirmative defense, and remanded the case back to that court to determine whether Ohio State University was protected by discretionary immunity in its response to the COVID-19 pandemic. View "Smith v. Ohio State Univ." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that the payment of a civil fine for a traffic violation under a city's automated traffic enforcement program without a dispute of liability for the violation precludes those improperly ticketed under the program from raising an unjust enrichment claim against the city in a separate action.Appellees - Plaintiffs in a class action - were vehicle lessees who received tickets under the city of the city of Cleveland's automated traffic enforcement program. Plaintiffs did not appeal their cases, and most paid the civil fine. The trial court granted Appellees' motion for class certification. The City appealed, arguing that res judicata precluded class relief. After the court of appeals affirmed the class certification order the trial court ruled in favor of the class. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that by paying their civil fines and not disputing their liability, Appellees admitted their liability for their traffic violations, and res judicata prevented a subsequent lawsuit. View "Lycan v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that Netflix Inc. and Hulu, LLC (together, Defendants) were not video-service providers under the Fair Competition in Cable Operations Act, Ohio Rev. Code 1332.21 (the Act) and that the Act did not expressly or impliedly give the City of Maple Heights the authority to bring a cause of action such as the one at issue in this case.The City of Maple Heights filed a federal class action and declaratory judgment lawsuit against Netflix and Hulu in federal court asserting that Defendants were in violation of the Act. Defendants moved separately to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that their streaming services did not fall within the Act. The federal court certified two state-law questions for Supreme Court review. The Court answered (1) Netflix and Hulu were not service providers under Ohio law; and (2) the Act did not grant Maple Heights either an express or an implied right to bring an action against Defendants to enforce Ohio's video service provider provisions. View "City of Maple Heights v. Netlix, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's class certification order and vacated the class certification order, holding that Ohio Rev. Code 124.34 does not authorize civil service employees to file a civil action in common pleas court to address an alleged reduction in pay in violation of section 124.34.Appellees and other named class representatives filed two consolidated class action lawsuits against Cuyahoga County seeking damages and a declaratory judgment that the county reduced their compensation, in violation of section 124.34. The trial court certified a class. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 124.34 does not authorize civil service employees to file a civil action in common pleas court for an alleged reduction in pay in violation of the statute; and (2) because Appellees' complaints did not state a cause of action for which relief may be granted, the trial court erred in certifying a class based on those claims. View "Binder v. Cuyahoga County" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that Plaintiff had opted out of a class-action settlement that was approved in Seifi v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, holding that McAdams's status as a member of the Seifi class was determined in that case, and therefore, McAdams's claim in this case was barred by res judicata.While the Seifi class action was pending, McAdams filed a complaint against Mercedez-Benz USA, Mercedez-Benz Easton, and Mercedes-Benz of New Rochelle, alleging claims relating to issues with the balance-shaft gear and the transmission conductor plate of her Mercedes. After the judgment in the Seifi class action was issued, the trial court determined that McAdams was bound by the Seifi class action settlement because she had not formally opted out of the class action, and therefore, her balance-shaft-gear claim was barred by res judicata. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that McAdams had opted out of the Seifi class-action settlement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that McAdams's claim that she had not opted out of the class action was barred by res judicata because the federal court determined who had opted out in its entry adopting the Seifi class-action settlement. View "McAdams v. Mercedes-Benz, USA, LLC" on Justia Law

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In this class action, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the common pleas court's decision to certify the class, holding that the common pleas court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the class action for the named and prospective class plaintiffs whose claims for recovery fell within the express language of Ohio Rev. Code 5160.37.The class action sought a declaratory judgment that former Ohio Rev. Code 5101.58 relating to Medicaid reimbursements is unconstitutional. The action further sought to recover all sums paid to the Ohio Department of Medicaid (Department) under section 5101.58. Plaintiff moved to certify as a class all persons who paid any amount to the Department pursuant to the statute from April 6, 2007 to the present. The trial court certified the class. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 5160.37 now provides the sole remedy for Medicaid program participants to recover excessive reimbursement payments made to the Department on or after September 29, 2007; and (2) therefore, the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction over the claims asserted by Plaintiffs. View "Pivonka v. Corcoran" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals holding that Ohio Rev. Code 1308.16(A) allows a purchaser of a bond to assert a breach-of-contract claim that accrued before the bondholder's purchase because the purchaser acquired the rights of one who held the bond when the breach allegedly occurred, holding that absent a valid assignment of a right to bring a cause of action, the sale of a municipal bond does not automatically vest in the purchaser.This breach-of-contract case came to the Supreme Court on appeal from a judgment finding that the court of common pleas erred by refusing to certify a class action on grounds that the class lacked commonality. Plaintiff asked the trial court to certify a class of bondholders. The trial court concluded that commonality had not been established because each class member would allege a different time and purchase price as the basis for a breach and thus would have different potential damages. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that absent a valid assignment of claims, the sale of a municipal bond does not automatically vest in the buyer all claims and causes of action of the seller relating to the bond that arose before the transaction. View "Paul Cheatham I.R.A. v. Huntington National Bank" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's judgment granting Plaintiff's motion to certify a class action, holding that when a class-certification case originates with a single named plaintiff and that plaintiff is not subject to an arbitration agreement that was entered into by unnamed putative class members, the defendant need not raise a specific argument referring or relating to arbitration in the defendant's answer.Plaintiff filed a class-action complaint against Defendant, his former employer. When Plaintiff moved to certify the case as a class action Defendant opposed the motion, asserting the defense of arbitration. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Defendant waived any right of arbitration. The appellate court affirmed, determining that Defendant's failure to assert the arbitration defense in his answer or to seek to enforce the right to arbitration prior to its opposition to the certification was inconsistent with its right to assert the defense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because arbitration was not available as a defense at the time Defendant submitted its answer, Defendant could not waive a right to assert arbitration at that time; and (2) Defendant had no duty to raise an argument that Plaintiff failed to satisfy Civ.R. 23(A)'s typicality and adequacy requirements. View "Gembarski v. PartsSource, Inc." on Justia Law

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Steve Maddox and eight other named relators (collectively, Maddox) brought this original action in mandamus against the village of Lincoln Heights and several of the village’s officials (collectively, the village). Maddox alleged that several classes of people who work for or have worked for the village had not been provided employee benefits owed to them and requested a writ directing the village to provide the withheld benefits. The parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement consisting of money payments to class members. The Supreme Court referred the case to mediation, with instructions for the parties to attempt an out-of-court settlement without court approval, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to preside over this monetary settlement because no class had yet been certified and nothing prevented the parties from settling the case without the approval of the Court. View "State ex rel. Maddox v. Village of Lincoln Heights" on Justia Law

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A circuit court in Boone County, Kentucky entered a multimillion dollar judgment against Stanley Chesley, a former attorney, for his conduct in a class action lawsuit that eventually settled. Chesley filed suit in Ohio state court seeking an injunction to prevent Respondents from collecting on the judgment and to relitigate the case. The Hamilton County Common Pleas Court Judge Robert Ruehlman acted outside its jurisdiction to repeatedly shield Chesley and his assets from creditors. Relator Angela Ford filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to preclude Judge Ruehlman from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the Hamilton County case. The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of prohibition and ordered the judge to vacate his orders, holding that Judge Ruehlman had no statutory authority to grant relief in this case. View "State ex rel. Ford v. Ruehlman" on Justia Law