Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against Kimberly-Clark Corporation, alleging that the company falsely advertised its bathroom wipes as flushable, leading consumers to pay a premium and causing plumbing damage. The parties reached a settlement where Kimberly-Clark agreed to pay up to $20 million in compensation to the class and up to $4 million in attorney’s fees. However, class members claimed less than $1 million. The district court approved the settlement under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York approved the settlement, finding it fair, reasonable, and adequate. Objector Theodore H. Frank appealed, arguing that the settlement disproportionately benefited class counsel, who received most of the monetary recovery. Frank contended that the district court failed to properly assess the allocation of recovery between the class and class counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with Frank that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in its Rule 23(e) analysis. The appellate court clarified that Rule 23(e) requires courts to compare the proportion of total recovery allocated to the class with the proportion allocated to class counsel. The court vacated the district court’s order and judgment approving the settlement and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The appellate court did not reach a conclusion on whether the settlement was fair but emphasized the need for a proper proportionality analysis. View "Kurtz v. Kimberly-Clark Corp." on Justia Law

John Wertymer purchased two bottles of Walmart’s Great Value brand honey in June 2022, labeled “Raw Honey” and “Organic Raw Honey.” He claimed he paid a premium for these products due to their perceived nutritional and medicinal benefits. In April 2023, Wertymer sent the honey to a laboratory for testing, which allegedly showed that the honey was not raw. He then filed a diversity suit against Walmart, seeking to represent a nationwide class of purchasers, or alternatively, an Illinois class, alleging violations under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act and common law fraudulent misrepresentation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Wertymer’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief for lack of standing, which Wertymer did not appeal. The district court also dismissed the remainder of his claims, finding that the complaint failed to support any claims of fraud, misrepresentation, or deceptive practices.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The court found that Wertymer’s complaint did not plausibly allege that Walmart committed a deceptive act. The court noted that Wertymer’s own allegations and sources indicated that elevated levels of 5-hydroxymethylfurfural (HMF) in honey could result from factors other than heating, such as storage conditions and geographic origin. The court also found that Wertymer’s claim regarding the presence of mannose in the “Organic Raw Honey” was speculative and unsupported by the sources cited in the complaint.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, concluding that Wertymer’s complaint was too speculative and failed to state a plausible claim for relief under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act or for common law fraudulent misrepresentation. View "Wertymer v Walmart Inc." on Justia Law

A data breach occurred at Wawa convenience stores, affecting customers' payment information. Wawa discovered the breach in December 2019 and contained it within days. The breach led to a class action lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, consolidating 15 actions into three tracks: financial institution, employee, and consumer. The consumer track, which is the focus of this case, alleged negligence, breach of implied contract, and violations of state consumer protection laws, seeking both damages and injunctive relief.The District Court preliminarily approved a settlement that included compensation through Wawa gift cards and cash for out-of-pocket losses, as well as injunctive relief to improve Wawa's data security. Class member Theodore Frank objected, arguing that the settlement's attorney's fees were excessive and that the settlement included a clear sailing agreement and a fee reversion clause. The District Court approved the settlement and the attorney's fees, but Frank appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the fee award and remanded the case, instructing the District Court to scrutinize the reasonableness of the attorney's fees and the presence of any side agreements. On remand, the District Court found no clear sailing agreement or collusion and determined that the fee reversion was unintentional. The court reaffirmed the attorney's fee award based on the funds made available to the class, considering the benefits provided, including the injunctive relief.The Third Circuit reviewed the District Court's findings and affirmed the judgment, holding that the attorney's fee award was reasonable and that the settlement process was free of collusion or improper side agreements. The court emphasized the meaningful benefits provided to the class members and the appropriateness of the fee award based on the amount made available rather than the amount claimed. View "In re: Wawa, Inc. Data Security Litigation" on Justia Law

A plaintiff filed a putative class action against a dietary supplement company, alleging that the supplement Hydro BCAA was mislabeled. The plaintiff claimed that preliminary testing showed the supplement contained more carbohydrates and calories than listed on its FDA-prescribed label. The plaintiff tested the supplement using FDA methods but did not follow the FDA’s twelve-sample sampling process.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the complaint, holding that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act preempted the claims because the plaintiff did not plead that he tested the supplement according to the FDA’s sampling process. The district court noted a divide among district courts on whether plaintiffs must plead compliance with the FDA’s testing methods and sampling processes to avoid preemption.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiff’s complaint allowed a reasonable inference that the supplement was misbranded under the Act, even without allegations of compliance with the FDA’s sampling process. The court found that the plaintiff’s preliminary testing of one sample, which showed significant discrepancies in carbohydrate and calorie content, was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The court emphasized that plaintiffs are not required to perform the FDA’s sampling process at the pleading stage to avoid preemption.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal, allowing the plaintiff’s state-law claims to proceed. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to avoid preemption and stated a plausible claim that the supplement was mislabeled under the Act. View "SCHEIBE V. PROSUPPS USA, LLC" on Justia Law

Former students of the University of Montana filed a class action lawsuit against the university, alleging mishandling of student loan reimbursement payments. They claimed that the university's contract with Higher One Holdings, Inc. subjected them to excessive bank fees and unlawfully disclosed their personal information without consent. The university had contracted with Higher One from 2010 to 2015 to process student loan reimbursements, which involved issuing debit cards and charging various fees.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in Missoula County certified three classes of plaintiffs but was later partially reversed by the Montana Supreme Court, which upheld the certification of two classes and reversed the third. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the jury found in favor of the university, concluding that it did not breach its fiduciary duty, violate privacy rights, or unjustly enrich itself.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case on appeal. The students raised several issues, including the admissibility of evidence regarding their banking practices, the testimony of the university's expert witness, the university's closing arguments, the admission of a fee comparison chart, and the refusal of a burden-shifting jury instruction. The court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings, including allowing the university to present evidence about students' banking practices and admitting the fee comparison chart. The court also held that the expert witness's testimony was permissible and that the university's closing arguments did not prejudice the students' right to a fair trial.Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the District Court's judgment in favor of the University of Montana, upholding the jury's verdict. View "Knudsen v. U. of M." on Justia Law

The case involves Elaine Neidig, who had three mammograms at Valley Health System's Winchester Medical Center between 2016 and 2019. In 2019, the FDA found that some mammograms performed at the facility had serious image quality deficiencies. Neidig received a notification from Valley Health about these issues and subsequently filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Valley Health misrepresented the quality of its mammography services. She claimed that the mammograms were worthless and sought economic damages, including statutory damages for consumer protection violations, compensatory damages, and contract damages. Neidig did not claim any physical or emotional injury.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia dismissed Neidig's complaint, ruling that her claims fell under the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA) and were barred by the MPLA’s statute of limitations. The court found that the MPLA applied because the claims were related to health care services, despite Neidig's argument that her claims were purely economic and not based on physical or emotional injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, asking whether the MPLA applies to claims where the plaintiff disclaims any form of physical or emotional injury. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reformulated the question to ask whether the MPLA applies when the plaintiff claims only economic damages and disclaims all liability based on physical injury, emotional injury, or death.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the MPLA does not apply to a suit against a health care provider or health care facility when the plaintiff claims only economic damages and disclaims all liability based on physical injury, emotional injury, or death. The court emphasized that the MPLA requires a predicate claim arising from the death or injury of a person, and since Neidig's claims were solely for economic damages, the MPLA did not apply. View "Neidig v. Valley Health System" on Justia Law

In 2018, Marriott announced a data breach affecting the guest reservation database of Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, which Marriott had acquired in 2016. The breach exposed personal information of approximately 133.7 million guests, including some payment card information. Plaintiffs filed class action lawsuits against Marriott and Accenture, a third-party IT service provider for Starwood and Marriott during the breach. The cases were consolidated for pretrial proceedings in the District of Maryland.The district court initially certified multiple state-specific damages classes against Marriott and issue classes against both Marriott and Accenture. However, the court did not address the effect of a class-action waiver in the Starwood Preferred Guest Program (SPG) contract, which Marriott argued precluded class certification. The Fourth Circuit vacated the class certification, instructing the district court to consider the class-action waiver's impact.On remand, the district court again certified the classes, holding that Marriott had waived its right to enforce the class-action waiver by participating in multidistrict litigation (MDL) and by agreeing to pretrial proceedings in Maryland, contrary to the SPG contract's venue and choice-of-law provisions. The court also suggested that the class-action waiver might be unenforceable under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that Marriott did not waive its right to enforce the class-action waiver and that the waiver was valid and enforceable. The court found that the waiver applied to the plaintiffs' claims, including consumer protection and negligence claims, as they were related to the SPG Program. Consequently, the court reversed the certification of all classes against Marriott and the issue classes against Accenture, as the latter were justified only in combination with the Marriott damages classes. View "Maldini v. Marriott International, Incorporated" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Joshua Naranjo, filed a class action lawsuit against Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc., alleging violations of the unfair competition law (UCL) and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) due to the hospital's practice of charging an undisclosed "Evaluation and Management Services Fee" (EMS Fee) to emergency room patients. Naranjo claimed that the fee was charged without prior notification or agreement, making it an unfair, deceptive, and unlawful practice.The Superior Court of Stanislaus County sustained the hospital's demurrer to each cause of action in Naranjo's first amended complaint (FAC) without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal. Naranjo appealed, and the Court of Appeal initially reversed the judgment, finding that Naranjo had stated valid causes of action under the UCL and CLRA and for declaratory relief. The court also directed the trial court to consider any future motion by Naranjo to amend his FAC to state a breach of contract cause of action.The California Supreme Court granted review and subsequently transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal, directing it to reconsider the matter in light of its ruling in Capito v. San Jose Healthcare System, LP. In Capito, the Supreme Court held that hospitals do not have a duty under the UCL or CLRA to disclose EMS fees to emergency room patients prior to treatment beyond what is required by the statutory and regulatory scheme.Upon reconsideration, the Court of Appeal concluded that Naranjo's claims are barred to the extent they are based on an alleged duty to disclose EMS fees prior to treatment. However, the court found that Naranjo had stated a valid contract-based cause of action for declaratory relief and should be allowed to amend his FAC to state causes of action for breach of contract and violations of the UCL and CLRA, subject to specific parameters. The judgment of dismissal was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Naranjo v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc." on Justia Law

In spring 2020, Czigany Beck, a full-time student at Manhattan College, paid tuition and a comprehensive fee for the semester. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the college transitioned to remote learning in March 2020, and Beck received only 46% of her education in person. Beck filed a class action lawsuit against Manhattan College, claiming breach of implied contract and unjust enrichment for not refunding a portion of her tuition and fees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Beck's claims. The court found that the college's statements were not specific enough to constitute a promise for in-person classes or access to on-campus facilities. The court also ruled that the comprehensive fee was nonrefundable based on the college's terms, and thus Beck's unjust enrichment claim for fees was barred. The court granted summary judgment to Manhattan College on Beck's remaining unjust enrichment claim for tuition, concluding that the college's switch to online instruction was reasonable given the pandemic.Beck appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the district court's judgment should be reversed based on the decision in Rynasko v. New York University. Manhattan College countered with decisions from the New York Supreme Court's Appellate Division, which supported affirming the district court's judgment. The Second Circuit identified a split between federal and state courts on New York contract-law principles and certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals: whether New York law requires a specific promise to provide exclusively in-person learning to form an implied contract between a university and its students regarding tuition payments. The Second Circuit reserved decision on Beck's appeal pending the New York Court of Appeals' response. View "Beck v. Manhattan College" on Justia Law

David O’Connell filed a class action lawsuit against the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) for fraudulent solicitation of donations. O’Connell alleged that USCCB misled donors about the use of funds collected through the Peter’s Pence Collection, which were purportedly for emergency assistance but were instead used for investments and other purposes. O’Connell claimed that if he had known the true use of the funds, he would not have donated.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied USCCB’s motion to dismiss the case, which was based on the church autonomy doctrine. The District Court found that O’Connell’s claims raised a secular dispute that could be resolved using neutral principles of law, without delving into religious doctrine. The court emphasized that it would not address purely religious questions if they arose during litigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed USCCB’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the collateral order doctrine did not apply. The court held that the church autonomy defense could be adequately reviewed on appeal after a final judgment, and that the denial of the motion to dismiss was not conclusive or separate from the merits of the case. The court emphasized that the church autonomy doctrine does not provide immunity from suit but serves as a defense to liability. The appeal was dismissed, and the case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. View "O'Connell v. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops" on Justia Law