Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

In late 2019, a hospital sent letters to over a thousand patients, including Linda Gierek, informing them of potential exposure to infectious diseases due to a technician's failure to fully sterilize surgical instruments. Gierek filed a class-action complaint against the hospital, asserting claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and medical malpractice. She sought class certification for similarly situated patients and their spouses. The trial court consolidated Gierek’s action with a similar class-action claim filed by Cheyanne Bennett.The Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund intervened, arguing that the claims sounded in ordinary negligence and thus the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) did not apply. The hospital argued the opposite. The trial court ruled in favor of the hospital, stating the MMA applied, and denied the motion for class certification, citing lack of subject-matter jurisdiction while a proposed complaint was pending before a medical-review panel. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the MMA’s applicability but reversed the trial court’s decision on class certification jurisdiction.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the MMA covers all claims for medical malpractice, not limited to bodily injury or death. The court also held that class certification is a proper preliminary determination under the MMA. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for the trial court to consider the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. View "Gierek v. Anonymous 1" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court certifying a class action in the underlying lawsuit brought under the Patient Right-to-Know Addfct, Ark. Code Ann. 20-6-201 et seq., holding that the court abused its discretion in concluding that the predominance prerequisite of a class action had been satisfied.In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that, after terminating his primary care physician, Dr. Anderson, St. Vincent Medical Group failed to provide Dr. Anderson with a list of his patients or to send them notice of his new location. The circuit court certified a class action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that Plaintiff identified "a common course of conduct that affected all members of the class." View "St. Vincent Medical Group v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former shareholder of infoGroup, Inc., brought its Second Amended Class Action complaint asserting, on behalf of themselves and their fellow former shareholders, that the merger of infoGroup into a subsidiary of CCMP Capital Advisors, pursuant to an agreement entered on March 8, 2010, was the product of breaches by the then-directors of infoGroup of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. The court held that the claim which plaintiff sought to assert was individual in nature and that plaintiff had alleged sufficiently that the merger was not approved by a disinterested and independent majority of the directors. The court also held that, although plaintiff acknowledged that it was not asserting certain claims the dismissal of which had been sought by defendants, for purposes of avoiding confusion, those claims were dismissed. Accordingly, with that limited exception, the court denied defendants' motions to dismiss.

This appeal involved a putative class action filed by three Pennsylvania Medicaid beneficiaries subject to the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare's (DPW) liens against future settlements or judgments. At issue was whether state agencies responsible for administering the Medicaid program have the authority to assert such liens and, if so, whether Pennsylvania's statutory framework was consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn. The court examined the text, structure, history, and purpose of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq., and held that liens limited to medical costs were not prohibited by the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(a)-(b). Accordingly, the court upheld Pennsylvania's longstanding practice of imposing such liens. The court also held that Pennsylvania's current statutory framework, which afforded Medicaid recipients a right of appeal from the default allocation, was a permissible default apportionment scheme.