Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

San Francisco operates a combined sewer system that collects and treats both wastewater and stormwater. In 1996, California voters approved Proposition 218, which added provisions to the California Constitution requiring voter approval for property-related charges, except for "sewer, water, and refuse collection services." Plaintiffs Robert Gluck and Adam Hertz filed a class action against the City and County of San Francisco, challenging the constitutionality of the City's sewer charges related to stormwater services. They argued that stormwater services funded by the City's sewer charges were not "sewer" services covered by the exception to Proposition 218's voter approval requirement and that the charges failed the proportionality requirement.The trial court sustained the City's demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that the City's combined sewer system provides "sewer" services falling within the voter approval exception of article XIII D, section 6(c). The court also found that the plaintiffs' fourth cause of action failed because it was based on the premise that stormwater management is not a "sewer service."The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment regarding the first three causes of action, agreeing that the City's combined sewer system provides "sewer" services exempt from the voter approval requirement. However, the court reversed the judgment regarding the fourth and fifth causes of action, concluding that the City did not establish that the plaintiffs' allegations regarding the City's reliance on wastewater factors to support charges for stormwater services were insufficient as a matter of law to establish a violation of the proportionality requirement of article XIII D, section 6(b)(3). The case was remanded for further proceedings on these claims. View "Gluck v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Edgar Osuna sued Spectrum Security Services, Inc., alleging violations of the California Labor Code. He brought five individual and class claims, and a sixth representative claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). The trial court dismissed Osuna’s class claims, sent his individual claims to arbitration, and sustained Spectrum’s demurrer to his PAGA claim without leave to amend. The court concluded that Osuna lacked standing to bring the PAGA claim because he did not suffer a Labor Code violation within the one-year statute of limitations for recovering civil penalties.The trial court’s decision was based on the interpretation that Osuna needed to have suffered a violation within the one-year period before filing his PAGA notice. Osuna appealed, arguing that he is an aggrieved employee with standing to assert a representative PAGA claim because he suffered Labor Code violations during his employment with Spectrum.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the standing requirements under PAGA. The appellate court held that to have standing under PAGA, an employee must have been employed by the alleged violator and suffered at least one Labor Code violation, regardless of whether the violation occurred within the one-year statute of limitations for recovering civil penalties. The court emphasized that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and does not affect standing.The appellate court reversed the portion of the trial court’s order sustaining Spectrum’s demurrer to Osuna’s representative PAGA claim and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Osuna v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Joshua Naranjo, filed a class action lawsuit against Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc., alleging violations of the unfair competition law (UCL) and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) due to the hospital's practice of charging an undisclosed "Evaluation and Management Services Fee" (EMS Fee) to emergency room patients. Naranjo claimed that the fee was charged without prior notification or agreement, making it an unfair, deceptive, and unlawful practice.The Superior Court of Stanislaus County sustained the hospital's demurrer to each cause of action in Naranjo's first amended complaint (FAC) without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal. Naranjo appealed, and the Court of Appeal initially reversed the judgment, finding that Naranjo had stated valid causes of action under the UCL and CLRA and for declaratory relief. The court also directed the trial court to consider any future motion by Naranjo to amend his FAC to state a breach of contract cause of action.The California Supreme Court granted review and subsequently transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal, directing it to reconsider the matter in light of its ruling in Capito v. San Jose Healthcare System, LP. In Capito, the Supreme Court held that hospitals do not have a duty under the UCL or CLRA to disclose EMS fees to emergency room patients prior to treatment beyond what is required by the statutory and regulatory scheme.Upon reconsideration, the Court of Appeal concluded that Naranjo's claims are barred to the extent they are based on an alleged duty to disclose EMS fees prior to treatment. However, the court found that Naranjo had stated a valid contract-based cause of action for declaratory relief and should be allowed to amend his FAC to state causes of action for breach of contract and violations of the UCL and CLRA, subject to specific parameters. The judgment of dismissal was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Naranjo v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former employees of Vicar Operating, Inc., filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Vicar failed to provide required meal periods as mandated by California Labor Code section 512 and IWC Wage Orders Nos. 4 and 5. Plaintiffs had signed written agreements waiving their right to a meal period for shifts between five and six hours, which they could revoke at any time. They argued that these prospective waivers allowed Vicar to circumvent statutory meal break requirements.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary adjudication in favor of Vicar, determining that the prospective meal period waivers were valid under section 512 and the wage orders. The court found that the waivers were enforceable as they were revocable and there was no evidence of coercion or unconscionability. Plaintiffs appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court examined the text of section 512 and the wage orders, as well as their legislative and administrative history. It concluded that the Legislature and IWC did not intend to prohibit prospective written waivers of meal periods for shifts between five and six hours. The court noted that the IWC had historically viewed prospective written waivers as protective for both employees and employers. The court also found that the case of Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court did not support Plaintiffs' arguments, as it did not address the timing or circumstances under which a meal period can be waived.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the prospective written waivers signed by Plaintiffs were valid and enforceable under section 512 and the applicable wage orders. View "Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating" on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against the defendants, alleging various wage and hour violations. The plaintiff sought class certification, which the trial court denied. The plaintiff's individual claims and representative claims under the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) remained pending. The plaintiff appealed the denial of class certification, arguing it was appealable under the death knell doctrine, which allows immediate appeal of orders effectively terminating class claims.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County denied the plaintiff's motion for class certification, finding issues with the numerosity of subclasses, lack of typicality, predominance of individual inquiries, manageability, and superiority of class adjudication. The court noted that the PAGA claims were not subject to class certification and remained pending. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, asserting the order was immediately appealable under the death knell doctrine.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the death knell doctrine did not apply because the PAGA claims were still pending when the notice of appeal was filed. The plaintiff's subsequent voluntary dismissal of the PAGA claims without prejudice did not retroactively make the class certification order appealable. The court held that the order denying class certification was not immediately appealable and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court emphasized that any appeal of the class certification order must await the entry of a final judgment disposing of all claims. View "Reyes v. Hi-Grade Materials Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against the City, alleging violations of the California Public Records Act (CPRA) and the California Constitution. The City maintains a website for public records requests but the Department of Water and Power (DWP) does not provide a specific method for such requests. Plaintiff, after receiving an erroneous water bill, submitted multiple records requests through the DWP website but received no response. She later posted a complaint on social media, which led to a phone call from a customer service representative but no records were provided.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the City’s demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that the CPRA does not permit class claims and that plaintiff’s individual claim was insufficient because the City provides a method for submitting CPRA requests through its main website. The court also denied the City’s motion for sanctions, finding plaintiff’s arguments were not frivolous.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with the trial court that the CPRA does not allow for class claims, as the statutory language and case law limit judicial relief to the individual who made the records request. However, the appellate court found that plaintiff’s individual claim was sufficient, as she alleged that she submitted a request for public records and the City failed to respond within the statutory period. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded with directions to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer as to the class claims and overruling the demurrer to plaintiff’s individual CPRA claim. View "Di Lauro v. City of Burbank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former employees of Vicar Operating, Inc., filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Vicar failed to provide the required meal periods as mandated by California Labor Code section 512 and IWC Wage Orders Nos. 4-2001 and 5-2001. Vicar contended that the plaintiffs had signed valid written agreements prospectively waiving their meal periods for shifts between five and six hours, which could be revoked at any time. The plaintiffs argued that such prospective waivers allowed employers to circumvent statutory meal break requirements and denied employees a meaningful opportunity to exercise their right to meal breaks.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary adjudication in favor of Vicar, determining that the prospective waivers were valid under section 512 and the wage orders. The court found that the plain language of the statute and wage orders permitted such waivers and distinguished the case from Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, which did not address the timing of meal break waivers. The court also concluded that a DLSE opinion letter cited by the plaintiffs was not applicable as it interpreted different wage order regulations.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the revocable, prospective waivers signed by the plaintiffs were enforceable in the absence of any evidence that the waivers were unconscionable or unduly coercive. The court concluded that the prospective written waiver of a 30-minute meal period for shifts between five and six hours was consistent with the text and purpose of section 512 and Wage Order Nos. 4 and 5. The court also determined that the legislative and administrative history confirmed that such waivers were consistent with the welfare of employees and that Brinker did not require a contrary result. View "Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating, Inc." on Justia Law

A debt buyer, Velocity Investments, LLC, purchased consumer debt from Citibank, N.A., which had been charged off as a loss. Velocity sent a written communication to David Chai regarding the debt but failed to include the required notice of Chai’s right to request records, as mandated by the Fair Debt Buying Practices Act. Chai filed a lawsuit individually and on behalf of a putative class, seeking statutory damages under the Act, while disclaiming any concrete injury from the violation.The Santa Clara County Superior Court certified a class of individuals who received similar communications from Velocity. Velocity moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Chai lacked standing because he admitted to no concrete injury. The trial court granted the motion, ruling that the Act requires a consumer to have suffered actual damage to sue. Chai appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the Fair Debt Buying Practices Act does not condition a consumer’s claim for statutory damages on the existence of actual damages. The court found that the Act allows consumers to seek statutory damages for violations of their rights under the Act, regardless of whether they suffered actual damages. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment, allowing Chai to pursue his claim for statutory damages. View "Chai v. Velocity Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

Nabors Corporate Services, Inc. (Nabors) performed oil well plug and abandonment work for the City of Long Beach (the City) between 2012 and 2014. The City had contracted with Tidelands Oil Production Company (Tidelands) for services on the Gerald Desmond Bridge Replacement Project, and Tidelands subcontracted the work to Nabors. The City and Tidelands had concluded that the work was not subject to prevailing wage laws, and Nabors was not informed otherwise during the bid process. After completing the work, Nabors faced a class action from its employees for unpaid prevailing wages, which led to arbitration awards and federal court judgments against Nabors.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained demurrers by the City and Tidelands, dismissing Nabors’s claims for indemnity under Labor Code sections 1781 and 1784. The court ruled that section 1784 could not be applied retroactively to Tidelands and that the arbitration awards confirmed by the federal court did not qualify as court decisions under section 1781.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the section 1784 claim against Tidelands, agreeing that the statute could not be applied retroactively. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the section 1781 claim against the City, holding that the federal court’s confirmation of arbitration awards did qualify as court decisions classifying the work as public work. The case was remanded with instructions to enter a new order overruling the City’s demurrer to the section 1781 cause of action. Nabors was awarded costs on appeal against the City, while Tidelands was awarded costs on appeal against Nabors. View "Nabors Corporate Services, Inc. v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

The Coachella Valley Water District (Water District) appealed a judgment finding that the rates it charged for Coachella Canal water violated Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The Water District argued that the rates were lawful and that no refund remedy was authorized. The court rejected both arguments, finding the rates unlawful and that a refund remedy was constitutionally mandated.In the lower court, the Superior Court of Riverside County ruled that the Water District's Canal Water rates and the Irrigation Water Availability Assessment (IWAA) violated Proposition 218. The court found that the Water District's historical priority argument was not persuasive and that the Water District had made no attempt to show that the rates complied with the California Constitution. The court deferred ruling on remedies and later awarded Class 2 customers approximately $17.5 million in refunds and interest for invalid charges from March 2018 through June 2022.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association (Howard Jarvis) had standing to challenge the Class 2 rates because domestic customers paid the rates indirectly. The court found that the Class 2 rates were taxes under Article XIII C and did not fall under any exceptions. The court rejected the Water District's arguments that the rates were justified based on historical priority and that they were expenditures of funds. The court also found that the IWAA was an assessment under Proposition 218 and that the Water District failed to show it was proportional to the benefits conferred on the properties.The court affirmed the lower court's ruling on liability and the amount of refund relief awarded. However, the court found that the injunction in the judgment was overbroad and modified the judgment to strike the paragraph enjoining the Water District from imposing any future Canal Water rates and charges that did not comply with Proposition 218. As modified, the judgment was affirmed, and Howard Jarvis was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Coachella Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law