Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

The named plaintiffs in this class action owned real property in Mallard Pointe, a residential neighborhood in Effingham County. Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products, LP has operated the Savannah River Mill nearby since 1986. Plaintiffs argued that their real property was contaminated by hydrogen sulfide gas released from the decomposition of solid waste sludge released by the mill. As a result, they have been exposed to noxious odors, their use and enjoyment of their property has been impaired, and the value of their property has diminished. Plaintiffs sued Georgia-Pacific for nuisance, trespass, and negligence. The plaintiffs sought not only to recover monetary damages for themselves, but they proposed to seek relief for a class of other nearby property owners. Georgia-Pacific appealed the certification of the class, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon the petition of Georgia-Pacific, the Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, and concluded after that review that the trial court abused its discretion when it certified the class. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals View "Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products, LP v. Ratner" on Justia Law

Diamante, LLC (Diamante) operated a private-membership golf club. There were 450 privately owned lots around the golf club and clubhouse that were located in two subdivisions. Supplemental declarations of covenants and restrictions ran with the land and created certain obligations and restrictions, called tie-in rights, that required, among other things, lot owners to become full golf members of the Diamante Country Club and to pay monthly dues to the Club. Appellees filed a declaratory judgment action asking the circuit court to declare the tie-in rights unenforceable due to Diamante's failure to collect monthly dues from all full golf members. Appellees filed a motion for class certification. The circuit court certified the class, defining the class as current owners of the 450 lots in the subdivisions with limited exclusions. Diamante appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting class certification.View "Diamante, LLC v. Dye" on Justia Law

The Clerk of the Circuit Court of the City of Fredericksburg, filed a putative class action in the federal district court against the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), alleging that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had failed to pay recordation taxes imposed by Code §§ 58.1-801 and -802. The federal court certified to the Virginia Supreme Court two questions: Under Virginia law, does a clerk of court possess statutory standing to initiate a lawsuit, in his official capacity, to enforce the real estate transfer tax; If a clerk of court does possess such authority, does Virginia law authorize him to do so as a class representative on behalf of all clerks of court throughout the Commonwealth? The court answered the first question “no” and did not address the second. The court characterized the clerk’s duties as ministerial and noted the statutory scheme for enforcement of the transfer tax.View "Small v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n" on Justia Law

A small group of landowners sought to certify a class composed of all owners of any real property interests in a twelve-mile stretch of land located adjacent to the Canadian River to litigate alleged takings claims against the State. The trial court denied certification, finding that the landowners failed to satisfy two prerequisites required by Tex. R. Civ. P. 42(a) and any one of the three Rule 42(b) requirements. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that certain conflicts identified by the trial court prevented the landowners from satisfying Rule 42(a)(4)'s adequacy-of-representation prerequisite. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion by relying on the conflicts identified in its order denying class certification to establish that the landowners failed to satisfy Rule 42(a)(4)'s adequacy-of-representation prerequisite; and (2) the court of appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's order on the same grounds.View "Riemer v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a developer, helped construct a planned development (the "community"). The community HOA sued the developers, sellers, and builders of the development, including Petitioner, on behalf of the individual homeowners, alleging construction-defect-based claims for breach of implied and express warranties and negligence. Thereafter, the community HOA filed a motion for the district court to determine that its claims satisfied the class action requirements of Nev. R. Civ. P. 23. The district court concluded that the HOA did not need to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 and thus allowed the action to proceed without conducting a class action analysis. Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus or prohibition, claiming that the district court acted arbitrarily and capriciously by refusing to undertake a class action analysis. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition to the extent that it directed the district court to analyze the Rule 23 factors in this case. In so doing, the Court clarified the application of D.R. Horton v. District Court when a homeowners' association seeks to litigate construction-defect claims on behalf of its members under Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3102(1)(d).View "Beazer Homes Holding Corp. v. Dist. Court " on Justia Law

This appeal was the third in the course of this litigation. Plaintiffs were a group of landowners with properties on the shores of Flathead Lake and a portion of the upper Flathead River. Plaintiffs commenced this action in 1999 against Montana Power Company (MPC) and MPC's successor, PPL Montana, LLC, asserting claims of trespass, nuisance, a taking of property, and breach of easements. In Mattson II, Plaintiffs filed motions to certify the lawsuit as a class action. The district court granted the motions as to both Defendants. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's orders concerning class certification. On remand, the district court denied Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in its application of Mattson II to the class-certification question under Mont. R. Civ. P. 23; and (2) the six criteria for certification of a class action under Rule 23 were satisfied in this case. Remanded with instructions to certify the class. View "Mattson v. Mont. Power Co." on Justia Law

Diana Albrecht brought a class-action lawsuit against Alaska Trustee, LLC, on behalf of a group of Alaska homeowners who had faced foreclosure on their homes. Alaska Trustee, acting as foreclosure trustee, had provided Albrecht and the other homeowners reinstatement quotes that included the costs of foreclosure. Albrecht maintained that the inclusion of foreclosure costs in her reinstatement quote violated her right to cure under a former version of AS 34.20.070(b), the non-judicial foreclosure statute, which provided that a homeowner’s "default may be cured by payment of the sum in default other than the principal that would not then be due if no default had occurred, plus attorney fees or court costs actually incurred by the trustee due to the default." According to Albrecht, Alaska Trustee's inclusion of foreclosure costs in addition to "attorney's fees or court costs" constituted a violation of not only the non-judicial foreclosure statute but also Alaska’s Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA). The superior court concluded that Albrecht lacked standing to sue and denied her motion for class certification. The superior court further ruled that Alaska Trustee's practice of including various fees and charges as foreclosure costs was permitted under the statute. The superior court awarded attorney's fees to Alaska Trustee as the prevailing party, enhancing those fees under AS 45.50.537(b) on the ground that Albrecht's claims were frivolous. Because the inclusion of foreclosure costs in a reinstatement quote did not violate AS 34.20.070, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court in most respects. But because the Court concluded that Albrecht’s claims were not frivolous and attorney's fees could not be awarded under Rule 82 for time spent litigating the structure of a class action, the Court remanded for recalculation of fees awarded. View "Albrecht v. Alaska Trustee, LLC" on Justia Law