Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

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The case involves a class action lawsuit filed by transgender women prisoners in Illinois, who allege that the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) has been deliberately indifferent to their gender dysphoria, a serious medical condition. The plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to ensure timely evaluations and treatments, including hormone therapy, gender-affirming surgery, and appropriate support for social transitioning.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois initially issued a preliminary injunction on February 7, 2022, which was intended to address the plaintiffs' claims. The court later issued further injunctions to supplement and modify the terms. However, more than a year and a half after the preliminary injunction was issued, the district court retroactively labeled it as a permanent injunction and issued a final judgment consistent with the February 7, 2022 decision. The defendants appealed several injunctions and a finding of civil contempt by the district court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court's attempt to retroactively transform the preliminary injunction into a permanent one was not authorized. The appellate court held that under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the preliminary injunction issued on February 7, 2022, expired 90 days later, on May 8, 2022. Consequently, the appellate court vacated all existing injunctions and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court also dismissed the portion of the appeal challenging the finding of contempt, as the district court had not yet imposed any sanctions, which are necessary to establish appellate jurisdiction. View "Monroe v. Bowman" on Justia Law

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The City of Rittman filed an original action in prohibition against Judge Corey E. Spitler of the Wayne County Common Pleas Court. Rittman sought to prevent Judge Spitler from exercising jurisdiction over a class-action lawsuit in which Rittman was named as a defendant. The lawsuit, filed by Tara Boler and Trista Bise, alleged that Rittman had illegally collected a 0.5 percent income tax increase beyond its authorized period and sought refunds for the overcharged taxes from 2008 to 2022.In the Wayne County Common Pleas Court, Judge Spitler denied Rittman’s motion to dismiss and motion to stay discovery, and he established a case-management schedule. Rittman then sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Ohio to stop Judge Spitler from proceeding with the case, arguing that the lawsuit was an impermissible attempt to bypass the statutory process for obtaining tax refunds.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that Judge Spitler had jurisdiction and statutory authority under R.C. 2723.01 to hear the case. The court found that the plaintiffs' claims were substantively governed by R.C. 2723.01, which allows common pleas courts to enjoin the illegal levy or collection of taxes and entertain actions to recover them when collected. The court concluded that although the plaintiffs did not explicitly invoke R.C. 2723, their claims fit within its scope. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied the writ of prohibition, allowing Judge Spitler to continue exercising jurisdiction over the underlying case. View "State ex rel. Rittman v. Spitler" on Justia Law

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A group of car owners from ten states sued Nissan, alleging that certain models equipped with automatic electronic braking systems had a defect causing "phantom activations" at inappropriate times, such as at railroad crossings or in parking garages. The plaintiffs claimed this defect breached warranties, constituted fraud, violated consumer protection statutes, and unjustly enriched Nissan. They sought to certify ten statewide classes of owners or lessees of the affected models.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee certified the ten classes under Civil Rule 23(b)(3), finding that the plaintiffs had demonstrated common questions of law or fact. Nissan appealed, arguing that the classes did not meet the requirements for certification, particularly due to differences in the software updates that had been applied to the braking systems over time.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court had not conducted a rigorous analysis of the commonality requirement. The appellate court noted that the district court failed to consider the material differences in the software updates and how these differences might affect the existence of a common defect. Additionally, the district court did not analyze the elements of each state law claim to determine whether they could be resolved with common answers.The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's certification of the classes and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court emphasized the need for a detailed examination of the elements of each claim and the impact of the software updates on the alleged defect. The court also held that the district court must perform a Daubert analysis to ensure the reliability of the plaintiffs' expert testimony, which was critical to establishing the commonality of the defect across the different models and software versions. View "IN RE: NISSAN NORTH AMERICA,INC. LITIGATION" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute over the interpretation of a statutory provision requiring the Executive Office of Housing and Livable Communities (HLC) to provide immediate temporary emergency shelter to families who appear to be eligible based on their statements and information already in the agency's possession. The plaintiffs, representing a class of individuals, argued that HLC's requirement for third-party verification of identity, familial relationship, and Massachusetts residency at the time of initial application for emergency assistance shelter was contrary to the statutory language.The Superior Court judge ruled that HLC could not require third-party verification of Massachusetts residency but could require verification of family status and identity, except for pregnant women. Both parties appealed this decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and concluded that the plain language of the statutory provision did not permit HLC to require third-party verification at the time of initial application. The court emphasized that the statute mandates immediate provision of shelter based on the family's statements and information in HLC's possession, without delay. The court found that the requirement for third-party verification at the initial application stage would contradict the statute's intent to provide immediate temporary shelter to those in need.The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the Superior Court's judgment to the extent it allowed HLC to require third-party verifications before providing shelter under the immediate placement proviso. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "Garcia v. Executive Office of Housing and Livable Communities" on Justia Law

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In April 2013, Michael Riste applied for a bail bond for his son, Michael Peterson, and signed an Indemnity Agreement and a Premium Agreement with Bad Boys Bail Bonds (Bail Agent). The agreements required Riste to pay a $10,000 premium in installments. Peterson signed identical documents after his release. The Bail Agent executed a $100,000 bail bond on behalf of The North River Insurance Company (Surety), ensuring Peterson's appearance at future court proceedings. Peterson failed to appear, leading to the forfeiture of the bail bond and a summary judgment against the Surety in October 2015.Two panels of the California Court of Appeal previously affirmed the denial of motions by the Surety and Bail Agent to set aside the summary judgment, vacate the forfeiture, and exonerate the bond. In October 2020, a class action cross-claim in Caldwell v. BBBB Bonding Corp. argued that the Bail Agent's premium financing agreements were subject to Civil Code section 1799.91 and were unenforceable without proper notice to cosigners. The trial court and the Court of Appeal agreed, enjoining the Bail Agent from enforcing such agreements without the requisite notice.In September 2022, the Surety and Bail Agent filed a third motion to set aside the summary judgment, citing Caldwell and arguing that the premium was part of the consideration for the bail bond, making the bond void. The trial court denied the motion, and the Surety and Bail Agent appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court's order. The court held that the bail bond was not void because the consideration for the bail bond was Peterson's release from custody, not the premium financing agreement. The court concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction over the bond and properly denied the motion to set aside the summary judgment, vacate the forfeiture, and exonerate the bond. View "People v. North River Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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Yolanda Bell obtained an automobile insurance policy from Shelter General Insurance Company. In February 2018, her vehicle was damaged, and Shelter determined it was a total loss, paying her $11,787 after deductions. Bell filed a class action suit in February 2022, alleging that Shelter breached its contractual duties by not including taxes and fees required to acquire a replacement vehicle in its payment. Bell argued that the policy did not require her to replace the vehicle before being reimbursed for these costs.The Circuit Court of Jackson County dismissed Bell's petition without prejudice, agreeing with Shelter's argument that the policy only covered taxes and fees if they were actually incurred by purchasing a replacement vehicle. Bell appealed the decision, standing on her original petition rather than amending it.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case de novo. The court found that Bell's petition adequately pleaded a breach of contract claim by alleging the existence of the insurance policy, her performance under the policy, Shelter's failure to pay the required taxes and fees, and the resulting damages. The court emphasized that the interpretation of the policy's terms was a matter for summary judgment or trial, not for a motion to dismiss. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bell vs. Shelter General Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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Shymikka Griggs filed a data-breach action against NHS Management, LLC, a consulting firm providing management services for nursing homes and physical-rehabilitation facilities. NHS collects sensitive personal and health information from employees, patients, and vendors. In May 2021, NHS discovered a cyberattack on its network, which lasted 80 days. NHS notified affected individuals, including Griggs, in March 2022. Griggs, a former NHS employee, claimed her personal information was found on the dark web, leading to credit issues, spam communications, and fraudulent activities.Griggs initially filed a class-action complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama but later dismissed it. She then filed a class-action complaint in the Jefferson Circuit Court in June 2023, alleging negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, invasion of privacy, unjust enrichment, breach of confidence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act. NHS moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed Griggs's complaint with prejudice.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The court held that Griggs failed to sufficiently plead her claims. Specifically, she did not demonstrate that NHS owed her a duty under Alabama law, failed to establish proximate cause for her negligence per se claim, did not allege intentional conduct for her invasion-of-privacy claim, and did not show that she conferred a benefit on NHS for her unjust-enrichment claim. Additionally, the court found that breach of confidence is not a recognized cause of action in Alabama and that Griggs did not establish a fiduciary relationship between her and NHS. View "Griggs v. NHS Management, LLC" on Justia Law

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The case involves a class action lawsuit brought by Jacklin Romeo, Susan S. Rine, and Debra Snyder Miller against Antero Resources Corporation. The plaintiffs, who own oil and gas interests in Harrison County, West Virginia, allege that Antero breached the terms of their leases by failing to pay the full one-eighth royalty specified in the leases. They argue that Antero improperly deducted postproduction costs from the gross sale proceeds of the gas, contrary to West Virginia Supreme Court precedents in Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc. and Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, L.L.C.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, which is handling the case, certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The first question asked whether the requirements of Wellman and Estate of Tawney extend only to the "first available market" as opposed to the "point of sale" when the duty to market is implicated. The second question asked whether the marketable product rule extends beyond gas to require a lessee to pay royalties on natural gas liquids (NGLs) and, if so, whether the lessors share in the cost of processing, manufacturing, and transporting the NGLs to sale.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia answered the first question in the negative, holding that the requirements of Wellman and Estate of Tawney extend to the point of sale, not just to the first available market. The court reaffirmed that the lessee must bear all costs incurred in exploring for, producing, marketing, and transporting the product to the point of sale unless the lease provides otherwise.For the second question, the court held that the marketable product rule extends beyond gas to require a lessee to pay royalties on NGLs. However, the court also held that absent express language in the lease to the contrary, the lessors do not share in the cost of processing, manufacturing, and transporting residue gas and NGLs to the point of sale. View "Jacklin Romeo, Susan S. Rine, and Debra Snyder Miller v. Antero Resources Corporation" on Justia Law

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Local Puerto Rico merchants brought unfair competition claims against major big-box retailers, alleging that during the COVID-19 pandemic, Costco Wholesale Corp. and Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc. violated executive orders limiting sales to essential goods. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants continued to sell non-essential items, capturing sales that would have otherwise gone to local retailers, and sought damages for lost sales during the 72-day period the orders were in effect.The case was initially filed as a putative class action in Puerto Rico's Court of First Instance. Costco removed the case to federal district court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The district court denied Costco's motion to sever the claims against it and also denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to state court. The district court dismissed most of the plaintiffs' claims but allowed the unfair competition claim to proceed. However, it later denied class certification and granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that the executive orders did not create an enforceable duty on the part of Costco and Wal-Mart.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case on jurisdictional grounds. The court held that CAFA jurisdiction is not lost when a district court denies class certification. It also held that CAFA's "home state" exception did not apply because Costco, a non-local defendant, was a primary defendant. However, the court found that CAFA's "local controversy" exception applied because the conduct of Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, a local defendant, formed a significant basis for the claims. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Costco's motion to sever and determined that the entire case should be remanded to the Puerto Rico courts. The court reversed the district court's denial of the motion to remand, vacated the judgment on the merits for lack of jurisdiction, and instructed the district court to remand the case to the Puerto Rico courts. View "Kress Stores of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2017, CNU of Alabama, LLC, and Shakeena Cox entered into a loan agreement allowing Cox to take cash advances. Cox took three advances totaling $1,250 but later defaulted. CNU assigned its rights to UHG I LLC, which then sued Cox in Mobile District Court. Cox argued the agreement, including an arbitration provision, was void under the Alabama Small Loan Act. The district court agreed and ruled in Cox's favor.UHG appealed to the Mobile Circuit Court, where Cox filed a counterclaim on behalf of herself and a class, adding CNU as a party and seeking injunctive relief and damages. Both companies moved to compel arbitration based on the agreement's arbitration provision. The circuit court denied the motions, holding that the agreement and arbitration provision were void under the Small Loan Act, the arbitration provision was unconscionable, and UHG had waived its right to arbitrate by appealing the district court's decision. UHG and CNU appealed.The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the circuit court's decision denying the motions to compel arbitration for Cox's counterclaim, holding that the arbitration provision was valid and enforceable. The court determined that challenges to the agreement's validity, including claims of voidness and unconscionability, were for an arbitrator to decide. However, the court affirmed the circuit court's decision that UHG waived its right to arbitrate its initial collection claim by pursuing it in court. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "CNU of Alabama, LLC v. Cox" on Justia Law