Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Simon Soto, a Marine Corps veteran, served from 2000 to 2006 and was medically retired due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In 2016, Soto applied for combat-related special compensation (CRSC) and was approved, but his retroactive compensation was limited to six years due to the Barring Act's limitations period. Soto filed a class-action lawsuit arguing that the CRSC statute should displace the Barring Act's limitations period.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of Soto and the class, holding that the CRSC statute provides its own settlement mechanism, thus displacing the Barring Act. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed this decision, stating that the CRSC statute does not explicitly grant settlement authority and therefore cannot displace the Barring Act.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the CRSC statute does confer authority to settle CRSC claims, thereby displacing the Barring Act’s settlement procedures and limitations period. The Court reasoned that the CRSC statute authorizes the Secretary concerned to determine both the validity of CRSC claims and the amount due, creating a comprehensive compensation scheme. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Soto v. United States" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit brought by Jacklin Romeo, Susan S. Rine, and Debra Snyder Miller against Antero Resources Corporation. The plaintiffs, who own oil and gas interests in Harrison County, West Virginia, allege that Antero breached the terms of their leases by failing to pay the full one-eighth royalty specified in the leases. They argue that Antero improperly deducted postproduction costs from the gross sale proceeds of the gas, contrary to West Virginia Supreme Court precedents in Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc. and Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, L.L.C.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, presided over by Chief Judge Thomas S. Kleeh, certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The first question asked whether the requirements of Wellman and Estate of Tawney extend only to the "first available market" as opposed to the "point of sale" when the duty to market is implicated. The second question asked whether the marketable product rule extends beyond gas to require a lessee to pay royalties on natural gas liquids (NGLs) and, if so, whether lessors share in the cost of processing, manufacturing, and transporting the NGLs to sale.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reaffirmed its previous rulings in Wellman and Estate of Tawney, holding that the requirements extend to the point of sale, not just to the first available market. The court also held that royalties are payable on NGLs, but absent express language in the lease, lessors do not share in the costs of processing, manufacturing, and transporting residue gas and NGLs to the point of sale. The court emphasized that any deductions for postproduction costs must be clearly and unambiguously stated in the lease agreements. View "Romeo v. Antero Resources Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves Elaine Neidig, who had three mammograms at Valley Health System's Winchester Medical Center between 2016 and 2019. In 2019, the FDA found that some mammograms performed at the facility had serious image quality deficiencies. Neidig received a notification from Valley Health about these issues and subsequently filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Valley Health misrepresented the quality of its mammography services. She claimed that the mammograms were worthless and sought economic damages, including statutory damages for consumer protection violations, compensatory damages, and contract damages. Neidig did not claim any physical or emotional injury.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia dismissed Neidig's complaint, ruling that her claims fell under the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA) and were barred by the MPLA’s statute of limitations. The court found that the MPLA applied because the claims were related to health care services, despite Neidig's argument that her claims were purely economic and not based on physical or emotional injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, asking whether the MPLA applies to claims where the plaintiff disclaims any form of physical or emotional injury. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reformulated the question to ask whether the MPLA applies when the plaintiff claims only economic damages and disclaims all liability based on physical injury, emotional injury, or death.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the MPLA does not apply to a suit against a health care provider or health care facility when the plaintiff claims only economic damages and disclaims all liability based on physical injury, emotional injury, or death. The court emphasized that the MPLA requires a predicate claim arising from the death or injury of a person, and since Neidig's claims were solely for economic damages, the MPLA did not apply. View "Neidig v. Valley Health System" on Justia Law

In 2008, a class action was filed against officials from the City of Tenaha and Shelby County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs claimed that the officials had an illegal practice of targeting and seizing property from racial or ethnic minorities. A settlement agreement, including a consent decree, was reached, requiring the defendants to follow specific procedures to prevent future illegal stops. The decree also included a court-appointed monitor to ensure compliance. The consent decree was initially entered in 2013, amended in 2019, and expired in July 2020. Plaintiffs' motion to extend the decree was denied, and the County Defendants settled, leaving only the City Defendants in the case.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas handled the case, where class counsel filed four motions for attorney fees. The first three motions were granted, totaling $324,773.90. The fourth motion requested $88,553.33 for fees from April to December 2020. Initially denied as untimely, the decision was vacated and remanded by the appellate court. On reconsideration, the district court awarded $16,020, reducing the hourly rates and the hours deemed reasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court failed to provide class-wide notice of the attorney-fee motion as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h). This failure deprived class members of the opportunity to object to the fee motion. The appellate court held that the district court abused its discretion by not enforcing the notice requirement and vacated the fee award, remanding the case for further proceedings to ensure compliance with Rule 23(h). View "Morrow v. Jones" on Justia Law

The case involves a putative class action filed by Christine Pino on behalf of herself and others against Grant Cardone and his associated entities, alleging violations of the Securities Act of 1933. Pino claims that Cardone made misleading statements and omissions on social media about the internal rate of return (IRR) and distribution projections for real estate investment funds, and misstated material facts regarding the funds' debt obligations.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially dismissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that Cardone and his entities were not "sellers" under § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act and that the statements in question were not actionable. Pino appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that Cardone and his entities could be considered statutory sellers and that some of the statements were actionable. The case was remanded for further proceedings.Upon remand, Pino filed a second amended complaint, and the district court again dismissed the claims without leave to amend, holding that Pino had waived subjective falsity by disclaiming fraud and failed to plausibly allege subjective and objective falsity. The court also found that the omission of the SEC letter did not support a claim and that the debt obligation statement was not material.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Pino did not waive subjective falsity by disclaiming fraud and sufficiently alleged that Cardone subjectively disbelieved his IRR and distribution projections, which were also objectively untrue. The court also held that Pino stated a material omission claim under § 12(a)(2) by alleging that Cardone failed to disclose the SEC letter. Additionally, the court found that Pino sufficiently alleged that Cardone misstated material facts regarding the funds' debt obligations, which could be considered material to a reasonable investor. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and allowed the claims to proceed. View "PINO V. CARDONE CAPITAL, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit filed by Albert Pickett, Jr., Keyonna Johnson, Jarome Montgomery, Odessa Parks, and Tiniya Shepherd against the City of Cleveland. The plaintiffs, all African American residents of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, allege that Cleveland Water's policy of placing water liens on properties for unpaid water bills disproportionately affects Black homeowners. The water liens, which accumulate penalties and interest, can lead to foreclosure and eviction. The plaintiffs claim that this policy violates the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Ohio Civil Rights Act (OCRA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, creating the "Water Lien Class" under Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class includes all Black homeowners or residents in Cuyahoga County who have had a water lien placed on their property by Cleveland Water within the last two years. The district court found that the plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a) and that common questions of law and fact predominated over individual issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's certification order. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue their FHA claim on a disparate-impact theory. The court found that the common question of whether Cleveland's water lien policy disproportionately affects Black homeowners predominated over individual issues, satisfying Rule 23(b)(3). The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(2) for injunctive and declaratory relief. The appellate court declined to address the merits of the plaintiffs' FHA claim, focusing solely on the class certification issues. View "Pickett v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Carvin Thomas and Terrell Lawrence, filed a class-action lawsuit against members of the Tennessee Board of Parole, alleging that the use of a computer test, STRONG-R, to determine parole eligibility violated their constitutional right to due process. They claimed that the test produced inaccurate results due to inadequate training of correctional employees and that the results were kept secret, preventing inmates from challenging them effectively. Both plaintiffs experienced changes in their STRONG-R scores without any new negative behavior, leading to parole denials based on these scores.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed the complaint, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim for relief. The court found that Tennessee’s parole statutes do not confer a protected liberty interest in parole, as they do not create a legitimate expectation of parole.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Tennessee’s parole statutes do not sufficiently constrain the Board’s discretion to deny parole, thus not creating a constitutionally recognized entitlement to parole. The court noted that while the plaintiffs identified serious issues with the STRONG-R test, the lack of a protected liberty interest in parole precluded their due process claims. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint. View "Thomas v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

In 2018, Marriott announced a data breach affecting the guest reservation database of Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, which Marriott had acquired in 2016. The breach exposed personal information of approximately 133.7 million guests, including some payment card information. Plaintiffs filed class action lawsuits against Marriott and Accenture, a third-party IT service provider for Starwood and Marriott during the breach. The cases were consolidated for pretrial proceedings in the District of Maryland.The district court initially certified multiple state-specific damages classes against Marriott and issue classes against both Marriott and Accenture. However, the court did not address the effect of a class-action waiver in the Starwood Preferred Guest Program (SPG) contract, which Marriott argued precluded class certification. The Fourth Circuit vacated the class certification, instructing the district court to consider the class-action waiver's impact.On remand, the district court again certified the classes, holding that Marriott had waived its right to enforce the class-action waiver by participating in multidistrict litigation (MDL) and by agreeing to pretrial proceedings in Maryland, contrary to the SPG contract's venue and choice-of-law provisions. The court also suggested that the class-action waiver might be unenforceable under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that Marriott did not waive its right to enforce the class-action waiver and that the waiver was valid and enforceable. The court found that the waiver applied to the plaintiffs' claims, including consumer protection and negligence claims, as they were related to the SPG Program. Consequently, the court reversed the certification of all classes against Marriott and the issue classes against Accenture, as the latter were justified only in combination with the Marriott damages classes. View "Maldini v. Marriott International, Incorporated" on Justia Law

San Francisco operates a combined sewer system that collects and treats both wastewater and stormwater. In 1996, California voters approved Proposition 218, which added provisions to the California Constitution requiring voter approval for property-related charges, except for "sewer, water, and refuse collection services." Plaintiffs Robert Gluck and Adam Hertz filed a class action against the City and County of San Francisco, challenging the constitutionality of the City's sewer charges related to stormwater services. They argued that stormwater services funded by the City's sewer charges were not "sewer" services covered by the exception to Proposition 218's voter approval requirement and that the charges failed the proportionality requirement.The trial court sustained the City's demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that the City's combined sewer system provides "sewer" services falling within the voter approval exception of article XIII D, section 6(c). The court also found that the plaintiffs' fourth cause of action failed because it was based on the premise that stormwater management is not a "sewer service."The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment regarding the first three causes of action, agreeing that the City's combined sewer system provides "sewer" services exempt from the voter approval requirement. However, the court reversed the judgment regarding the fourth and fifth causes of action, concluding that the City did not establish that the plaintiffs' allegations regarding the City's reliance on wastewater factors to support charges for stormwater services were insufficient as a matter of law to establish a violation of the proportionality requirement of article XIII D, section 6(b)(3). The case was remanded for further proceedings on these claims. View "Gluck v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Towers Watson & Co. (Towers Watson) was insured under a directors and officers (D&O) liability policy by National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (National Union) and had excess coverage from other insurers. Following a merger with Willis Group Holdings plc (Willis), Towers Watson shareholders filed class actions alleging that the merger consideration was inadequate due to a conflict of interest involving Towers Watson’s CEO. The shareholders settled for $90 million, and Towers Watson sought indemnity coverage under the D&O policy. The insurers denied coverage, citing the policy’s “bump-up exclusion,” which excludes coverage for settlements that effectively increase the consideration paid for an acquisition.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia initially granted summary judgment in favor of Towers Watson, finding that the merger did not involve an acquisition within the meaning of the bump-up exclusion. The insurers appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded, clarifying that the merger did involve an acquisition. On remand, the district court held that the bump-up exclusion applied, barring indemnity coverage for the settlement, and granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the settlements represented an effective increase in the consideration paid for the merger, thus triggering the bump-up exclusion. The court also upheld the district court’s application of the common fund doctrine, concluding that the entire settlement amount, including the portion allocated to attorneys’ fees, fell within the exclusion. Consequently, Towers Watson was not entitled to indemnity coverage under the D&O policy. View "Towers Watson & Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law