Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

A train carrying hazardous chemicals derailed in East Palestine, Ohio, resulting in a release of dangerous substances into the environment. This incident led to a class-action lawsuit involving nearly half a million residents. After extensive environmental testing and expert analysis, both sides reached a settlement to avoid prolonged litigation. The settlement established a $600 million fund, allowing residents to receive direct payments and, if desired, additional compensation for waiving personal injury claims. Those with extraordinary losses or injuries could submit claims for further individualized consideration.Prior to this appeal, some objectors challenged the settlement, asserting that class counsel should have reviewed and disclosed more expert evidence regarding long-term risks. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, after a fairness hearing, approved the settlement and rejected these objections. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed that approval, citing the adequacy and fairness of the settlement process and the sufficiency of the evidence considered.A small group of residents who had waived personal injury claims subsequently sought relief from the settlement, alleging fraud and misconduct by class counsel and Norfolk Southern. The Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of relief under Rule 60 for abuse of discretion. The court held that the movants failed to demonstrate fraud on the court, fraud by an opposing party, or extraordinary circumstances warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(3), 60(d)(3), or 60(b)(6). The court further concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing. The main holding is that the settlement approval stands and the movants are not entitled to relief from judgment. The disposition by the Sixth Circuit is affirmed. View "In re: E. Palestine Train Derailment" on Justia Law

Five individuals, who were either peaceful protesters or independent journalists, attended demonstrations at the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement facility in Portland, Oregon. During these events, they were exposed to tear gas and pepper balls used by federal agents to disperse crowds. The protests involved both peaceful activities and significant unrest, including vandalism, blocking entrances, and attacks on law enforcement. The plaintiffs claimed that federal agents specifically targeted them in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon against federal officials and the Department of Homeland Security. After discovery and an evidentiary hearing, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction restricting the use of non-lethal munitions to situations involving an imminent threat of physical harm, prohibiting their use on certain parts of the body, imposing limits on pepper spray, and requiring redesign of agent uniforms for better identification. Additionally, the District Court provisionally certified a class of all individuals who had protested or reported on DHS activities at the Portland ICE facility. The government’s motion to stay the injunction pending appeal was denied by the District Court but granted by the Ninth Circuit.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated both the preliminary injunction and the provisional class certification. The court held that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment retaliation claim, as law enforcement may use non-lethal force to clear crowds and restore order without facing an imminent threat of physical harm. The record did not support claims of an unwritten policy or intent to retaliate against First Amendment activity. The court also found the injunction overbroad and unworkable, and the class failed to meet Rule 23’s commonality and indivisible remedy requirements. The preliminary injunction and class certification were vacated. View "DICKINSON V. TRUMP" on Justia Law

Five individuals who participated as peaceful protesters and independent journalists at demonstrations outside the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facility in Portland, Oregon, alleged that federal law enforcement officers targeted them with non-lethal crowd-control munitions such as tear gas and pepper balls. The plaintiffs claimed this was retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights. The protests, which occurred between June 2025 and February 2026, often involved both peaceful dissent and significant unrest, including vandalism, trespassing, and obstruction of law enforcement. The plaintiffs were exposed to crowd-control devices during these protests, frequently while in proximity to unlawful activity.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting federal officers from using non-lethal munitions except against individuals posing an imminent threat of physical harm, and ordered that agents’ uniforms be redesigned with conspicuous identifying markings. The district court also certified a provisional class encompassing all individuals who had protested or reported on DHS activities at the Portland ICE facility since June 2025, and denied the government’s motion to stay the injunction pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s orders. The Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and provisional class certification, holding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on their First Amendment claim. The court found no evidence of an unwritten policy or pattern of retaliation by DHS and held that law enforcement may use non-lethal force to clear crowds and restore order without waiting for an imminent threat of physical harm. The injunction was found to be overbroad, improperly granting relief to non-parties, and unworkable. The class certification was vacated for lack of commonality and failure to satisfy Rule 23(b)(2)’s indivisible-remedy requirement. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Apria Healthcare provides home healthcare products and services, employing delivery drivers through third-party agencies and licensed vocational nurses directly. Travis Smith and Uriel Arauz, both former employees, commenced a class action against Apria in Sutter County Superior Court alleging wage and hour violations on behalf of similarly situated employees. Proposed interveners Angela Tisdale and Terrance Pratt are former delivery drivers and named plaintiffs in a separate, related federal action against Apria for similar wage and hour claims, covering delivery drivers hired after the class certification date in another Los Angeles County action.The Sutter County Superior Court preliminarily approved a settlement in the Smith action, which conditionally certified a class and found the settlement fair. Tisdale and Pratt, concerned about a collusive “reverse auction” settlement that might undermine the rights of putative class members in their federal action, filed an ex parte application to intervene in the Smith action after the court’s preliminary approval and class notice. Their application was supported by evidence of their early awareness and concern over the settlement process, but was filed several months after those concerns were first raised.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the trial court’s denial of the intervention application. The appellate court held that Tisdale and Pratt’s application was untimely, noting that they knew or should have known of risks to their interests well before filing, and their delay prejudiced the settlement process and the original parties. The court affirmed the trial court’s order denying intervention, concluding that the untimeliness of the application defeated both mandatory and permissive intervention. Respondents were awarded costs on appeal. View "Smith v. Apria Healthcare" on Justia Law

Several Medicaid enrollees in Florida, whose benefits were terminated due to income-based eligibility determinations, challenged the adequacy of the notices they received from the state. These notices, generated by Florida’s Department of Children and Families (DCF), typically stated that Medicaid benefits would end because “household income is too high,” but did not include essential individualized information such as the household size used, the countable income figure, the income threshold applied, or the specific Medicaid eligibility category considered. In some cases, the notices also included contradictory or confusing information about which household members were affected. Many recipients later learned that their coverage had been terminated or restored in error, but the notices did not provide enough detail for them to understand or contest the agency’s decisions.The case was brought as a class action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, focusing on whether the notices met the requirements of due process. After a bench trial, the district court found that the written notices were confusing, lacked sufficient individualized detail to explain the state’s decisions, and failed to enable recipients to understand or meaningfully challenge their benefit terminations. The court also found that other sources of information available to recipients, such as call centers or online resources, did not cure these deficiencies. The district court issued a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction, requiring Florida to provide clear and case-specific information in future notices before terminating Medicaid benefits for income ineligibility.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Florida’s notice system, considered as a whole, did not satisfy due process because it was not reasonably calculated to adequately inform recipients of the reasons for benefit termination or enable them to decide whether to contest the action. View "Chianne D. v. Secretary, Florida Agency for Health Care Administ" on Justia Law

The dispute arose after the United States constructed navigation structures in the Catahoula Basin, raising water levels and affecting property in the area. Landowners in the basin, divided into Lake Plaintiffs and Swamp Plaintiffs, brought a class action against the State of Louisiana, alleging unlawful expropriation of their land and seeking damages, a declaration of ownership, and recovery of mineral royalties. The central factual issue was how to classify the Catahoula Basin: the Lake Plaintiffs argued it was part of the Little River’s banks, entitling them to ownership, while the State argued it was a lake owned by the state.After a bench trial in the Ninth Judicial District Court, the court found in favor of the plaintiffs, recognizing the Lake and Swamp Plaintiffs as owners of the disputed lands, awarding damages for inverse condemnation, and granting attorney fees. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, affirmed most of the judgment but shifted the attorney fee burden entirely to the plaintiffs’ common fund. The Louisiana Supreme Court then held that plaintiffs’ compensation claims had prescribed, reversing the damages awards but leaving the attorney fee issue unresolved. When the trial court subsequently recalculated attorney fees using the lodestar method, the appellate court increased the award by applying a fourfold multiplier, finding the initial fee too low given the case’s complexity and duration.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the attorney fee award and found that while a multiplier was warranted due to the exceptional duration, risk, and complexity of the litigation, the appellate court’s fourfold multiplier was excessive given the high hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation. The court reduced the multiplier to three, setting the attorney fee at $16,713,656.20, and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment as amended. The matter was remanded for the trial court to determine appropriate reserves and payment arrangements. View "CROOKS VS. STATE" on Justia Law

A group of DirecTV subscribers, both residential and commercial, brought a class action lawsuit alleging that the National Football League (NFL) and its member teams engaged in anticompetitive conduct. The subscribers claimed that the NFL’s interlocking agreements—including pooling telecast rights, exclusive distribution through DirecTV, and arrangements with networks—suppressed competition for out-of-market NFL games. These agreements allegedly forced subscribers to pay inflated prices for the “Sunday Ticket” package, which bundled NFL games not otherwise available in their local markets.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially allowed the case to proceed, certifying classes and admitting expert testimony by the plaintiffs’ economists. After trial, a jury found the NFL liable on antitrust grounds and awarded substantial damages to the subscribers. However, the district court later excluded the plaintiffs’ expert testimony, finding it unreliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the NFL. In the alternative, the district court conditionally ordered a new trial on damages, concluding the jury’s damages calculation was not supported by the evidence and was improperly derived.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the plaintiffs’ expert testimony, ruling that while experts’ methods and opinions may be impeachable, such disputes are for the jury to resolve unless the methods are fundamentally unreliable or speculative. However, the appellate court agreed that a new trial on damages was warranted because the jury’s award was based on an improper calculation method. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment as a matter of law, affirmed the order granting a new trial on damages, remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury’s liability verdict, and directed a new trial limited to the issue of damages. View "NINTH INNING INC. V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, INC." on Justia Law

The plaintiff worked as a cleanup worker in Pascagoula, Mississippi, following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, allegedly exposed to crude oil and chemical dispersants through inhalation and direct contact. He claimed this exposure caused a chronic worsening of his preexisting asthma. The plaintiff sued BP Exploration & Production, Inc. and BP America Production Company under the Back-End Litigation Option (BELO) of the Medical Settlement Agreement related to the Deepwater Horizon class-action litigation. The parties stipulated to venue in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.The litigation required the plaintiff to prove that his injuries were legally caused by exposure to oil spill-related substances. He proffered two experts, Dr. Michael Freeman and Dr. Shawn French, to establish causation. BP moved to exclude their testimony and for summary judgment. The district court denied the plaintiff’s request for an evidentiary hearing, excluded the expert testimony, and granted summary judgment in favor of BP, finding that the expert evidence was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to causation. The plaintiff timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that toxic tort causation standards, requiring expert testimony to establish both general and specific causation, apply under maritime law for BELO claims involving non-readily observable injuries with multiple possible etiologies. The Fifth Circuit found the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the plaintiff’s experts, both for lack of reliability and relevance under Rule 702 and Daubert, and for deficiencies in qualifications and methodology. The district court’s grant of summary judgment was affirmed. View "Dufour v. BP Exploration & Production" on Justia Law

James Bien worked as a conductor for Union Pacific Railroad Company. In 2013, he failed two vision tests required for his job and was subsequently removed from his conductor position, receiving a work restriction that prevented him from performing duties requiring color signal recognition. After several months, he was employed by Union Pacific in a different, lower-paying role. In 2015, following a notification from the company, Bien took another vision test, which he passed. He then requested a follow-up test to potentially remove his work restriction and be reinstated as a conductor. Union Pacific denied this request, determining that his prior test failures were dispositive and that the new test had been administered in error. Bien filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC in April 2020 and later brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in January 2025.Prior to Bien's lawsuit, a class action had been filed in the District of Nebraska, Harris v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, challenging similar employment actions by Union Pacific. The initial class definition was broad, but the court later certified a narrower class. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas concluded that Bien fell within the original class definition but not the certified, narrower one, reasoning that his 2015 testing and related correspondence did not constitute a “fitness-for-duty examination” under the certified class. As a result, the district court held that the statute of limitations barred Bien’s claim and dismissed his case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and reversed the district court’s decision. The Fifth Circuit held that, under American Pipe tolling, a plaintiff must be unambiguously excluded from a class definition to terminate tolling of the statute of limitations. Because Bien was not unambiguously excluded from the certified class, he was entitled to tolling, and his suit was not time-barred. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bien v. Union Pacific" on Justia Law

A property management company in Los Angeles employed an individual from April 2023 to September 2024. As part of the hiring and onboarding process, the employee was required to sign an arbitration agreement that mandated all employment-related claims be resolved through binding arbitration and included a waiver of class and representative actions. The employee later filed a class action lawsuit against the employer, alleging wage-and-hour violations and unfair business practices.The employer responded by filing a motion in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to compel arbitration of the employee's individual claims, dismiss the class claims, and stay the action. The employer made clear that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) did not apply and relied on California law. The employee opposed, arguing that under California Labor Code section 432.6, it is illegal for an employer to require an employee to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment unless the agreement is enforceable under the FAA. The Superior Court denied the employer’s motion, finding that the arbitration agreement was required as a condition of employment, thus violating section 432.6, and that, since the FAA did not apply, the agreement was unenforceable under California law.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that, under California law, an arbitration agreement required as a condition of employment in violation of section 432.6 is unenforceable unless it is otherwise enforceable under the FAA. Because the parties agreed the FAA did not apply and the agreement was required as a condition of employment, the employer could not enforce it. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration. View "Molina v. Triumph Residential Services, Inc." on Justia Law