Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Buyers of over-the-counter nasal decongestants containing oral phenylephrine brought numerous class actions against drug manufacturers and retailers, alleging that for years these companies sold and advertised decongestant products they knew to be ineffective. The plaintiffs claimed that scientific studies, particularly since 2016, had shown oral phenylephrine to be no better than a placebo at relieving congestion, yet the companies continued to market their products as effective decongestants and complied with Food and Drug Administration (FDA) labeling requirements. The FDA, despite mounting evidence, did not remove oral phenylephrine’s designation as an effective decongestant under its regulations.The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated nearly one hundred class actions and transferred them to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting New York statutory and common-law claims as well as a federal RICO claim. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) expressly preempted the state law claims because the drugs’ labels complied with FDA requirements, and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the RICO claim. The court also dismissed a Lanham Act claim brought by one pharmacy plaintiff.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the FDCA expressly preempts most of the state law claims because the federal regime requires manufacturers to follow the FDA-approved labeling, but it vacated the dismissal for claims regarding “Maximum Strength” labeling and brand-name drugs approved via the New Drug Application process, remanding those for further proceedings. The court affirmed dismissal of the RICO claim, adopting the indirect purchaser rule, and upheld denial of the pharmacy’s motion for reconsideration regarding its Lanham Act claim. View "Yousefzadeh v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc." on Justia Law

A group of consumers who purchased products from a coffee company’s website filed a class action lawsuit, claiming that the website’s terms and conditions improperly restricted their right to post negative reviews about the company or its products. The website included clauses stating that users could not submit content intended to cause commercial harm or use the company’s trademarks in a way that would disparage the brand. The plaintiffs did not allege that the company ever threatened to enforce these provisions against them or that they experienced any economic harm as a result.In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the company responded with a demurrer, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim because merely including such provisions in the terms and conditions does not violate California Civil Code section 1670.8 unless there is an attempt to enforce or threaten enforcement of the provision. The court agreed, finding that section 1670.8 only permits a consumer to seek civil penalties when a business attempts to enforce or otherwise penalizes a consumer under such a clause, not merely for including the clause in a contract. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ related claim under the Unfair Competition Law, as no economic harm was alleged. The court denied leave to amend the Civil Code section 1670.8 claim and entered judgment in favor of the company.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the interpretation of section 1670.8. The appellate court held that while non-disparagement clauses in consumer contracts are void and unenforceable, a business can only be held liable for civil penalties if it threatens to enforce or seeks to enforce such a provision or penalizes a consumer for protected speech. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "Arterberry v. Peet's Coffee" on Justia Law

A noncitizen from the Democratic Republic of the Congo was detained in New York pending removal proceedings and was ordered released on bond, which he could not pay. He then brought a class action and habeas petition on behalf of similarly situated noncitizens, challenging government bond-hearing procedures as violating due process. Specifically, he argued that the procedures wrongly placed the burden of proof on detainees, failed to consider ability to pay, and did not require consideration of alternatives to detention.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York initially certified the class and issued a preliminary injunction requiring changes to bond-hearing procedures, with the government complying for nearly two years. After the Supreme Court decided Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, which held that lower courts lack jurisdiction to issue class-wide injunctive relief under certain immigration statutes, the district court vacated the injunction. It then decertified the class entirely, concluding that neither class-wide injunctive nor declaratory relief was appropriate, and dismissed the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in decertifying the class for injunctive relief, as lower courts lack authority for such relief post-Aleman Gonzalez. However, it found that the district court erred by decertifying the class for declaratory relief based on factors irrelevant to the Rule 23(b)(2) class-certification analysis. The Second Circuit clarified that while injunctive relief is unavailable, district courts retain authority to grant class-wide declaratory relief in these cases. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Onosamba-Ohindo v. Ball" on Justia Law

The plaintiff worked as a Sterile Processing Technician for the defendant, a health system, and was compensated with a base hourly wage, shift differentials, weekend differentials, extra pay for additional hours, and bonuses for on-call time. The dispute centered on how overtime and holiday pay were calculated. The defendant included shift and weekend differentials and extra pay in the regular rate calculation, but excluded holiday premiums. The plaintiff, representing a certified class, alleged that the defendant’s method improperly credited regular-rate compensation toward overtime premiums and wrongly excluded holiday pay from the regular rate, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Wisconsin law.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment to the defendant on all class-wide claims. The court found that the defendant’s approach to overtime calculations—using total remuneration (excluding statutory exclusions) divided by total hours worked, and then applying a 0.5 multiplier to the regular rate for overtime hours—was consistent with federal and state law. The court also concluded that statutory exclusions in § 207(e)(6) of the FLSA permitted the exclusion of holiday premiums from the regular rate. The plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and the case was dismissed with prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the summary judgment de novo. The court held that the defendant’s methodologies for calculating overtime and excluding holiday premiums complied with both the FLSA and Wisconsin law. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied the plaintiff’s request to certify a question to the Wisconsin Supreme Court regarding holiday pay exclusions. The district court’s decisions granting summary judgment and denying reconsideration were affirmed. View "Lutz v Froedtert Health, Inc." on Justia Law

Several plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit against a city, challenging the validity of recently adopted water rates. They alleged that the city’s new rates, implemented by a resolution passed in May 2023, violated Proposition 218 by including costs for public fire service, resulting in charges exceeding the actual cost of water service. Prior to filing suit, the plaintiffs submitted claims under the Government Claims Act, which were denied. The plaintiffs sought refunds, declaratory relief, equitable relief, and a writ of mandate.After the city litigated the case for more than a year, including discovery and other pretrial activities, it moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that plaintiffs failed to bring a reverse validation action as required by Government Code section 53759 and Code of Civil Procedure sections 860 et seq. The San Francisco County Superior Court granted the city’s motion, holding that the validation statutes applied, were both mandatory and jurisdictional, and that plaintiffs had not complied with them in two ways: their suit was time-barred and they failed to follow proper notice procedures, including service by publication.On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, plaintiffs argued that the city had waived the validation requirements by litigating the case and that their action was timely. The appellate court reviewed the matter de novo and held that the validation statutes were mandatory and jurisdictional for challenges to water rates, and plaintiffs’ failure to comply with statutory procedures—including timely filing and notice by publication—was fatal to their claims. The court rejected arguments regarding waiver, good cause, and belated publication, ultimately affirming the trial court’s order and concluding that the procedural requirements for reverse validation actions must be strictly followed. View "Toy v. City and County of S.F." on Justia Law

Several inmates who were in the custody of either the South Carolina Department of Corrections or the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice filed a lawsuit alleging that prison officials were negligent in failing to implement proper policies, procedures, and staffing, resulting in their being sexually assaulted. The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of all inmates who were victims of nonconsensual sexual battery while in custody from 2012 to the present. They argued that common issues of law and fact predominated, justifying class treatment.The Circuit Court for Dorchester County certified two plaintiff classes—one for each department—based on alleged failures in protection and policy, finding that the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure were met. The departments appealed the certification order, but the South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that class certification orders are not immediately appealable.The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted a common-law writ of certiorari to review the circuit court’s class certification. The Supreme Court held that the proposed classes failed to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a), particularly the commonality requirement, because the factual and legal issues, including whether an individual was assaulted, whether negligence occurred, proximate causation, and damages, would require individualized determinations for each claimant. The Court clarified that interlocutory class certification orders are never immediately appealable to the court of appeals and reiterated that class certification requires a qualitative predominance of common issues. The Supreme Court reversed the class certification and remanded the case for discovery and trial solely on the individual claims of the named plaintiffs. View "Henson v. SCDC" on Justia Law

Several third-party payors who covered prescriptions for Avandia, a diabetes medication manufactured by GlaxoSmithKline LLC, brought a putative class action alleging that the company misrepresented Avandia’s cardiovascular risks and benefits. They claimed these misrepresentations led health care providers to prescribe Avandia more frequently than less expensive alternatives, causing the payors to reimburse for prescriptions that otherwise would not have been issued. The plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of entities that paid for Avandia prescriptions during a specified period.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania previously reviewed this case. It denied GlaxoSmithKline’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, and the Third Circuit affirmed that denial. Later, the District Court granted summary judgment to GlaxoSmithKline on certain claims, but the Third Circuit reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. Most recently, the District Court granted class certification, finding the class ascertainable and concluding that common issues would predominate regarding causation. It relied on evidence of a common scheme to deceive and statistical analyses showing marketing campaigns increased prescriptions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s class certification. The Third Circuit held that while the class is ascertainable, the record does not yet demonstrate that common questions predominate on causation. The court clarified that plaintiffs in pharmaceutical fraud RICO class actions may use statistical evidence to prove causation, but such evidence must establish causation, not merely correlation. Because the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence failed to satisfy this standard, the Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s class certification and remanded for further fact-finding on predominance under the clarified standard. View "In re Avandia Marketing" on Justia Law

A private company operating an automated license plate recognition (ALPR) system collected and stored images of license plates and related data, including date, time, and location, from vehicles in public areas in California. The company maintained a written usage and privacy policy, posted on its website, which set out authorized uses of the ALPR information and procedures for access and security. A California resident whose license plate information was collected by this system filed a class action lawsuit, alleging that the company violated the ALPR statute by failing to meaningfully implement or publicly disclose a compliant usage and privacy policy, by failing to enact adequate security measures, and by improperly allowing customers to use the data for unauthorized purposes. The plaintiff claimed harm based on an asserted invasion of privacy due to the collection and storage of his information, but did not allege any unauthorized access, disclosure, or tangible injury.The Superior Court of San Diego County granted summary judgment to the company, finding that the plaintiff lacked standing because he had not suffered actual harm as required by the ALPR statute. The court also denied another class member’s ex parte application to intervene as a substitute plaintiff, partly because the application was untimely and partly because he too failed to demonstrate actual harm resulting from a statutory violation.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed both rulings. The appellate court held that standing to sue under the ALPR statute requires a showing of actual harm arising from a violation of the statute, not merely a statutory violation or a subjective sense of privacy invasion. The court concluded the plaintiff had not suffered actual harm, and therefore lacked standing. The appellate court also found no reversible error in the denial of the motion to intervene, as the movant failed to address all grounds for the trial court’s decision. View "Mata v. Digital Recognition Network, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of shareholders alleged that a major aerospace manufacturer and several of its former executives made repeated misrepresentations regarding the company’s commitment to safety following two fatal airplane crashes involving one of its aircraft models. The shareholders claimed that these false and misleading statements artificially inflated or maintained the company’s stock price. When a subsequent in-flight safety incident and other disclosures revealed ongoing safety and quality issues, the company’s stock price declined, causing significant losses for the shareholders. The lead plaintiffs, representing a proposed class, sought to recover these losses through a class action lawsuit.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia oversaw the initial proceedings. It denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding the allegations sufficiently detailed, and subsequently certified a class. The district court concluded that the plaintiffs’ proposed damages methodology, which was based on an “out-of-pocket” measure, satisfied the requirements established by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend. The court found that this methodology fit the plaintiffs’ theory of liability and that class-wide issues predominated over individual questions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed whether class certification was proper. The Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiffs did not provide a sufficiently specific damages methodology at the class certification stage, as required by Comcast. The court held that simply describing a general measure of damages was inadequate, and that the plaintiffs needed to commit to a particular methodology and demonstrate its consistency with their liability theory. Because the district court did not conduct the rigorous analysis required and relied on inadequate proof, the Fourth Circuit reversed the class certification order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re: The Boeing Company" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are individuals who received marketing text messages and phone calls from a medical services company, promoting its home sleep tests. Despite their efforts to stop the communications—such as replying “STOP” to text messages and registering on the National Do-Not-Call Registry—they continued to receive unwanted texts and calls. They filed a consolidated class action complaint seeking monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief for alleged violations of both the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227, and the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois reviewed the complaint after the defendant moved to dismiss the TCPA claims. The defendant argued that the relevant TCPA provision, § 227(c)(5), only provides a private right of action for unwanted telephone calls, not text messages. The plaintiffs did not argue that their suit could proceed based on calls alone. The district court agreed with the defendant, found that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the TCPA because their complaint focused on text messages, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim, ultimately dismissing the entire suit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The main issue was whether § 227(c)(5)’s reference to “telephone calls” includes text messages. The court held that, based on the statute’s text, context, and the ordinary public meaning at the time of enactment, “telephone call” does not encompass text messages. The court also concluded that neither FCC interpretations nor prior decisions involving other TCPA provisions required a different outcome. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Steidinger v Blackstone Medical Services" on Justia Law