Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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Five individuals, who were either peaceful protesters or independent journalists, attended demonstrations at the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement facility in Portland, Oregon. During these events, they were exposed to tear gas and pepper balls used by federal agents to disperse crowds. The protests involved both peaceful activities and significant unrest, including vandalism, blocking entrances, and attacks on law enforcement. The plaintiffs claimed that federal agents specifically targeted them in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon against federal officials and the Department of Homeland Security. After discovery and an evidentiary hearing, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction restricting the use of non-lethal munitions to situations involving an imminent threat of physical harm, prohibiting their use on certain parts of the body, imposing limits on pepper spray, and requiring redesign of agent uniforms for better identification. Additionally, the District Court provisionally certified a class of all individuals who had protested or reported on DHS activities at the Portland ICE facility. The government’s motion to stay the injunction pending appeal was denied by the District Court but granted by the Ninth Circuit.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated both the preliminary injunction and the provisional class certification. The court held that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment retaliation claim, as law enforcement may use non-lethal force to clear crowds and restore order without facing an imminent threat of physical harm. The record did not support claims of an unwritten policy or intent to retaliate against First Amendment activity. The court also found the injunction overbroad and unworkable, and the class failed to meet Rule 23’s commonality and indivisible remedy requirements. The preliminary injunction and class certification were vacated. View "DICKINSON V. TRUMP" on Justia Law

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Five individuals who participated as peaceful protesters and independent journalists at demonstrations outside the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facility in Portland, Oregon, alleged that federal law enforcement officers targeted them with non-lethal crowd-control munitions such as tear gas and pepper balls. The plaintiffs claimed this was retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights. The protests, which occurred between June 2025 and February 2026, often involved both peaceful dissent and significant unrest, including vandalism, trespassing, and obstruction of law enforcement. The plaintiffs were exposed to crowd-control devices during these protests, frequently while in proximity to unlawful activity.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting federal officers from using non-lethal munitions except against individuals posing an imminent threat of physical harm, and ordered that agents’ uniforms be redesigned with conspicuous identifying markings. The district court also certified a provisional class encompassing all individuals who had protested or reported on DHS activities at the Portland ICE facility since June 2025, and denied the government’s motion to stay the injunction pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s orders. The Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and provisional class certification, holding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on their First Amendment claim. The court found no evidence of an unwritten policy or pattern of retaliation by DHS and held that law enforcement may use non-lethal force to clear crowds and restore order without waiting for an imminent threat of physical harm. The injunction was found to be overbroad, improperly granting relief to non-parties, and unworkable. The class certification was vacated for lack of commonality and failure to satisfy Rule 23(b)(2)’s indivisible-remedy requirement. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

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Three transgender children in Arizona, representing a class of all transgender individuals born in Arizona who wish to amend the sex marker on their birth certificates without undergoing a sex change operation, challenged the requirements for amending birth certificates. Arizona law, specifically A.R.S. § 36-337(A)(3), requires the registrar to amend a person’s birth certificate upon receiving a written request and a physician’s statement verifying a sex change operation. The plaintiffs argued that this “surgical requirement” violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that the statute discriminated based on transgender status and burdened fundamental rights, thus applying heightened and strict scrutiny. The district court concluded the statute failed these standards and entered a permanent injunction, striking the word “operation” from the statute and its implementing regulation to allow amendments without proof of surgery.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit clarified that Arizona’s statute provides two avenues for amending the sex marker on a birth certificate: through a physician’s verification of a sex change operation or by obtaining a court order. The court found that the law does not classify based on transgender status, but rather on whether an individual has undergone surgery, and that all individuals—including transgender people who have not had surgery—can seek a court order for amendment. Applying rational basis review, the court concluded the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest in ensuring adequate evidentiary support for amendments. The court also held that the statute does not violate due process, as it does not burden fundamental rights in all its applications. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the plaintiffs, vacated the permanent injunction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "ROE V. PETERSEN" on Justia Law

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A woman was arrested in Randolph County, Alabama, under a system that required arrestees to pay a predetermined bail amount based on the charged offense for immediate release. Those unable to pay had to wait until an initial appearance, which could take up to three days, and frequently did not result in a release determination. Instead, release decisions were often deferred until a preliminary hearing up to four weeks later. The plaintiff, unable to afford bail, filed a class action alleging that the county’s bail practices discriminated against indigent individuals and violated their constitutional rights.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama initially granted a temporary restraining order, releasing the plaintiff. While the case was pending, Randolph County adopted a new, more permissive bail policy. Defendants moved to dismiss the case as moot, arguing the new policy ended the challenged conduct. The district court certified a class of arrestees unable to pay secured bail, but after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a similar case, Schultz v. Alabama, the district court dismissed most claims as moot, limiting plaintiffs to facial challenges against the new policy, and concluded those remaining claims failed to state a plausible claim for relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the voluntary cessation doctrine precludes defendants from mooting the case simply by changing the bail policy during litigation. The class may proceed with facial and as-applied challenges to the prior bail practices, as well as as-applied challenges to the current bail practices. However, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of facial challenges to the current bail policy. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Edwards v. Randolph County Sheriff" on Justia Law

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Two inmates who identify as transgender women brought a class action against the Oregon Department of Corrections and related officials, alleging Eighth Amendment violations for purportedly exposing transgender women inmates to substantial risk of harm by housing them in men’s prisons. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary mandatory injunction on behalf of a class of all current and future transgender women in Oregon prison facilities, requesting that they be presumptively assigned to the state’s women’s prison and given additional protections.A magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted the motion for a preliminary injunction and provisionally certified the class. The injunction required Oregon to presumptively assign transgender women inmates to the women’s prison unless a specific security justification was documented, along with other measures for safety and privacy. Defendants moved for reconsideration, and the district court amended but largely maintained the injunction. Defendants appealed and obtained a stay of the injunction pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order, applying an abuse-of-discretion standard to the injunction and de novo review to underlying legal issues. The Ninth Circuit found the district court committed clear error by basing its injunction on an unsupported finding that the defendants employed a default presumption of housing transgender women in men’s prisons. The appellate court determined that the record showed individualized assessments for inmate placement and that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, or commonality for class certification. The Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, ordered the class to be decertified, and remanded the case. The mandate was issued forthwith. View "S.D. V. REESE" on Justia Law

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Three individuals filed a class action lawsuit against San Francisco, challenging new water rates adopted by the city’s Public Utility Commission in May 2023. The plaintiffs alleged that the new rates violated Proposition 218 of the California Constitution by including costs unrelated to the actual provision of water service, resulting in charges that exceeded the cost of service. Before adopting the new rates, the city provided required notice to ratepayers, including information about a 120-day period for legal challenges under the applicable validation statutes. The plaintiffs sought a refund, declaratory and equitable relief, and a writ of mandate.After the class action was filed, the City litigated the case for over a year. It participated in discovery, case management, and even moved for summary judgment, without initially arguing that the suit was procedurally improper. Eventually, the City moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that plaintiffs’ action was subject to the validation statutes, specifically Government Code section 53759 and Code of Civil Procedure sections 860 et seq., which require reverse validation actions attacking agency matters like water rates to be brought within 120 days and with specific notice by publication to all interested parties. The trial court (San Francisco County Superior Court) agreed with the City, finding the statutes mandatory and jurisdictional, and dismissed the case for failure to comply with the procedural requirements, including timely filing and appropriate notice.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the judgment de novo. The court held that compliance with the validation statutes was mandatory and jurisdictional. Plaintiffs’ failure to file a proper reverse validation action and to provide notice by publication deprived the court of jurisdiction. The court rejected arguments that the City had waived these requirements or that good cause existed for noncompliance. The judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "Toy v. City & County of S.F." on Justia Law

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Three Venezuelan nationals, alleged by the government to be members of the Tren de Aragua gang, were detained in Texas following a presidential proclamation under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA). This proclamation, issued in March 2025, authorized immediate removal of Venezuelan citizens aged fourteen or older, residing in the United States, who were not naturalized or lawful permanent residents and were identified as members of the gang. The petitioners challenged the proclamation, arguing that it exceeded the President’s authority under the AEA and violated due process rights. They sought class certification and injunctive relief to prevent removal under the AEA.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied temporary restraining orders and class certification. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit initially dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, in A.A.R.P. v. Trump, vacated that dismissal and remanded, instructing the Fifth Circuit to address two issues: whether the petitioners were entitled to a preliminary injunction against removal under the AEA, and whether the notice provided for due process claims was sufficient for the putative class. The Supreme Court also allowed the government to remove the petitioners under other lawful authorities.After remand, the three named petitioners were removed from the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), not the AEA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that, because the petitioners were no longer in the country and no class had been certified, it was impossible to grant any effectual relief. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot for lack of jurisdiction, declining to substitute new class representatives on appeal but leaving open the possibility for future proceedings in the district court. View "W.M.M. v. Trump" on Justia Law

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Several individuals arrested in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, were detained pending trial after cash bail was set at their preliminary arraignments. At these arraignments, which were conducted via video without counsel present, the Magisterial District Judges allegedly imposed bail without considering the defendants’ ability to pay or other required factors under state law. Because they could not afford bail, the plaintiffs remained incarcerated. They brought a class action against four Magisterial District Judges (in their official capacities), Lancaster County, and the Warden of the county prison, alleging violations of their rights to equal protection, due process, and counsel.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania first dismissed the plaintiffs’ Sixth Amendment claim, holding that the right to counsel attaches at the preliminary arraignment but does not require counsel’s presence at that proceeding, relying on Supreme Court precedent. The District Court later abstained from hearing the equal protection and due process claims under the doctrine established in Younger v. Harris, reasoning that federal intervention would improperly intrude upon ongoing state criminal proceedings and that state courts could address the plaintiffs’ bail-related claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed both rulings. The Third Circuit held that Younger abstention was inappropriate because the plaintiffs did not seek to enjoin ongoing state criminal prosecutions but rather challenged procedures ancillary to those prosecutions—specifically, the process by which bail was set. Therefore, the District Court’s abstention was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings on the equal protection and due process claims. However, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Sixth Amendment claim, holding that the preliminary arraignment under Pennsylvania law is not a “critical stage” requiring the presence of counsel, even though the right to counsel attaches at that point. View "Hartmann v. Chudzik" on Justia Law

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A noncitizen from the Democratic Republic of the Congo was detained in New York pending removal proceedings and was ordered released on bond, which he could not pay. He then brought a class action and habeas petition on behalf of similarly situated noncitizens, challenging government bond-hearing procedures as violating due process. Specifically, he argued that the procedures wrongly placed the burden of proof on detainees, failed to consider ability to pay, and did not require consideration of alternatives to detention.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York initially certified the class and issued a preliminary injunction requiring changes to bond-hearing procedures, with the government complying for nearly two years. After the Supreme Court decided Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, which held that lower courts lack jurisdiction to issue class-wide injunctive relief under certain immigration statutes, the district court vacated the injunction. It then decertified the class entirely, concluding that neither class-wide injunctive nor declaratory relief was appropriate, and dismissed the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in decertifying the class for injunctive relief, as lower courts lack authority for such relief post-Aleman Gonzalez. However, it found that the district court erred by decertifying the class for declaratory relief based on factors irrelevant to the Rule 23(b)(2) class-certification analysis. The Second Circuit clarified that while injunctive relief is unavailable, district courts retain authority to grant class-wide declaratory relief in these cases. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Onosamba-Ohindo v. Ball" on Justia Law

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A residential subdivision in Black Hawk, South Dakota, known as Hideaway Hills, was constructed atop land with a history of both underground and surface gypsum mining. The State of South Dakota, through the South Dakota Cement Plant Commission, purchased the property, conducted surface mining, and reclaimed the land to pasture before selling it at public auction, while retaining subsurface mineral rights. Subsequent private owners and developers, aware of prior mining activity, developed the land into residential lots. Years later, residents began experiencing foundational problems and sinkholes, which culminated in a significant sinkhole event in 2020, leading to evacuation and property devaluation.After previous lawsuits against various parties were dismissed, a class action was brought in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Meade County, against the State and related entities. The plaintiffs alleged inverse condemnation, asserting that the State’s reclamation and retention of subsurface rights amounted to a taking or damaging of private property for public use under the South Dakota Constitution. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the State, holding that the plaintiffs’ claims were, in essence, tort claims barred by sovereign immunity.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a viable inverse condemnation claim because the alleged governmental actions occurred while the State owned the property, and thus did not implicate “private property.” The Court further found that the State’s activities were not for “public use” within the meaning of the state constitution, as the retained mineral rights did not confer a public right of use. The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the State. View "Morse v. State" on Justia Law