Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
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The plaintiff, Adan Ortiz, worked for two companies, GXO Logistics Supply Chain, Inc., and Randstad Inhouse Services, LLC, both of which were his former employers. Ortiz's role involved handling goods in a California warehouse facility operated by GXO. The goods, primarily Adidas products, were received from mostly international locations and stored at the warehouse for several days to a few weeks before being shipped to customers and retailers in various states.Ortiz filed a class action lawsuit against his former employers alleging various violations of California labor law. The defendants moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in Ortiz's employment contract. Ortiz opposed this on the grounds that the agreement could not be enforced under federal or state law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part the district court's order denying the appellants' motion to compel arbitration. It concluded that Ortiz belonged to a class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce and was therefore exempted from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The court reasoned that although Ortiz's duties were performed entirely within one state's borders, his role facilitated the continued travel of goods through an interstate supply chain, making him a necessary part of the flow of goods in interstate commerce. The court also rejected the argument that an employee must necessarily be employed by a transportation industry company to qualify for the transportation worker exemption. View "ORTIZ V. RANDSTAD INHOUSE SERVICES, LLC" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed a case involving the Cenikor Foundation, a nonprofit drug rehabilitation center. The foundation had been sued by a group of its rehabilitation patients for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The patients contended that they were effectively employees of the foundation, as they were required to work as part of their treatment program without receiving monetary compensation. The foundation contested the lawsuit and appealed a district court's decision to certify the case as a collective action under the FLSA.The Court of Appeals found that the district court had applied the incorrect legal standard in determining whether the patients were employees under the FLSA. Specifically, the court should have applied a test to determine who was the primary beneficiary of the work relationship, rather than a test typically used to distinguish employees from independent contractors.The appellate court remanded the case back to the district court to apply this primary beneficiary test and to consider the foundation's defense that any benefits provided to the patients offset any requirement to pay them a wage. The court emphasized that the question of whether the foundation's patients were employees under the FLSA was a threshold issue that needed to be resolved before the case could proceed as a collective action. View "Klick v. Cenikor Foundation" on Justia Law

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In this class action case, Nicole DeMarinis and Kelly Patire, current and former employees of Heritage Bank of Commerce, brought a case under the California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) against Heritage Bank for wage and hour and other Labor Code violations. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three affirmed the trial court’s decision, rejecting Heritage Bank’s argument to compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ individual PAGA claims based on a waiver in their arbitration agreement.In the agreement, the plaintiffs had waived their right to bring any claims against each other in any class or representative proceeding. The bank argued that the denial of arbitration was erroneous because the waiver provision was enforceable, pertaining only to plaintiffs’ nonindividual PAGA claims. The court, however, found that the provision violated public policy as it required plaintiffs to completely abandon their right to bring both individual and nonindividual PAGA claims in any forum.The court also found that the waiver provision's nonseverability clause and a "poison pill" provision, which stated that if the waiver provision is found unenforceable, then the entire arbitration agreement is null and void, precluded severance of the unenforceable nonindividual PAGA claims waiver. Consequently, the court concluded that the unenforceability of the waiver provision rendered the entire arbitration agreement null and void, thereby affirming the trial court's decision denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "DeMarinis v. Heritage Bank of Commerce" on Justia Law

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The case concerned a lawsuit brought by Ariana Miles against her former employer, Kirkland's Stores Inc., alleging that two of the company's employee policies violated California law. The first policy required employees to take rest breaks on store property, while the second necessitated employees to undergo bag checks when they finished their shifts. Miles sought class certification for subclasses of employees affected by these two policies from May 2014 to the present. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of class certification for subclasses related to the Rest Break Claim due to the inaccuracy of the district court's finding that the rest break policy was inconsistently applied. The court held that overwhelming record evidence indicated that the company consistently enforced its rest break policy across all employees. However, the court upheld the district court's denial of class certification for the Bag Check Claim, as the evidence suggested that the bag check policy was sporadically enforced, which would require individualized inquiries. The case was thus remanded for further proceedings concerning the Rest Break Claim. View "MILES V. KIRKLAND'S STORES, INC." on Justia Law

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In this case, the plaintiff, Lorenzo Dominguez, who was a former employee of Better Mortgage Corporation, alleged that the company violated federal and state wage-and-hour laws, primarily by failing to pay overtime to him and other mortgage underwriters. Upon being sued, Better Mortgage attempted to reduce the size of the potential class and collective action by persuading employees to agree not to join any collective or class action and to settle their claims individually. The district court found that Better Mortgage's communications were misleading and coercive. As such, the court nullified the new employment agreements, release agreements, and ordered the company to communicate with current and former employees about wage-and-hour issues only in writing and with prior approval.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order imposing a communication restriction on Better Mortgage, considering the company's appeal timely due to a motion to reconsider the restriction, thus tolling the time to file the notice of appeal. The appellate court held that it had jurisdiction to review the communication restriction and found it both justified and tailored to the situation created by the employer’s misleading and coercive communications. However, the appellate court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the employer’s appeal from the district court’s order nullifying agreements between the employer and current and former employees. The appellate court found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the nullification order because the issue was raised in an interlocutory appeal and did not fit any exception that would allow for review. View "DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORPORATION" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff class participates in “403(b)” retirement plans administered by Cornell University (“Cornell”). Plaintiffs brought this suit against Cornell and its appointed fiduciaries alleging a number of breaches of their fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). Plaintiffs appealed from entry of judgment in Defendants’ favor on all but one claim, which was settled by the parties. On appeal, Plaintiffs challenged: (1) the dismissal of their claim that Cornell entered into a “prohibited transaction” by paying the plans’ recordkeepers unreasonable compensation, (2) the “parsing” of a single count alleging a breach of fiduciary duty into separate sub-claims at the motion to dismiss stage, (3) the award of summary judgment against Plaintiffs for failure to show loss on their claim that Defendants breached their duty of prudence by failing to monitor and control recordkeeping costs, and (4) the award of summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs’ claims that Cornell breached its duty of prudence by failing to remove underperforming investment options and by offering higher-cost retail share classes of mutual funds, rather than lower-cost institutional shares.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ prohibited transactions claim and certain duty-of-prudence allegations for failure to state a claim and did not err in granting partial summary judgment to Defendants on the remaining duty-of-prudence claims. In so doing, the court held as a matter of first impression that to state a claim for a prohibited transaction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 1106(a)(1)(C), it is not enough to allege that a fiduciary caused the plan to compensate a service provider for its services. View "Cunningham v. Cornell University" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Carlie Sherman, Anna Gozun, and Amanda Nash appealed a district court’s denial of class certification in a forced labor action against Trinity Teen Solutions (“Trinity”), a residential treatment center for adolescent girls, and its owners and operators (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs, now adults, were all sent to Trinity as minors by their parents. Trinity advertised itself as offering a wide range of therapies for troubled adolescent girls in a ranch environment and as taking a "tough love" approach, with its residents living in primitive conditions and working on the ranch as part of their treatment experience. Plaintiffs alleged that, during their residence at Trinity, they were forced to work long hours without pay under threat of serious harm. Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants, on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of former Trinity residents, bringing three forced labor claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, and sought class certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, proposing a putative class of “Plaintiffs, and all similarly situated persons who received treatment from [Trinity] and were subjected to the provision of ‘agricultural labor.’" The district court denied class certification, concluding Plaintiffs had failed to satisfy Rule 23’s commonality, typicality, and predominance requirements. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erred by applying the incorrect legal standard to its analysis of Rule 23(a)’s commonality and typicality requirements and Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. Therefore, it vacated the district court’s order denying class certification and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Sherman, et al. v. Trinity Teen Solutions, et al." on Justia Law

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Randy Quint, John Linn, and Mark Molina (“Colorado Plaintiffs”) filed a class and collective action against Vail Resorts, Inc. alleging violations of federal and state labor laws (“Colorado Action”). Different plaintiffs filed similar lawsuits against a Vail subsidiary, which were pending in federal and state courts in California. After Vail gave notice that it had agreed to a nationwide settlement with some of the other plaintiffs, Colorado Plaintiffs filed an emergency motion asking the district court to enjoin Vail from consummating the settlement. The district court denied their motion, and Colorado Plaintiffs filed this interlocutory appeal, arguing the district court erred by: (1) applying the wrong standard in reviewing the report and recommendation ("R&R"); (2) holding the Anti-Injunction Act applied to an injunction against Vail rather than the state court; (3) declining to consider one exception to the Anti-Injunction Act; (4) holding a second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act did not apply; (5) failing to enforce the first-to-file rule; and (6) abstaining under the Colorado River doctrine. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Quint, et al. v. Vail Resorts" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs brought two actions against KeyPoint Government Solutions: a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (the FLSA) on behalf of KeyPoint employees nationwide, and a state-law putative class action on behalf of California employees. They alleged KeyPoint violated the FLSA through policies requiring employees to work uncompensated overtime and also violated certain provisions of California’s wage-and-hour laws. On appeal, KeyPoint argued: (1) the district court erred in denying KeyPoint’s motion to compel arbitration of California state-law claims by some California Plaintiffs; and (2) the district court erred in certifying under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 of the California employee class. After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the district court’s denial of KeyPoint’s motion to compel arbitration, vacated the court’s certification of the Rule 23 class, and remanded for further proceedings. "The district court did not distinguish Plaintiffs’ meal- and rest-break claims from Plaintiffs’ off-the-clock claims. It analyzed only KeyPoint’s allegedly unlawful policy and assumed that the policy could 'prohibit[] Plaintiffs from taking required meal and rest breaks.' This was insufficient. ... The court abused its discretion in failing to perform claim-specific analysis. We vacate the district court’s Rule 23 class certification so that the district court can properly consider predominance." View "Brayman, et al. v. Keypoint Government Solutions" on Justia Law

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BD LaPlace, LLC, doing business as Bayou Steel (Bayou Steel), operated a steel mill in LaPlace, Louisiana. Without giving The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) notice, Bayou Steel terminated Plaintiffs’ employment and closed the LaPlace mill where they worked. Seeking to recover under the WARN Act, Plaintiffs initially filed a putative class action complaint against Bayou Steel in Delaware bankruptcy court. Plaintiffs dismissed that action and filed the instant class action in federal district court. Rather than suing their employer Bayou Steel, Plaintiffs sued Bayou Steel BD Holdings II, LLC and Black Diamond Capital Management, LLC(a private equity firm that advised the fund that owned BD Holdings II). Plaintiffs demanded a jury trial, which the district court denied. Defendants sought summary judgment, which the district court granted. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging both the denial of their jury demand and the summary judgment for Defendants.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that there is no right to a jury trial under the WARN Act. The court also affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to BD Holdings II. But the district court erred in granting summary judgment to BDCM because there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether BDCM exercised de facto control over Bayou Steel’s decision to close its LaPlace steel mill and order Plaintiffs’ layoffs. The court explained that if BDCM “specifically directed” the closing of the mill without proper notice, the company may be liable for Bayou Steel’s WARN Act violation even absent the other factors. View "Fleming v. Bayou Steel" on Justia Law