Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against the defendants, alleging various wage and hour violations. The plaintiff sought class certification, which the trial court denied. The plaintiff's individual claims and representative claims under the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) remained pending. The plaintiff appealed the denial of class certification, arguing it was appealable under the death knell doctrine, which allows immediate appeal of orders effectively terminating class claims.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County denied the plaintiff's motion for class certification, finding issues with the numerosity of subclasses, lack of typicality, predominance of individual inquiries, manageability, and superiority of class adjudication. The court noted that the PAGA claims were not subject to class certification and remained pending. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, asserting the order was immediately appealable under the death knell doctrine.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the death knell doctrine did not apply because the PAGA claims were still pending when the notice of appeal was filed. The plaintiff's subsequent voluntary dismissal of the PAGA claims without prejudice did not retroactively make the class certification order appealable. The court held that the order denying class certification was not immediately appealable and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court emphasized that any appeal of the class certification order must await the entry of a final judgment disposing of all claims. View "Reyes v. Hi-Grade Materials Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former employees of Vicar Operating, Inc., filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Vicar failed to provide the required meal periods as mandated by California Labor Code section 512 and IWC Wage Orders Nos. 4-2001 and 5-2001. Vicar contended that the plaintiffs had signed valid written agreements prospectively waiving their meal periods for shifts between five and six hours, which could be revoked at any time. The plaintiffs argued that such prospective waivers allowed employers to circumvent statutory meal break requirements and denied employees a meaningful opportunity to exercise their right to meal breaks.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary adjudication in favor of Vicar, determining that the prospective waivers were valid under section 512 and the wage orders. The court found that the plain language of the statute and wage orders permitted such waivers and distinguished the case from Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, which did not address the timing of meal break waivers. The court also concluded that a DLSE opinion letter cited by the plaintiffs was not applicable as it interpreted different wage order regulations.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the revocable, prospective waivers signed by the plaintiffs were enforceable in the absence of any evidence that the waivers were unconscionable or unduly coercive. The court concluded that the prospective written waiver of a 30-minute meal period for shifts between five and six hours was consistent with the text and purpose of section 512 and Wage Order Nos. 4 and 5. The court also determined that the legislative and administrative history confirmed that such waivers were consistent with the welfare of employees and that Brinker did not require a contrary result. View "Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners, representing a class of current and former Cornell University employees, participated in two defined-contribution retirement plans from 2010 to 2016. They sued Cornell and other plan fiduciaries in 2017, alleging that the plans engaged in prohibited transactions by paying excessive fees for recordkeeping services to Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America-College Retirement Equities Fund and Fidelity Investments Inc., in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) §1106(a)(1)(C).The District Court dismissed the prohibited-transaction claim, requiring plaintiffs to allege self-dealing or disloyal conduct. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal but on different grounds, holding that plaintiffs must plead that the transaction was unnecessary or involved unreasonable compensation, incorporating §1108(b)(2)(A) exemptions into §1106(a) claims.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and remanded the case. The Court held that to state a claim under §1106(a)(1)(C), a plaintiff need only plausibly allege the elements contained in that provision itself, without addressing potential §1108 exemptions. The Court determined that §1108 sets out affirmative defenses, which must be pleaded and proved by defendants. The Court emphasized that the statutory text and structure do not impose additional pleading requirements for §1106(a)(1) claims and that the burden of proving exemptions rests on the defendants. View "Cunningham v. Cornell University" on Justia Law

Lynwood Pickens worked for Hamilton-Ryker IT Solutions from 2018 to 2019, inspecting pipes at a natural-gas export terminal in Texas. He was paid $100 per hour but was guaranteed a weekly salary of $800, equivalent to eight hours of work. For any hours worked beyond the initial eight, he received additional hourly compensation. Pickens regularly worked over 50 hours per week but did not receive overtime pay, as Hamilton-Ryker classified him as a salaried employee exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).Pickens sued Hamilton-Ryker in 2020, claiming he was a non-exempt hourly worker entitled to overtime pay. Fourteen coworkers joined the lawsuit. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted summary judgment to Hamilton-Ryker, classifying Pickens as a salaried employee under the FLSA and dismissing the claims of his coworkers for not being "similarly situated."The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Pickens was not paid on a salary basis as defined by the FLSA regulations. The court emphasized that a true salary must cover a regular workweek, not just a portion of it. Since Pickens' guaranteed pay only covered eight hours, not his usual 52-hour workweek, he did not meet the salary basis test. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, leaving the determination of the collective action status and the claims of Pickens' coworkers to the district court. View "Pickens v. Hamilton-Ryker IT Solutions" on Justia Law

Three former employees of Amazon filed a class action complaint seeking payment for straight-time and overtime wages under Connecticut’s wage laws for time spent undergoing mandatory security screenings after clocking out. The employees argued that this time should be compensable under state law. Amazon required employees to pass through security screenings when exiting the secured area of their fulfillment centers, but not upon entry. The screenings involved metal detectors and varied based on the personal belongings employees carried. Employees were not compensated for the time spent in these screenings.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment in favor of Amazon, dismissing the employees' complaint. The court relied on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, which held that time spent in mandatory security screenings is not compensable under federal law. The employees appealed the decision and moved to certify a question to the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding the applicability of Connecticut’s wage laws to their case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the question of whether Connecticut’s wage laws require compensation for time spent in mandatory security screenings is unresolved. The court decided to certify this question to the Connecticut Supreme Court for a definitive resolution. Additionally, the court asked the Connecticut Supreme Court to address whether a de minimis exception applies to such compensable time and, if so, what amount of time is considered de minimis. The Second Circuit reserved its decision and dismissed the employees' motion to certify as moot, pending the Connecticut Supreme Court's response. View "Del Rio v. Amazon.com.DECE, LLC" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Perez, a former employee of Rose Hills Company, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of herself and similarly situated employees, alleging violations of California wage-and-hour laws. The complaint did not specify the amount in controversy or the frequency of the alleged violations. Rose Hills removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which allows removal if the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.The United States District Court for the Central District of California remanded the case to state court, stating that Rose Hills did not meet CAFA’s $5 million amount-in-controversy requirement. The district court found that Rose Hills failed to provide evidence justifying its assumed violation rate, which was used to calculate the amount in controversy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a removing defendant under CAFA is permitted to rely on reasonable assumptions based on the plaintiff’s complaint to calculate the amount in controversy. The court found that Rose Hills’ approach, which included assumptions about the violation rate tethered to the language of the complaint, was reasonable. The district court erred by requiring Rose Hills to provide evidence supporting its assumed violation rate.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to evaluate whether Rose Hills’ violation-rate assumption was a reasonable interpretation of the complaint. The court emphasized that assumptions need not be proven with evidence if they are reasonable interpretations of the complaint’s allegations. View "Perez v. Rose Hills Company" on Justia Law

Nabors Corporate Services, Inc. (Nabors) performed oil well plug and abandonment work for the City of Long Beach (the City) between 2012 and 2014. The City had contracted with Tidelands Oil Production Company (Tidelands) for services on the Gerald Desmond Bridge Replacement Project, and Tidelands subcontracted the work to Nabors. The City and Tidelands had concluded that the work was not subject to prevailing wage laws, and Nabors was not informed otherwise during the bid process. After completing the work, Nabors faced a class action from its employees for unpaid prevailing wages, which led to arbitration awards and federal court judgments against Nabors.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained demurrers by the City and Tidelands, dismissing Nabors’s claims for indemnity under Labor Code sections 1781 and 1784. The court ruled that section 1784 could not be applied retroactively to Tidelands and that the arbitration awards confirmed by the federal court did not qualify as court decisions under section 1781.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the section 1784 claim against Tidelands, agreeing that the statute could not be applied retroactively. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the section 1781 claim against the City, holding that the federal court’s confirmation of arbitration awards did qualify as court decisions classifying the work as public work. The case was remanded with instructions to enter a new order overruling the City’s demurrer to the section 1781 cause of action. Nabors was awarded costs on appeal against the City, while Tidelands was awarded costs on appeal against Nabors. View "Nabors Corporate Services, Inc. v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

Armando Guevara worked as a domestic service employee for Robert and Maria Zamora for over a decade, performing various tasks such as cleaning, car maintenance, and grocery shopping. Occasionally, he also provided services for the Zamoras' businesses, Lafise Corporation and Latin American Financial Services, Inc. (LAFS). Guevara was paid $1,365.88 biweekly, but there was no written employment agreement, and the parties disagreed on whether this amount represented a salary or an hourly wage. The Zamoras claimed they paid him an hourly rate with overtime, while Guevara asserted he was paid a salary without proper overtime compensation.Guevara filed a putative class action against the Zamoras, Lafise, and LAFS for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that Guevara was not covered by the FLSA through either "enterprise coverage" or "individual coverage." The court also found that Guevara was fully compensated for all his overtime work hours based on the Zamoras' testimony and calculations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The appellate court determined that there was a genuine dispute regarding Guevara's regular hourly rate and, therefore, his overtime rate. The court noted that the Zamoras did not maintain accurate records, and the evidence presented created a genuine issue of fact that should be determined by a jury. The appellate court also vacated the district court's ruling on whether Lafise was a joint employer, as the lower court failed to provide sufficient reasoning and did not address the relevant factors. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Guevara v. Lafise Corp." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Carmen Mercado and Jorge Lopez, filed a class action complaint against their former employer, S&C Electric Company, in the circuit court of Cook County. They alleged that S&C underpaid their overtime wages by excluding certain performance bonuses from the "regular rate" of pay used to calculate overtime. S&C argued that the bonuses were statutorily excluded from the regular rate of pay and that they had made adjusted payments to cover any alleged unpaid wages.The circuit court granted S&C's motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, finding that the adjusted payments satisfied the alleged underpayment. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, agreeing that the bonuses were properly excluded from the regular rate of pay and that the adjusted payments fully compensated the plaintiffs.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' judgments. The court held that the performance bonuses should have been included in the regular rate of pay for calculating overtime wages. The court found that the bonuses were not gifts but compensation for services performed, and thus did not fall under the exclusion in section 210.410(a) of the regulations. Additionally, the court held that the adjusted payments did not fully compensate the plaintiffs for their statutory damages, including treble damages, monthly interest, and attorney fees, as required by section 12(a) of the Minimum Wage Law.The Supreme Court of Illinois remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Mercado v. S&C Electric Co." on Justia Law

Freedom Vans LLC, a company that converts and customizes vans into mobile houses, hired Jeremy David and Mark Springer. David, a self-taught carpenter, was hired in 2019 and later promoted to foundations manager. Springer, an automotive and maritime mechanic, was hired in 2020 as an electrician. Both employees earned less than twice the minimum wage and signed a noncompete agreement prohibiting them from engaging in any business that competed with Freedom Vans. They claimed they declined additional work offers due to fear of termination and legal action. They stopped working for Freedom Vans in 2021.David and Springer filed a class action lawsuit in 2022, alleging the noncompete agreement violated chapter 49.62 RCW, which regulates noncompete clauses in employment contracts. They sought damages and injunctive and declaratory relief. The superior court granted summary judgment to Freedom Vans, reasoning that RCW 49.62 does not restrict an employer’s right to require employee loyalty and avoidance of conflicts of interest. The court denied Freedom Vans' request for attorney fees. Both parties appealed.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that noncompete agreements for employees earning less than twice the minimum wage must be reasonable and narrowly construed in light of the legislature’s intent to protect low wage workers and promote workforce mobility. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, concluding that prohibiting employees from providing any kind of assistance to competitors exceeds a narrow construction of the duty of loyalty. The case was remanded to the superior court to determine the reasonableness of the noncompete agreement and assess damages and attorney fees. View "Springer v. Freedom Vans LLC" on Justia Law