Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC is the developer of a mixed-use condominium project in San Francisco known as GS Heritage Place, which includes both timeshare and whole residential units. Stephen Schneider owns a timeshare interest in one of the fractional units and has voting rights in the homeowners association. In 2018, Schneider filed a class action lawsuit against Cocoa and others, alleging improper management practices, including the use of fractional units as hotel rooms and misallocation of expenses. The parties settled that lawsuit in 2020, with Schneider agreeing not to disparage Cocoa or solicit further claims against it, and to cooperate constructively in future dealings.In 2022, Schneider initiated another lawsuit against Cocoa. In response, Cocoa filed a cross-complaint against Schneider, alleging intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, breach of contract (the settlement agreement), unjust enrichment, and defamation. Cocoa claimed Schneider engaged in a campaign to prevent the sale of unsold units as whole units, formed unofficial owner groups, made disparaging statements, and threatened litigation, all of which allegedly violated the prior settlement agreement and harmed Cocoa’s economic interests.Schneider moved to strike the cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16), arguing that Cocoa’s claims arose from his protected activities—namely, petitioning the courts and speaking on matters of public interest related to association management. The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco granted Schneider’s motion, finding that all claims in the cross-complaint arose from protected activity and that Cocoa failed to show a probability of prevailing on the merits.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that Cocoa’s claims were based on Schneider’s protected litigation and association management activities, and that Cocoa did not establish a likelihood of success on any of its claims. View "Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC v. Schneider" on Justia Law

After a series of chemical explosions at an industrial plant in Crosby, Texas, following Hurricane Harvey, property owners and lessees in the affected area experienced contamination and property damage. These individuals, including the appellants, initially participated in a federal class action seeking both injunctive and monetary relief for the harm caused by the explosions. The federal district court certified a class for injunctive relief but declined to certify a class for monetary damages. Subsequently, a class settlement addressed only injunctive relief, leaving monetary claims unresolved.Following the settlement, nearly 800 class members, including the appellants, filed individual lawsuits in Texas state court seeking monetary damages for their property-related claims. The appellants acknowledged that their claims accrued in September 2017 and were subject to a two-year statute of limitations, but argued that the pendency of the federal class action tolled the limitations period under Texas law. Arkema, the defendant, removed the cases to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas and moved to dismiss, asserting that Texas does not recognize cross-jurisdictional tolling—meaning a federal class action does not toll the state statute of limitations. The district court consolidated the cases and dismissed the claims as untimely, relying on Fifth Circuit precedent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that, under its binding precedent, Texas law does not permit cross-jurisdictional tolling of statutes of limitations based on the pendency of a federal class action. The court rejected the appellants’ arguments for exceptions to this rule and found no intervening Texas authority to the contrary. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the appellants’ claims as time-barred. View "Ackerman v. Arkema" on Justia Law

Several residents of a recreational vehicle park in Oregon brought a class action lawsuit against the park’s owners and managers, alleging that the park’s utility billing practices violated the Oregon Residential Landlord Tenant Act (ORLTA). Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they were charged for electricity at rates higher than the actual cost and were improperly assessed meter reading fees. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class covering a ten-year period prior to the filing of the complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations should be tolled until tenants discovered or reasonably should have discovered the alleged violations.The Marion County Circuit Court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that the one-year statute of limitations in ORS 12.125 incorporated a discovery rule. The court certified a class including tenants who paid the disputed charges during the ten years before the complaint was filed, provided they did not or should not have discovered the facts giving rise to their claims more than one year before filing. The court later granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, found the defendants liable, and awarded substantial damages and attorney fees.On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s class certification and related rulings, holding that ORS 12.125 does not include a discovery rule and that the one-year limitations period is not tolled by a plaintiff’s lack of knowledge of the claim. The plaintiffs sought review of this issue.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The court held that ORS 12.125 does not incorporate a discovery rule; the one-year statute of limitations begins to run when the alleged violation or breach occurs, not when the plaintiff discovers it. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hathaway v. B & J Property Investments, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of single-family residential (SFR) water customers challenged the City of San Diego’s tiered water rate structure, which imposed higher rates for increased water usage, arguing that these rates exceeded the proportional cost of service attributable to their parcels as required by California Constitution article XIII D, section 6(b)(3) (enacted by Proposition 218). The City’s water system serves a large population and divides customers into several classes, but only SFR customers were subject to tiered rates; other classes paid uniform rates. The City’s rates were based on cost-of-service studies using industry-standard methodologies, including “base-extra capacity” and “peaking factors,” but the plaintiffs contended these methods did not accurately reflect the actual cost of providing water at higher usage tiers.The Superior Court of San Diego County certified the case as a class action and held a bifurcated trial. In the first phase, the court found that the City failed to demonstrate, with substantial evidence, that its tiered rates for SFR customers complied with section 6(b)(3), concluding the rates were not based on the actual cost of service at each tier but rather on usage budgets and conservation goals. The court also found the City lacked sufficient data to justify its allocation of costs to higher tiers and that the rate structure discriminated against SFR customers compared to other classes. In the second phase, the court awarded the class a refund for overcharges, offset by undercharges, and ordered the City to implement new, compliant rates.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s judgment with directions. The appellate court held that the City bore the burden of proving its rates did not exceed the proportional cost of service and that the applicable standard was not mere reasonableness but actual cost proportionality, subject to independent judicial review. The court found substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings that the City’s tiered rates were not cost-based and thus violated section 6(b)(3). The court also upheld class certification and the method for calculating the refund, and directed the trial court to amend the judgment to comply with newly enacted Government Code section 53758.5, which affects the manner of refunding overcharges. View "Patz v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, former tenants of apartments owned and managed by the defendants, filed a putative class action alleging that the defendants violated Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 186, Section 15B (4) (iii) by deducting charges for "reasonable wear and tear" from tenants' security deposits. The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants included lease provisions requiring tenants to have the premises professionally cleaned at the end of the lease, which they argued was a violation of the same statute.The case was initially filed in the Superior Court and later removed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs moved for class certification, and both parties moved for summary judgment. The Federal judge denied these motions without prejudice and certified two questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts regarding the interpretation of the statute.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a tenant's reasonable use of a property as a residence is expected to result in gradual deterioration, such as the need for painting, carpet repair, or similar refurbishment at the end of a lease. Deductions from a security deposit for such reasonable wear and tear violate the statute. Whether damage constitutes "reasonable wear and tear" is a fact-specific question depending on various circumstances, including the nature and cause of the damage, the condition of the property at the start of the lease, and the length of the occupancy.The court also held that a lease provision requiring a tenant to have the premises professionally cleaned at the end of the lease, on penalty of bearing the costs of repairs regardless of whether the damage is reasonable wear and tear, conflicts with the statute. Such a provision is void and unenforceable under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 186, Section 15B (8). View "Peebles v. JRK Property Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, who owned real property in Southfield, Michigan, became delinquent on their property taxes between 2012 and 2014. Oakland County foreclosed on their properties under the General Property Tax Act (GPTA). The plaintiffs had the opportunity to redeem their properties by paying the delinquent taxes, but they failed to do so. Consequently, the properties were foreclosed, and the city of Southfield exercised its right of first refusal to purchase the properties for the minimum bid, which included the unpaid taxes and associated fees. The properties were then conveyed to the Southfield Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative (SNRI).The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in the Oakland Circuit Court, alleging violations of their constitutional rights, including the Takings Clauses of the Michigan and United States Constitutions. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants, citing lack of jurisdiction, lack of standing, and res judicata. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. However, the Michigan Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Co, which held that retaining surplus proceeds from tax-foreclosure sales violated the Takings Clause of the Michigan Constitution.On remand, the trial court again granted summary disposition to the defendants, but the Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that Rafaeli applied retroactively and that the plaintiffs had valid takings claims. The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that a taking occurs when a governmental unit retains property without offering it for public sale and the value of the property exceeds the amount owed in taxes and fees. The Court also held that MCL 211.78m, as amended, applies prospectively, while MCL 211.78t applies retroactively but does not govern this case. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. Southfield Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit filed by Albert Pickett, Jr., Keyonna Johnson, Jarome Montgomery, Odessa Parks, and Tiniya Shepherd against the City of Cleveland. The plaintiffs, all African American residents of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, allege that Cleveland Water's policy of placing water liens on properties for unpaid water bills disproportionately affects Black homeowners. The water liens, which accumulate penalties and interest, can lead to foreclosure and eviction. The plaintiffs claim that this policy violates the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Ohio Civil Rights Act (OCRA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, creating the "Water Lien Class" under Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class includes all Black homeowners or residents in Cuyahoga County who have had a water lien placed on their property by Cleveland Water within the last two years. The district court found that the plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a) and that common questions of law and fact predominated over individual issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's certification order. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue their FHA claim on a disparate-impact theory. The court found that the common question of whether Cleveland's water lien policy disproportionately affects Black homeowners predominated over individual issues, satisfying Rule 23(b)(3). The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(2) for injunctive and declaratory relief. The appellate court declined to address the merits of the plaintiffs' FHA claim, focusing solely on the class certification issues. View "Pickett v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Susan Carpenter, as trustee for the H. Joe King, Jr. Revocable Trust, sold two properties in North Carolina in April 2020. Both properties were part of homeowners’ associations managed by William Douglas Management, Inc. Carpenter paid fees for statements of unpaid assessments required for the sales, which she claimed were excessive under North Carolina law. She filed a class action lawsuit against William Douglas and NextLevel Association Solutions, Inc., alleging violations of state laws, including the prohibition of transfer fee covenants, the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and the Debt Collection Act, along with claims of negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy.The case was initially filed in North Carolina state court but was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. The district court dismissed Carpenter’s complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that the fees charged were not transfer fees as defined by state law and that the companies were not deceptive or unfair in charging them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the fees charged for the statements of unpaid assessments did not qualify as transfer fees under North Carolina law. The court also found that the fees were not unfair or deceptive under the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Consequently, Carpenter’s additional claims of unjust enrichment, violation of the Debt Collection Act, negligent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy were also dismissed, as they were contingent on the success of her primary claims. View "Carpenter v. William Douglas Management Inc" on Justia Law

Phillip and Sara Alig, along with Daniel and Roxanne Shea, filed a class action lawsuit against Quicken Loans, Inc. (now Rocket Mortgage, LLC) and Title Source, Inc. (now Amrock, Inc.). They alleged that during the refinancing of their home mortgage loans, they paid for appraisals that were not independent because the defendants had provided appraisers with the homeowners' estimates of their homes' value. They claimed this made the appraisals worthless and asserted statutory, breach of contract, and conspiracy claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia certified a class of West Virginia citizens who refinanced mortgage loans with Quicken and received appraisals that included an estimate of the property's value. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, awarding over $10.6 million in damages. The court found that the plaintiffs had established a conspiracy between the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the class certification and summary judgment on the statutory and conspiracy claims but vacated and remanded the breach of contract claim. The Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, which emphasized that every class member must have Article III standing to recover damages.On remand, the district court reinstated its original judgment, stating that TransUnion did not affect the class's standing. However, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs failed to establish that class members suffered concrete harm from the defendants' actions. The court reversed the district court's judgment certifying the class and awarding damages, affirming the judgment on the named plaintiffs' statutory and conspiracy claims, and vacating the judgment on the breach of contract claim, remanding it for further proceedings. View "Alig v. Rocket Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, former residents of a federally subsidized housing complex, alleged that the defendants, the complex's owner and management company, failed to maintain the property in a safe and habitable condition. They claimed the defendants delayed inspections, concealed hazards, and violated housing laws. The plaintiffs sought class certification for all residents from 2004 to 2019, citing issues like a 2019 sewage backup and systemic neglect.The Superior Court in Hartford, transferred to the Complex Litigation Docket, denied the motion for class certification. The court found that the proposed class did not meet the predominance and superiority requirements under Practice Book § 9-8 (3). It reasoned that determining whether each unit was uninhabitable required individualized proof, making a class action unsuitable. The court noted that while some claims might support class certification for specific events, the broad class definition over many years was too extensive.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the proposed class was too broad and lacked generalized evidence for the entire period. It emphasized that the trial court had no obligation to redefine the class sua sponte. The plaintiffs did not request a narrower class definition, and the trial court was not required to do so on its own. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. View "Collier v. Adar Hartford Realty, LLC" on Justia Law