Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a class action complaint in Nevada state court against his employer, alleging that the employer failed to pay him and other similarly situated employees overtime and minimum wages, listing causes of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 216(b), under Nevada labor laws, and for breach of contract. At issue was whether a rejected offer of judgment for the full amount of a putative class representative's individual claim mooted a class action complaint where the offer preceded the filing of a motion for class certification. The court held that where a defendant made an unacceptable Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 offer of judgment that fully satisfied a named plaintiff's individual claim before the named plaintiff filed a motion for class certification, the offer did not moot the case so long as the named plaintiff could still file a timely motion for class certification. Once filed, a timely motion for class certification related back to the time of the filing of the complaint. The court further held that the district court abused its discretion in finding that plaintiff could no longer file a timely motion of class certification; that it erred in refusing to allow plaintiff to abandon his FLSA claims; and that it erred in holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.100 abrogated plaintiff's breach of contract claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

After multiple appeals to the court and extensive trial and other proceedings, plaintiffs' Title VII class action for employment discrimination against Lufkin Industries, Inc. (Lufkin) culminated in a favorable multimillion dollar judgment and injunctive relief. Both parties subsequently challenged the district court's attorneys' fee award and Lufkin's complaint that back pay damages were erroneously authorized in an earlier appeal. The court affirmed as to the back pay damages but vacated and remanded as to the attorneys' fees. In particular, given the unrebutted evidence in the record that it was necessary for plaintiffs to retain counsel from outside the Eastern District of Texas, the district court abused its discretion in failing to use the rate counsel charged in their home district as the starting point in the lodestar calculation.

Plaintiffs appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing their class-action complaint, which asserted a single claim against MetLife under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Plaintiffs alleged that through the use of "retained asset accounts" (RAAs), MetLife breached fiduciary duties imposed by ERISA by retaining and investing for its own profit life insurance proceeds due them under employee benefit plans that MetLife administered. The court held that the district court correctly determined that plaintiffs failed to state a claim, since MetLife discharged its fiduciary obligations under ERISA when it established the RAAs in accordance with the plans at issue, and did not misuse "plan assets" by holding and investing the funds backing the accounts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiffs in these four cases appealed from a judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant and dismissing their product liability claims for injuries allegedly caused by defendant's prescription drug, Fosamax. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision concluding that their product liability claims, brought under Virginia law, were not tolled by the pendency of a putative federal class action that raised identical claims and dismissing plaintiffs' claims as time-barred. The court held that the availability of "cross jurisdictional tolling" in this context raised questions of Virginia law that were appropriately certified to the Supreme Court of Virginia.

Davis learned that the government was suspending sale of new 30-year bonds.The information was embargoed until 10 AM. He passed the information to traders, who bought futures contracts with an eight-minute head start and reaped profits. The brokerage settled SEC charges. PPP sought to represent a class of traders who held short positions in futures when the brokerage took the long side. The district judge concluded that such a class would be unrelated to trading that occurred during eight minutes of October 31, 2001 and denied certification. Investors, all of whom held short positions during the eight minutes, filed their own suit. The court dismissed because the two-year limitations period (7 U.S.C. 25(c)), had expired, rejecting an argument that claims did not accrue until the SEC filed its complaint. Meanwhile PPP's proposal for a reduced class was rejected. PPP accepted an offer of judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. The court rejected PPP's proposal to continue the suit. The investor suit plaintiff sought to intervene as class representative. The district court denied that motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. With respect to the limitations period, the court noted when the investors were aware of their harm. There cannot be a class action without a viable representative and there was no such representative involved in the appeal.

The Township brought a putative class action on behalf of itself and similarly situated New Jersey municipalities, alleging that defendants, companies who operate hotel booking sites online, owe unpaid hotel occupancy taxes. Defendants calculate the tax owed based on the negotiated rate paid by a defendant (wholesale rate), not the higher rate charged consumers (retail rate). Defendants pay the tax to the hotel, which remits it to the state taxing authority.The district court dismissed on grounds of prudential standing, holding that state officials have the right to enforce the statutory tax scheme. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Township is not the proper plaintiff. Authority to adopt a hotel tax is granted municipalities by N.J. Stat. 40:48F-1, but administration and collection are left to state officials.

Plaintiffs Cynthia Dudley-Barton, Richard Ice, Richard Mason, Deana Murphy and Susan Schmitz filed a class action lawsuit against Service Corporation International (SCI) based on allegedly unlawful employment practices and policies. Plaintiffs sought to recover unpaid wages based on SCI's purported failure to compensate its employees for time spent outside of regular work hours but on company business. In making these assertions, Plaintiffs brought four claims for violation of Colorado wage and labor laws, and state claims for breach of contract, fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conversion and misrepresentation. Shortly after Plaintiffs filed their complaint, SCI removed the case to federal court. Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand. The district court granted Plaintiffs' motion, concluding that SCI had not established that the amount in controversy exceeded the $5 million jurisdictional threshold required under federal law. SCI appealed the remand to state court to the Tenth Circuit. But before SCI filed its appeal, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss their state court petition against SCI without prejudice. The Tenth Circuit subsequently granted SCI's petition for leave to appeal. The Tenth Circuit dismissed this appeal as moot.

Plaintiffs, on behalf of a putative class, sued defendant under the Missouri Second Mortgage Loan Act (MSMLA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 408.231-408.241, alleging that defendant charged them unauthorized interest and fees in violation of section 408.233.1 of the MSMLA. At issue was whether defendants violated the MSMLA by charging plaintiffs a loan discount, settlement/closing fee, document processing/delivery fee, and prepaid interest. The court held that plaintiffs did suffer a loss of money when defendant charged the loan discount, although plaintiffs received the loan discount amount two days later as part of a loan disbursement. The court also held that it could not decide whether the loan discount and the settlement/closing fee violated the MSMLA and remanded for further proceedings. The court further held that the document processing/delivery fee was not included in section 408.233's exclusive list of authorized charges and violated the MSMLA. The court finally held that because the processing/delivery free violated the MSMLA, the prepaid interest was an additional violation of the statute. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs, visually or manually impaired Florida citizens who were registered to vote in Duval County, Florida and were represented by the American Association of People with Disabilities, filed a putative class action against defendants, alleging that defendants violated federal statutory and state constitutional provisions by failing to provide handicapped-accessible voting machines to visually or manually impaired Florida voters after the 2000 general election. The court vacated its prior opinion and in its revised opinion, held that the district court erroneously granted plaintiffs' requested declaratory judgment and injunction against purported violations of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. The opinion, however, based that outcome exclusively on the ground that voting machines were not "facilities" under 28 C.F.R. 35.151(b).

Plaintiffs want to represent a class of more than 100 people with stakes of more than $5 million and invoked federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2), the Class Action Fairness Act. They claim that the company violates the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act prohibition on pyramid schemes, 815 ILCS 505/2A(2). The company's customers sell each other the right to act as travel agencies, as well as selling travel services to the public. The district court did not decide whether the operation is a pyramid scheme, but ruled that transactions with residents of states other than Illinois are outside the Act, dismissed the non-Illinois plaintiffs, and decided that the suit is an intra-state controversy that belongs in state court. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Section 1332(d)(4) requires the court to decline jurisdiction when at least two-thirds of the members of the proposed class reside in the same state as the principal defendant. The class that plaintiffs propose is nationwide. Subject-matter jurisdiction depends on the state of things when suit is filed; what happens later does not detract from jurisdiction already established. While the pleadings do not establish that Illinois law does apply, they do not defeat the application of that law.