Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

In 1999, four employees of a Domino Sugar refinery sued parent company Tate & Lyle North America Sugars, Inc. (T&L) for damages from noise exposure during their employment with T&L between 1947 and 1994. Continental Casualty Insurance Company insured T&L with eight general liability policies. Each of the policies contained exclusions for bodily injury to employees arising out of the course and scope of their employees. In one of the eight policies, the exclusion was deleted by a special endorsement effective in 1975. After T&L notified Continental of the lawsuit, Continental retained defense counsel to defend T&L. In 2001, 125 new plaintiffs were added to the suit, and the complaint was amended to allege noise exposure from 1947 to 2001. At some point, trial was continued to allow for settlement. In 2003, without Continental's consent, T&L settled with 1 of 15 "flights" of plaintiffs for $35,000 per plaintiff. After that settlement, Continental was notified. One month later, Continental withdrew from the defense, disclaiming its liability based on a mistaken belief that all of its policies contained the exclusions for injuries to employees. In the subsequent years following the first settlement, additional plaintiffs were added. In 2004, the trial court granted partial summary judgment to T&L, finding that Continental had waived its right to rely on its policy exclusion defenses for "first flight" plaintiffs. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on Continental's exclusions and its disclaiming liability for subsequent plaintiffs. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Court held that an insurer's breach of the duty to defend does not result in a waiver of all coverage defenses when the insured seeks indemnity under the policy. In this case, Continental had disclaimed coverage at the time more plaintiffs were added to the lawsuit, and did not provide a defense to those claims. Therefore, waiver principles did not apply. Continental was only liable to T&L in indemnity on a pro rata basis for the exposures that took place during the coverage period. The Court remanded the case for a determination of whether twelve remaining plaintiff-flights met the settlement criteria.

Defendants Farmers Insurance Company of Oregon, Mid-Century Insurance Company and Truck Insurance Exchange (Farmers) petitioned the Supreme Court to reconsider an opinion that affirmed a trial court's judgment against it for approximately $8.9 million in compensatory and punitive damages. Farmers contended that the Court's resolution of certain state law issues violated its federal due process rights. Farmers was required by statute and contract to provide personal injury protection to its insureds by covering all reasonable and necessary medical expenses within a year of the insured's injury. Plaintiff Mark Strawn filed a class action suit against Farmers, alleging that Farmers' claims handling process breached its contractual obligations to its insureds. According to Farmers, the Court, in its prior decision, created an "irrebuttable presumption" that altered what was required under state law to prove a fraud claim in a class action in a way that violated due process. The Court held that "Farmers's argument misses the mark" by characterizing the Court's conclusion in its prior holding as "novel" by "assuming the answer to one of the legal questions that [the] Court had to resolve." The Court concluded that Farmers' premises on appeal were incorrect, and that "Farmers's legal arguments therefore fail."

This appeal arose from a motion for class certification filed in the trial court by petitioner where petitioner claimed that respondent violated sections 627.840(3)(b) and 627.835, Florida Statutes, by knowingly overcharging him an additional service charge of $20 twice in a twelve month period in two premium finance agreements which he entered into with respondent. At issue was whether the putative class members satisfied the requirements of commonality and predominance needed for class certification under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220. The court held that the Third District's decision was incorrect because it afforded no deference to the trial court's actual factual findings and conducted a de novo review which constituted error where the proper appellate standard of review for a grant of class certification was abuse of discretion. The court also held that the Third District incorrectly addressed whether petition satisfied section 627.835's "knowingly" requirement and incorrectly held that petitioner and the putative class members failed to satisfy rule 1.220's commonality and predominance requirements. Therefore, the court held that the Third District created conflict with Olen Properties Corp. v. Moss and Smith v. Glen Cove Apartments Condominiums Master Ass'n. Accordingly, the court quashed the Third District's judgment.

Minnesota homeowners brought this action against Zurn Pex, Inc. and Zurn Industries, Inc. (Zurn), alleging that brass fittings used in the company's cross linked polyethylene (PEX) plumbing systems was inherently defective. Zurn appealed the order issued by the district court certifying the warranty and negligence classes. The court held that the district court did not err by conducted a focused Daubert analysis which scrutinized the reliability of the expert testimony in light of the criteria for class certification and the current state of the evidence. In doing so, the district court conducted the requisite "rigorous analysis" of the parties' claims to determine "whether the defendant's liability to all plaintiffs may be established with common evidence." After thoroughly reviewing the record made in the district court in light of the controlling law, the court held that the district court did not commit legal error or abuse its discretion and its class certification was affirmed.

The issues central to this case are whether donning doffing poultry processing workers’ personal protective equipment is "changing clothes" under 29 U.S.C. 204 and whether a turkey processing plant is a “food and beverage industry” under Colorado law. Plaintiffs/Appellants Clara Salazar and Juanita Ybarra brought suit on behalf of hourly production employees at Defendant/Appellee Butterball, LLC’s Colorado turkey processing plant. Plaintiffs claimed that Butterball’s failure to compensate them for the time spent changing in and out of their personal protective equipment violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Colorado Minimum Wage Order. The district court entered summary judgment in Butterball’s favor, holding that the donning and doffing time was excluded and that the Colorado Wage Order did not apply to Butterball. Upon consideration of the submitted briefs and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Court found that donning and doffing time is not "hours worked" as defined by FLSA. Furthermore, Butterball is a reseller, and the Colorado regulation applied only to employers "that sell food directly to the consuming public." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s decisions.

In this lawsuit, one of several suits alleging construction defects in homes located in a Shea Homes planned community, plaintiffs Albert Albano and other homeowners appealed to the circuit court from the district court's summary judgment dismissing their construction-defect claims against Shea Homes as barred by Arizona's statute of repose. The plaintiffs were three homeowners not allowed to join a previous putative class action against Shea Homes. On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the district court erred in failing to apply American Pipe v. Utah, which tolls the applicable statute of limitations for non-named class members until class certification is denied, to the period between the filing of the previous putative class action lawsuit and the denial of class certification. The Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction to answer the certified question of whether the American Pipe tolling rule would also apply to a statute of repose. The Court held that the class-action tolling doctrine does not apply to statutes of repose, and more specifically, to the statute of repose for construction defects.

The United States Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation consolidated approximately 1800 cases involving claims that sought damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by exposure to welding fumes. Several dozen of these cases are governed by Alabama law, and the MDL court identified three issues of law that may be determinative in those cases. The Supreme Court responded in summary: (1) a plaintiff injured by long-term continuous exposure to a toxic substance is limited to recovering damages attributable to injuries occurring within the period of limitations; (2) a six-year statute of limitations applies to wantonness claims filed before the Court’s holding in "Ex parte Capstone" was released; and (3) a plaintiff injured by long-term continuous exposure to a toxic substance has the burden to establish what damages (if any) are attributable to his injuries occurring within the applicable limitation period.

This appeal involved a putative class action filed by three Pennsylvania Medicaid beneficiaries subject to the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare's (DPW) liens against future settlements or judgments. At issue was whether state agencies responsible for administering the Medicaid program have the authority to assert such liens and, if so, whether Pennsylvania's statutory framework was consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn. The court examined the text, structure, history, and purpose of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq., and held that liens limited to medical costs were not prohibited by the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(a)-(b). Accordingly, the court upheld Pennsylvania's longstanding practice of imposing such liens. The court also held that Pennsylvania's current statutory framework, which afforded Medicaid recipients a right of appeal from the default allocation, was a permissible default apportionment scheme.

This suit followed BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc.'s (BPXA) temporary shut-down of its pipelines and oil production in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, upon its discovery of a leak in a pipeline located in its Prudhoe Bay Eastern Operating Area. Plaintiff, on behalf of a class of purchasers of BP p.l.c. shares, subsequently brought a class action suit against BPXA alleging claims arising under Sections 10(b), 18, and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act (SEC), 15 U.S.C. 78b(b), 78r, and 78t(a), and Rule 10b-5. Both parties appealled in part from the judgment of the district court. The court held that BPXA's breach of a contractual promise of specific future conduct, even though the contract was filed in conjunction with SEC reporting requirements, was not a sufficient foundation for a securities fraud action. The court declined plaintiff's invitation to review other issues that were not certified for interlocutory appeal. In light of the court's conclusion that breached contractual obligations did not constitute misrepresentations by BPXA that were actionable under the securities laws, the court did not reach the issue of scienter. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

Plaintiffs in this putative class action were buyers and processors of farm-raised crawfish who sought to recover their economic loss from a pesticide manufacturer under the Louisiana Products Liability Act, (LPLA), La. Rev. State. Ann. 9:2800.54. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to the manufacturer because plaintiffs' economic loss was unaccompanied by damage to their own person or property. The court held that, although plaintiffs have submitted evidence suggesting that they worked closely with crawfish farmers, plaintiffs have not submitted any evidence suggesting that the pesticide actually harmed their crawfish. The court also held that there was no evidence that plaintiffs were deprived of an actual, legal right to buy crawfish from the crawfish farmers. The court further denied plaintiffs' request to certify their proposed question to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order of summary judgment.