Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

In this putative class action, plaintiff alleged that HSBC and Best Buy (collectively, defendants) defrauded California customers by offering credit cards without adequately disclosing that cardholders would be subject to an annual fee. At issue was whether the district court erred when it considered extrinsic evidence in deciding defendants' motion to dismiss, and whether dismissal was proper under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that the district court properly incorporated the disclosure documents at issue and the court affirmed its order dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. View "Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., et al." on Justia Law

Objectors appealed the district court's approval of a class action settlement. The underlying case involved allegations that Disney violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12182 et seq., by implementing a policy that banned the use of two-wheeled vehicles, including Segways, by customers within its park and hotels, without exception. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class and in approving the settlement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the settlement orders. View "Ault, et al. v. Walt Disney World Co., et al." on Justia Law

This case arose out of the Boeing Company’s 2005 sale, to Spirit AeroSystems, Inc. of facilities in Wichita, Kansas, and Tulsa and McAlester, Oklahoma. Boeing terminated the Division's entire workforce of more than 10,000. The next day, Spirit rehired 8,354 employees, who had been selected by Boeing’s managers. Although older employees predominated in the workforce both before and after the sale, a lower percentage of older workers than younger ones were rehired. The plaintiffs sued, seeking to be declared a class of about 700 former Boeing employees who were not hired by Spirit. The Employees alleged, among other things, that Boeing, Onex, and Spirit violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). In two separate orders, the district court granted summary judgment on the Employees’ Title VII and ADA claims, and their ERISA and ADEA claims. The court denied the Employees’ motion for reconsideration. Upon review of the Employees' claims on appeal, the Tenth Circuit found no error in the district court's judgment and affirmed the grant of summary judgment. View "Apsley v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

Appellants, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, filed a class action complaint against their Internet service providers (Providers). Providers' Internet service agreement contained an arbitration clause that required customers to submit damage claims against Insight to arbitration, and it barred class action litigation against Providers by their customers. The circuit court determined the class action ban was enforceable and dismissed Appellants' complaint. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the contractual provision under which Appellants waived their right to participate in class action litigation was enforceable under federal law; (2) the service agreement's choice of law provision was not enforceable; (3) the service agreement's general arbitration provision was enforceable; and (4) the provision imposing a confidentiality requirement upon the litigants to arbitration proceedings was void and severable from the remaining portions of the agreement. Remanded for entry of a final judgment. View "Schnuerle v. Insight Commc'ns Co., LP" on Justia Law

Appellants, attorney Barbara Bonar and her law firm, claimed entitlement to a portion of the attorney's fees awarded in a class action settlement. Bonar and Appellees, a law firm and attorneys, initiated the class action as co-counsel. Before the settlement was negotiated, Bonar withdrew. Bonar claimed she was forced to withdraw. Following a bench trial, the circuit court concluded Bonar was not entitled to any of the attorney's fees because her withdrawal was voluntary. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the weight of the evidence supported the conclusion that Bonar withdrew from the case voluntarily, and therefore, Bonar was not entitled to any portion of the attorney's fees awarded to class counsel; (2) the trial court did not improperly limit discovery; and (3) the trial court did not violate Bonar's right to a fair trial by commenting on Bonar's conduct. View "B. Dahlenburg Bonar, P.S.C. v. Waite, Schneier, Bayless & Chesley Co., LPA" on Justia Law

Holocaust survivors and heirs of other Holocaust victims sued, alleging that the Hungarian National Bank and Hungarian National Railway participated in expropriating property from Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust. Railway plaintiffs claimed subject matter jurisdiction under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(3), and assert: takings in violation of international law, aiding and abetting genocide, complicity in genocide, violations of customary international law, unlawful conversion, unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and accounting. Bank plaintiffs claimed subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA expropriation and waiver exceptions, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(1) and assert: genocide, aiding and abetting genocide, bailment, conversion, constructive trust, and accounting. They sought certifications as class actions, seeking to have the railway held responsible for approximately $1.25 billion, and the bank held jointly and severally responsible with private banks for approximately $75 billion. The district court declined to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit held that it had appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and remanded with instructions that plaintiffs either exhaust available Hungarian remedies identified by defendants or present a legally compelling reason for failure to do so. The court should allow jurisdictional discovery with respect to whether the railway is engaged in “commercial activity” in the U.S. View "Abelsz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank" on Justia Law

Holocaust survivors and heirs of other Holocaust victims sued, alleging that defendant banks participated in expropriating property from Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust. Invoking subject-matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1330(a), the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.1350, and federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, they alleged: genocide, aiding and abetting genocide, bailment, conversion, constructive trust, and accounting. Plaintiffs sought certification as a class action and asked that each bank be held jointly and severally responsible for damages of approximately $75 billion. This case and a parallel case against the Hungarian national railway have produced nine appeals and mandamus petitions. The district court declined to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit, noting that such a decision would ordinarily not be reviewable, stated that: “This is the rare case, however, in which it is appropriate for this court to exercise its discretion to issue a writ of mandamus to confine the district court to the exercise of its lawful jurisdiction” The court cited the extraordinary scale of the litigation, the inherent involvement with U.S. foreign policy, and the “crystal clarity” of the lack of foundation for exercising general personal jurisdiction over the banks. View "Abelesz v. OTP Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's order denying class certification of their proposed class action against T-Mobile, contending that the district court erred in concluding that T-Mobile did not waive its right to assert arbitration and class-action defenses. The court held, however, that plaintiffs failed to challenge in their opening brief the district court's ruling that they failed to establish the predominance of common issues because of variations in damages. Therefore, plaintiffs have abandoned any contention that the district court erred in denying class certification. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Robinson, et al. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc." on Justia Law

This was an interlocutory appeal from a Superior Court order that certified a class represented by the plaintiff, Karen L. Lawrence, consisting of "all individuals who purchased Marlboro Lights cigarettes in New Hampshire from January 1, 1995, until the date of trial." The superior court transferred a single question for the Supreme Court's review: :Did the Superior Court err in its application of New Hampshire law when it granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification?" The Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative and reversed the trial court’s certification order. View "Lawrence v. Philip Morris USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Alleging that Appellant Conestoga Title Insurance Company charged more for title insurance than its filed rates permitted, Appellee Nancy A. White asserted three claims against Conestoga in a class action complaint. The Supreme Court granted review to consider whether White was precluded from pursuing all of her claims because Article VII of the Insurance Department Act of 1921 provided her with an exclusive administrative remedy under Section 1504 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed in part and affirm in part. Specifically, the Court reversed the Superior Court's order reversing the trial court's dismissal of White's common law claims for money had and received and for unjust enrichment, and the Court affirmed (albeit on different grounds) the Superior Court's order reversing the trial court's dismissal of White's statutory claim brought under Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. View "White v. Conestoga Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law