Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

This case involved an interlocutory appeal from an order granting plaintiffs' motion for class certification where the certified class putatively consisted of various governmental entities within the State of Louisiana whose representatives entered into contracts with defendants for cellular telephone service. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants engaged in deceptive billing practices that constituted a breach of contract and violated the state's unfair trade and consumer protection laws. The court agreed with defendants that the district court abused its discretion when it certified plaintiffs' class because, in doing so, it effectively certified an "opt in" class, which was impermissible under Rule 23. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated, remanding for further proceedings. View "Ackal, et al v. Centennial Beauregard Cellular, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in these five separate putative class actions alleged that Wells Fargo and Wachovia Bank unlawfully charged them overdraft fees for their checking accounts, which were governed by agreements that provided for arbitration of disputes on an individual basis. On appeal, Wells Fargo argued that it did not waive its right to compel arbitration because it would have been futile to move to compel arbitration before the Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. The court concluded that Concepcion established no new law. Because the court concluded that it would have been futile for Wells Fargo to argue that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., preempted any state laws that purported to make the classwide arbitration provisions unenforceable, the court affirmed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration. View "Garcia v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

LG Display sought to appeal the district court's rejection of their assertions of federal court jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332. South Carolina initiated these cases in state court, alleging violations of the State's Antitrust Act and its Unfair Trade Practices Act (SCUTPA), S.C. Code 39-3-130, -180. The court concluded that CAFA's minimal diversity requirement was not satisfied in either of these cases, and the district court properly remanded them to state court. Accordingly, the petitions for appeal of LG Display were granted and the Remanded Decisions were affirmed. View "AU Optronics Corp. v. State of South Carolina" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated plaintiffs, argued that a series of automated telephone calls placed to his home by Best Buy violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, and the Washington Automatic Dialing and Announcing Device Act (WADAD), Wash. Rev. Code 80.36.400. The court concluded that these calls were aimed at encouraging listeners to engage in future commercial transactions with Best Buy to purchase its goods. They constituted unsolicited advertisements, telephone solicitations, and telemarketing, and were prohibited by the TCPA, the WADAD, and the Washington Consumer Protection Act, Wash. Rev. Code 80.36.400(3). View "Chesbro v. Best Buy Co., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2010-2011 several hundred plaintiffs filed 10 lawsuits in Illinois state courts against Abbott, for personal injuries they allege were caused by Depakote, a prescription. Plaintiffs moved the Supreme Court of Illinois to consolidate and transfer their cases to St. Clair County, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 384; the Supreme Court has not ruled. Abbott removed each of the cases to federal court, asserting that the motion to consolidate brought the cases under the “mass action” provision of the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(11)(B)(i), which allows the removal of any case where 100 or more people propose to try their claims jointly. Cases filed in St. Clair and Madison counties were removed to the Southern District of Illinois and cases filed in Cook County were removed to the Northern District; plaintiffs moved to remand in both courts. The Northern District denied plaintiffs’ motion to remand. The Seventh Circuit held that removal was proper, rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that they did not propose a joint trial because their motion to consolidate did not address how the trials of the various claims in the cases would be conducted, other than proposing that they all take place in St. Clair County.View "Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Alexander" on Justia Law

PRA appealed the district court's order granting plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and provisional class certification. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that PRA's debt collection efforts violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. The court held that the district court had jurisdiction to issue the order; the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying a provisional class for purposes of the preliminary injunction; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assoc., et al" on Justia Law

In this action under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651, and the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283, the court considered whether, following the approval of a federal class action settlement, the district court properly enjoined a state court action for legal malpractice directed at counsel for the plaintiff class. The court held that the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act could not form the basis for the district court's injunction of the state court action, as the limited circumstances in which the injunction of an in personam action could be appropriate "in aid of" the court's jurisdiction were not present in this case. The court also concluded that where, as here, the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the reasonableness of counsel's representation, a subsequent malpractice action could be enjoined under the relitigation exception. View "Barroway v. Computer Assoc., et. al." on Justia Law

This putative class action was one of a number of breach-of-contract suits being brought against financial institutions nationwide by mortgagors who claimed that they were improperly forced to increase flood insurance coverage on their properties. The plaintiff in this case asserted that Bank of America's demand that he increase his flood coverage by $46,000 breached both the terms of his mortgage contract and the contract's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court concluded that the pertinent provision of the mortgage unambiguously permitted the lender to require the increased flood coverage and, hence, it granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of dismissal in favor of the Bank, holding that the mortgage was reasonably susceptible to an understanding that supported the plaintiff's breach of contract and implied covenant claims. Remanded. View "Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP" on Justia Law

United HealthCare hired Chimes, a centralized vendor management company, to assist it with the procurement and management of contingent workers. Chimes entered into supplier contracts with New Millennium and Pacific Management, among others, to provide the contingent labor to United HealthCare. New Millennium and Pacific Management brought this putative class action against United HealthCare, alleging that it was liable to them and other suppliers for the unpaid bills as the principal of Chimes. Because Chimes was not an agent of United HealthCare under prevailing Minnesota law, the court affirmed the district court's denial of class certification and grant of summary judgment to United HealthCare. View "New Millennium Consulting, et al v. United Healthcare Services" on Justia Law

Lesley and Fogg presented the Benistar 419 Plan to the Ouwingas, their accountant, and their attorney, providing a legal opinion that contributions were tax-deductible and that the Ouwingas could take money out tax-free. The Ouwingas made substantial contributions, which were used to purchase John Hancock life insurance policies. In 2003, Lesley and Fogg told the Ouwingas that the IRS had changed the rules; that the Ouwingas would need to contribute additional money; and that, while this might signal closing of the “loophole,” there was no concern about tax benefits already claimed. In 2006, the Ouwingas decided to transfer out of the Plans. John Hancock again advised that there would be no taxable consequences and that the Plan met IRS requirements for tax deductible treatment. The Ouwingas signed a purported liability release. In 2008, the IRS notified the Ouwingas that it was disallowing deductions, deeming the Plan an “abusive tax shelter.” The Ouwingas filed a class action against Benistar Defendants, John Hancock entities, lawyers, Lesley, and Fogg, alleging conspiracy to defraud (RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), (d)), negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and violations of consumer protection laws. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, View "Ouwinga v. Benistar 419 Plan Servs., Inc." on Justia Law