Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Until late 2008, Sprint included a flat-rate early termination fee provision in its cellular telephone contracts, which allowed it to charge a set fee to customers who terminated their contracts before the end date stated in the contract. Class action lawsuits were brought against cellular phone service providers who charged flat-rate ETFs, including Sprint. In this case, the plaintiffs entered into negotiations with Sprint, and, after five months of mediation, the parties decided to settle the matter for $17.5 million. Over objections lodged by several class members, the district court certified the settlement class and approved the Settlement Agreement. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. The district court did not adequately protect the rights of absent class members when it determined that it would be unreasonable to require a search of billing records for the purpose of providing individual notice to those class members. The court also suggested that the district court consider whether class representatives can adequately represent all members. View "Larson v. AT&T Mobility LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Larry Frederick brought a putative class action suit against Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company (Hartford) in Colorado state court; Hartford removed the case to federal court. Looking to the face of Plaintiff’s complaint, the district court concluded that the amount in controversy did not exceed $5,000,000 (which was required for federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)). Accordingly, the district court remanded the case to state court. In reaching its decision, the district court acknowledged that the Tenth Circuit had not defined the burden a defendant must carry to prevent a remand in a CAFA suit. Faced with this question, the Tenth Circuit held that a defendant in these circumstances is entitled to present his own estimate of the amount at stake and must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the amount in 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2) (currently $5,000,000). The Court emphasized that the preponderance standard applies to punitive damages as well, and that such damages cannot be assumed when calculating the amount in controversy. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Frederick v. Hartford" on Justia Law

Two people who use wheelchairs and organizations that represent persons with disabilities brought a class action against the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission and the TLC Commissioner for violation of Parts A and B of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The district court granted plaintiffs partial summary judgment as to liability on the ADA claim and entered a temporary injunction, requiring that all new taxi medallions and street-hail livery licenses be limited to vehicles that are wheelchair accessible until the TLC proposes and the district court approves a comprehensive plan to provide meaningful access to taxi service for wheelchair-bound passengers. The Second Circuit vacated the temporary injunction as improvidently granted. Although the TLC exercises pervasive control over the taxi industry in New York City, defendants were not required by Title II(A) to deploy their licensing and regulatory authority to mandate that persons who need wheelchairs be afforded meaningful access to taxis. View "Noel v. NY City Taxi & Limousine Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2011, FSRO filed a Demand for Arbitration against Fantastic Sam's Franchise Corporation, on behalf of its members, who are franchisees, holding individual license agreements with Fantastic Sams. FSRO alleged that the Corporation had breached those license agreements. The Corporation filed a petition pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 4, to stay FSRO's arbitration and to compel FSRO members to arbitrate their claims individually. The district court allowed the petition as to license agreements that specifically prohibit class-arbitration. The decision in favor of the Corporation was not appealed. The court denied relief as to other agreements, which state: “Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating in any way to this Agreement or with regard to its formation, interpretation or breach shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association." The First Circuit affirmed. Whether the language permits group arbitration, as requested by FSRO, is a question for the arbitrators. View "Fantastic Sams Franchise Corp. v. FSRO Ass'n, Ltd." on Justia Law

At issue here was national assets stolen by President Ferdinand Marcos. Victims of Marcos' human rights abuses ("Pimentel class") obtained a judgment against Marcos' estate and, in enforcing the judgment, sought to obtain assets also sought by the Republic of the Philippines and its commission organized to retrieve the assets (collectively, Republic). In dispute was the assets of Arelma, a Panamanian corporation, which were held in a brokerage account. The brokerage firm commenced an interpleader action in federal court. The district court awarded ownership of the Arelma assets to the Pimentel claimants. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the assertion of sovereign immunity by the Republic required dismissal for lack of a required party. Petitioner then commenced this turnover proceeding seeking to execute the Pimental judgment against the Arelma account. Meanwhile, a Philippine court determined the assets had been forfeited to the Republic. PNB and Arelma moved to intervene, requesting dismissal. Supreme Court denied the motion. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellate division did not err in concluding that dismissal was required under N.Y.C.P.L.R. 1001, as the Republic was a necessary party but could not be subject to joinder in light of the assertion of sovereign immunity. View "Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc." on Justia Law

Former inmates of Cook County Jail filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, charging that failure to provide more than a single dentist to 10,000 inmates constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, violating the Eighth Amendment and the due process clause. Although some are convicts, most are pretrial detainees, to whom the cruel and unusual punishments clause does not apply; the due process clause has been interpreted to provide equivalent protection. Two district judges denied class certification, but in a third materially identical suit, the judge granted certification after the Supreme Court held that "neither a proposed class action nor a rejected class action may bind nonparties." The Seventh Circuit granted the Rule 23(f) appeal from certification, limited to whether a district court, in deciding class certification, should "defer, based on the principles of comity, to a sister court's ruling on a motion for certification of a similar class." The court upheld the certification as not precluded, while noting that it could be incorrect. Without a rule of preclusion, class action lawyers can keep bringing identical class actions with new representatives until they draw a judge who is willing to certify the class, but preclusion is not the solution. View "Smentek v. Dart" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Arrienne Mae Winzler brought state law claims against Defendant-Appellee Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc. (Toyota) on behalf of a proposed nationwide class of 2006 Toyota Corolla and Toyota Corolla Matrix owners and lessees. She alleged that the cars harbored defective "Engine Control Modules" ("ECMs"), making them prone to stall without warning. As relief, she asked for an order requiring Toyota to notify all relevant owners of the defect and then to create and coordinate an equitable fund to pay for repairs. Before addressing whether Plaintiff's class should be certified, the district court held her complaint failed to state a claim and dismissed it under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). As Plaintiff began her appeal, Toyota announced a nationwide recall of 2005-2008 Toyota Corolla and Corolla Matrix cars to fix their ECMs. Arguing that these statutory and regulatory processes were exactly the relief sought in Plaintiff's complaint, Toyota asked the Tenth Circuit to find that its recall rendered Plaintiff's case moot. "Because prudential mootness is arguably the narrowest of the many bases Toyota has suggested for dismissal, and because it is sufficient to that task, [the Court has] no need to discuss any of Toyota's other arguments for the same result." The Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. View "Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, on behalf of thousands of retired county employees participating in county-sponsored health care plans, filed suit against the county challenging changes it made to the structure of two health benefits. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the county. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings and with the answer provided by the California Supreme Court to the certified question in the Retired Employees Association of Orange County, Inc.(REAOC) litigation. The court took judicial notice of the documents; reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' subsidy claims and remanded so that the district court could reassess those claims in light of the California Supreme Court's opinion, and coordinate those claims with the REAOC litigation; the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' grant claims because the court found that plaintiffs should be given an opportunity to amend their complaint to set out specifically the terms of those memoranda of understanding (MOUs) on which their claim predicated; and the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), California Government Code 12940 et seq., claim because the court found that Mr. McConnell's timely filed administrative complaint was sufficient to establish exhaustion of the administrative remedies for all class members. View "Harris, et al. v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

Five Medicaid recipients filed a class action against the District, alleging that the District systematically denied Medicaid coverage of prescription medications without providing the written notice required by federal and D.C. law. The district court dismissed the case on the pleadings, concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. At least with regard to one plaintiff, John Doe, the allegations sufficiently established injury, causation, and redressability and the court concluded that Doe had standing to pursue his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. Therefore, the court had no need to decide whether the other plaintiffs had standing and reversed the judgment, remanding for further proceedings. View "NB, et al. v. DC, et al." on Justia Law

A suit seeking to represent a class of inmates at the “supermax” Tamms Correctional Center, alleging due process violations, was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While remand was pending, the Illinois Department of Corrections developed a “Ten-Point Plan,” revising procedures for transferring inmates to Tamms, with a detailed transfer-review process. Although it had not been implemented, IDOC submitted the Plan at trial. The court held that conditions at Tamms impose atypical and significant hardship, establishing a due-process liberty interest in avoiding transfer to Tamms, and that procedures for transfer decisions were unconstitutional. The court entered an injunction incorporating the Ten-Point Plan. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The scope and specificity of the injunction exceed what is required to remedy the due process violation, contrary to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A), and to Supreme Court statements about remedial flexibility and deference to prison administrators in this type of litigation. Injunctive relief to remedy unconstitutional prison conditions must be “narrowly drawn,” extend “no further than necessary” to remedy the violation, and use the “least intrusive means” to correct the violation of the federal right. Making the Plan a constitutional baseline eliminated operational discretion and flexibility, exceeding what due process requires and violating the PLRA. View "Westefer v. Neal" on Justia Law