Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

These thirteen consolidated appeals brought by class counsel and six groups of objectors (collectively, Objectors) challenged the district court's decisions regarding attorney fee awards after the settlement of an antitrust class action against West Publishing Corp. and Kaplan, Inc. In this opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed nine separate appeals challenging the propriety of the district court's decision to deny attorneys' fees to class counsel McGuireWoods on account of a conflict of interest and to deny fees to objectors for their efforts in securing that decision. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that because the district court's decisions were not legally erroneous, the respective fee orders were affirmed, with the exception of the order denying fees to the Schneider Objectors, which the Court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rodriguez v. Disner" on Justia Law

Wal-Mart cleaning crew members sought compensation for unpaid overtime and certification of a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, civil damages under RICO, and damages for false imprisonment. The workers, illegal immigrants who took jobs with contractors and subcontractors Wal-Mart engaged to clean its stores, alleged: Wal-Mart had hiring and firing authority over them and closely directed their actions such that Wal-Mart was their employer under the FLSA; Wal-Mart took part in a RICO enterprise by transporting and harboring illegal immigrants, encouraging illegal immigration, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and involuntary servitude (18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(F)); Wal-Mart‘s practice of locking some stores at night and on weekends, without always having a manager available with a key, constituted false imprisonment. Over eight years and multiple opinions, the district court rejected final certification of an FLSA class and rejected the RICO and false imprisonment claims on several grounds, and rejected the false imprisonment claim on the merits. The Third Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs were not “similarly situated” under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 626(b). View "Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs filed this action against Cox Enterprises, Inc., on behalf of themselves as well as a putative class consisting of all persons in the United States who subscribe to Cox for so-called premium cable and who paid Cox a monthly rental fee for the accompanying set-up box. In order to receive full access to Cox’s premium cable services the plaintiffs had to rent the set-up box from Cox. The plaintiffs alleged that this constituted an illegal tie-in in violation of the Sherman Act. The case came before the Tenth Circuit on the district court's denial of their request for class certification. Upon review of the materials filed with the Court and the applicable law, the Tenth Circuit concluded the case was not appropriate for immediate review, and denied plaintiffs' request. View "Gelder, et al v. CoxCom Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Walsh is a nationwide builder; superintendents have discretion over hiring and pay of hourly workers. Walsh has rules against racial discrimination but superintendents are generally in charge. Plaintiffs worked for Walsh in 2002 and earlier and claimed that superintendents practiced, or tolerated, racial discrimination. Plaintiffs submitted a statistics indicating that black workers were less likely to work overtime; contended that some superintendents used words such as “nigger” or failed to prevent journeymen from doing so; and claimed that derogatory graffiti appeared in toilets or break sheds. Walsh claims that these were the work of subcontractors’ employees and that sites had different superintendents whose practices differed. The district court certified hostile work environment and overtime classes for the 262 Walsh sites in the Chicago area. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The 12 named plaintiffs cannot represent either class, since none worked for Walsh after 2002, but the classes extend into the indefinite future. The overtime class defined members as persons who did not earn more “because of their race.” Using a future decision on the merits to specify the scope of the class makes it impossible to determine who is in the class until the case ends. Plaintiffs may choose to propose site- or superintendent-specific classes. View "Bolden v. Walsh Constr. Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal were two issues: (1) whether the judicially created "filed rate doctrine," which typically has been utilized in common carrier and public utility litigation, was applicable in a class action lawsuit seeking monetary and injunctive relief under state law arising from the misreporting of pricing data to the USDA, where the data in turn were used to set a minimum price structure for raw milk sales; and (2) if the doctrine was applicable in that situation, whether the district court erred when it dismissed Plaintiffs' state causes of action on the ground that the filed rate doctrine barred such claims, even though the court found that it was not disputed that the USDA determined that the rates calculated were erroneous and that other rates should have applied based on correct pricing inputs. The plaintiffs here were dairy farmers who sold raw milk that was priced according to the erroneous reports. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the district court properly determined that the filed rate doctrine applied to the minimum milk pricing program, but erred by concluding that the doctrine applied to bar the plaintiffs' state-law claims in this case. View "Carlin v. DairyAmerica, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, Marcus leased a 2007 BMW from a dealership in New Jersey. Marcus suffered four “flat” tires during his three-year lease. Each time, he drove his car to a BMW dealership in New York and had the tire replaced. BMW billed Marcus between $350 to $390 for parts, labor, fees, and taxes. In each instance, the run-flat tires (RFT) worked as intended. Marcus sued Bridgestone, asserting consumer fraud, breach of warranty, and breach of contract claims. He claims that Bridgestone RFTs are “defective” because they: are highly susceptible to flats, punctures and bubbles, and fail at a significantly higher rate than radial tires or other run-flat tires; cannot be repaired, only replaced, in the event of a small puncture; and are “exorbitantly priced.” He claimed RFT-equipped BMWs cannot be retrofitted to operate with conventional tires, and that they are difficult to replace. The district court certified the suit under FRCP 23(b)(3) as an opt-out class action on behalf of all purchasers and lessees of certain model-year BMWs equipped with Bridgestone RFTs sold or leased in New Jersey with tires that have gone flat and been replaced. The Third Circuit vacated. Marcus’s claims do not satisfy the numerosity and predominance requirements. View "Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC" on Justia Law

Two individuals brought suit as individuals and on behalf of a putative class of investors, alleging that Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. (Stifel) and two of its employees, Neil Harrison and Roger Compton, violated federal securities law. Stifel and Compton (Defendants) filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). The district court concluded that Plaintiffs' allegations failed to satisfy the requirements for class action claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) and dismissed Plaintiffs' compliant with prejudice. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (1) reversed the district court's order with respect to Plaintiffs' individual claims, holding the district court erred in dismissing the claims without either staying the claims pending arbitration or undertaking an analysis of the claims under the PSLRA; and (2) affirmed the district court's order as it applied to Plaintiffs' class claims, holding that the court correctly determined that the complained failed to state viable class claims under Rule 23. Remanded. View "McCrary v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co." on Justia Law

Three named plaintiffs in a class action suit to enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b) and parallel state laws appealed the district court’s decertification of the classes. Proceeding as individual lawsuits by the three plaintiffs, the case settled, reserving plaintiffs’ right to appeal the decertification. The Seventh Circuit denied a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. If appeals such as this were held to be precluded on standing grounds, there would be no judicial economies, since if the named plaintiffs settle after denial of class certification and then exit the scene another member of the class can step forward and take the quitters’ place. View "Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff found a $20 parking citation on his windshield and initiated a class action, claiming that the inclusion of personal information, such as his driver's license number, address, and weight, violated the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2721, which generally makes it unlawful to disclose personal information contained in a motor vehicle record. The district court dismissed and the Seventh Circuit initially affirmed. On rehearing, en banc, the court reversed, holding that the DPPA’s general rule of non-disclosure of personal information held in motor vehicle records and its overarching purpose of privacy protection must inform a proper understanding of the other provisions of the statute. Any disclosure must comply with those legitimate uses of information identified in the statutory exceptions. The Village’s placement of protected personal information in view of the public constituted a disclosure regulated by the statute, regardless of whether plaintiff can establish that anyone actually viewed it. View "Senne v. Vill. of Palatine" on Justia Law

Defendant, Law Offices of Sidney Mickell, sent a debt collection letter addressed to Plaintiff, Catherine Evon, in "care of" her employer. Evon filed a class action lawsuit alleging (1) Mickell's act of sending letters "care of" the class members' employers violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act's prohibition on communication with third parties, and (2) the contents of the letter violated the Act's prohibition against false, deceptive, or misleading misrepresentations. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (1) held Mickell's act of sending "care of" letters constituted a per se violation of the Act, and reversed the district court's denial of Evon's class certification motion on that issue; and (2) held that the contents of the letter did not violate the Act, and therefore affirmed the district court's denial of Evon's class certification motion in that regard. Remanded. View "Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney Mickell" on Justia Law