Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Between 1994 and 1997 Wyeth’s predecessor sold fenfluramine and dexfenfluramine, prescription weight loss drugs. After the drugs were linked to valvular heart disease and an FDA public health advisory, Wyeth withdrew the drugs from the market in 1997. Thousands of individuals filed suit; the cases were consolidated. In 1999, Wyeth entered into a Settlement Agreement; in 2000, the court certified the class, approved the Agreement, and retained jurisdiction. The Agreement enjoins class members from suing Wyeth for diet drug-related injuries, but allows class members to sue Wyeth if they can demonstrate that they developed PPH (a condition that deprives the lungs of oxygen) at a specified level through the use of the diet drugs. In 2011, Cauthen sued, alleging that she developed PPH. She produced a pulmonary consultation prepared by Fortin, a cardiologist. Because Cauthen’s report showed that lung capacity of less than 60 percent of predicted at rest, Wyeth sought to enjoin the state court lawsuit for failing to satisfy the precondition provided by the Agreement. Dr. Fortin asserted that comparing individual lung capacity with average capacity of persons having a similar demographic profile is not determinative in diagnosing PPH. The district court enjoined the suit. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "In Re: Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a California resident, brought a putative class action against ADT in California Superior Court, alleging that ADT recorded his telephone conversation with an ADT representative without his consent in violation of Section 632 of California's invasion of privacy law, Cal. Penal Code 632. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on diversity grounds. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiff's pleadings failed to state a plausible claim upon which relief could be granted. The court remanded, however, in order to give plaintiff an opportunity to seek to amend his complaint to successfully plead a cause of action under the federal standards set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. View "Faulkner v. ADT Security Services, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Ronica Tabor and Dacia Gray worked as inside salespeople for Hilti, Inc and Hilti of North America, Inc. After being denied promotions to Account Managers (outside sales), they each filed individual claims for gender discrimination under Title VII and moved to certify a class of all female inside salespersons at Hilti who were denied similar promotions. The district court refused to certify the class and granted summary judgment in favor of Hilti on all claims. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to Tabor's claim for retaliation, and Gray's claim for failure to promote. The Court also affirmed the refusal to certify a class. However, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court with respect to Tabor's individual claims for failure to promote and disparate impact, and remanded Gray's individual disparate impact claim because the district court did not address that claim in its opinion. View "Tabor, et al v. Hilti, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Eleven plaintiffs who obtained home loans from Countrywide Bank, sought to challenge alleged racial disparities dating back to 2002 and resulting from Countrywide’s loan-pricing policy for home mortgages. The district court denied class certification, finding that the proposed class failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)’s commonality requirement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs challenged policies that grant broad discretion to local agents; they do not claim that a uniform policy or practice guides how local actors exercise their discretion, such that the corporate guidance caused or contributed to the alleged disparate impacts. To justify certification, class members must unite acts of discretion under a single policy or practice, or through a single mode of exercising discretion; the mere presence of a range within which acts of discretion take place will not suffice to establish commonality. View "Miller v. Countrywide Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this civil enforcement action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., alleging that defendants, the Bank, and individual members of the Bank's Corporate Benefits Committee, engaged in prohibited transactions and breached their fiduciary duties by selecting and maintaining Bank-affiliated mutual funds in the investment menu for the Bank's 401(k) Plan and the Bank's separate but related Pension Plan (collectively, the Plans). The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Pension Plan claims in the Second Amended Complaint on the basis that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The district court correctly determined that plaintiffs' remaining claims were time-barred under the limitations period in 29 U.S.C. 1113(1)(A). Finally, the district court's dismissal of the Third Amended Complaint with prejudice did not constitute an abuse of discretion where plaintiffs failed to file a motion to amend and had already amended their original complaint three times. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "David v. Alphin" on Justia Law

The Chicago-area law firms (Anderson) represent plaintiffs in class action lawsuits under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act-Junk Fax Prevention Act, which authorizes $500 in damages for faxing an unsolicited advertisement, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(C), (b)(3). This award triples upon a showing of willfulness, and each transmission is a separate violation. Advertisers would pay a fee, and B2B would send an ad to hundreds of fax numbers without obtaining permission from the recipients. When Anderson learned that defendants in four cases under the Act had contracted with B2B, B2B records became the focus of discovery. Despite obtaining all information necessary to certify classes in the four cases, Anderson continued pushing for B2B, and, at a deposition at which B2B was represented by Ruben, obtained the names of other B2B clients, and sent solicitation letters. Anderson attempted to give Ruben $ 5000. Defendants in new cases learned that Anderson had promised B2B confidentiality and unsuccessfully challenged class certification. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that when an ethical breach neither prejudices an attorney’s client nor undermines the integrity of judicial proceedings, state bar authorities are generally better positioned to address the matter through disciplinary proceedings, rather than the courts through substantive sanction in the underlying lawsuit. View "Reliable Money Order, Inc. v. McKnight Sales Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Kentucky commenced this action in Kentucky state court against Purdue, alleging that Purdue violated Kentucky law by misleading health care providers, consumers, and government officials regarding the risks of addiction associated with the prescription drug OxyContin, which Purdue manufactures, markets, and sells. Following transfer from the Eastern District of Kentucky to the Southern District of New York, the district court granted Kentucky's motion to remand, concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the suit did not meet the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005's (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, requirements. Purdue appealed the remand order under 28 U.S.C. 1453(c)(1). The court held that the district court correctly determined that Kentucky's action was not a class action as defined in CAFA, and therefore the case was properly remanded. Accordingly, the petition for leave to appeal was denied. View "Purdue Pharma, L. P. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky" on Justia Law

Bristol Care appealed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration in a suit initiated by its former employee asserting claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and seeking class action certification. Given the absence of any contrary congressional command from the FLSA that a right to engage in class actions overrides the mandate of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 3-4, in favor of arbitration, the court held that arbitration agreements containing class waivers were enforceable in claims brought under the FLSA. Because the court concluded that the Mandatory Arbitration Agreement (MAA) signed by the employee and Bristol Care was enforceable, the court reversed the district court's decision and directed the district court to enter an order granting Bristol Care's motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. View "Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased variable universal life insurance policies from defendant. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a class action suit against defendant under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), 15 U.S.C. 78bb(f)(1), for levying excessive cost of insurance charges. The court concluded that claims of breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing were not precluded by SLUSA, even if such claims related to the purchase or sale of a covered security. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the two contract claims, on the condition that plaintiffs amend their complaint to remove any reference to deliberate concealment or fraudulent omission. The court affirmed the dismissal of the class claim for unfair competition in violation of California law. View "Freeman Investments, L.P., et al v. Pacific Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The class consists of chemical companies that purchase sulfuric acid as one of the inputs into their production of chemicals. The defendants own smelters that process nonferrous minerals such as nickel and copper. They also produce sulfuric acid and sell or sold it to the members of the class. The class was certified, but the suit, alleging violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, was dismissed on the merits. The district judge ruled that the case could not go to trial on a theory of per se liability. The plaintiffs could have gone to trial on a theory of liability under the rule of reason, but chose to appeal the dismissal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument based on how the defendants organized their operations. The court stated that: “ If there were no joint venture, there would still be no per se violation for there would still be the legitimate business reasons for the defendants to have cooperated.” View "In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law