Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff represented a class of legal immigrants in the state of Washington adversely affected by its recent termination of a state-funded food assistance program for legal immigrants, which exclusively benefitted Washington resident aliens who became ineligible for federal food stamps following the enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. Plaintiff contended that the state, by eliminating food assistance to class members while continuing to administer federal food assistance to U.S. citizens and certain qualified aliens, violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and, by failing to provide class members adequate pre-deprivation notice and opportunity to be heard, also violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Because plaintiff failed even to allege that the State treated her less favorably than a similarly situated citizen of the State, her claim of alienage discrimination failed on the merits. The court agreed with the State that plaintiff lacked the concrete and particularized interest required for standing to claim a procedural due process violation. Consequently, plaintiff either lacked standing or would not succeed on the merits of her claims. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's order granting the motion for a preliminary injunction, vacated the injunction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pimentel v. Dreyfus, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff rented a car, drove 64 miles in one day, refilled the fuel tank, and returned the car to the same location from which he rented the car. In addition to rental and other fees that he does not dispute, he was charged a $13.99 fuel service fee that he challenged by filing a putative class action, claiming breach of contract, fraud, and unjust enrichment. Defendant claimed that, because plaintiff drove fewer than 75 miles during the rental period, to avoid the charge he was required to return the car with a full fuel tank and to submit a receipt. The district court dismissed, finding that the contract was not ambiguous. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the voluntary payment doctrine.View "Salling v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

The Bank of New York Mellon, acting in its capacity as trustee of trusts established to hold residential mortgage-backed securities, settled claims that the originator and servicer breached obligations owed to the trusts. Then, as a condition precedent to the settlement, the Bank initiated an Article 77 proceeding in New York Supreme Court to confirm that it had the authority to enter into the settlement under the governing trust documents and that entry into the settlement did not violate its duties under the governing trust agreements. On appeal from an order of the district court denying petitioners' motion to remand the proceeding to New York Supreme Court, the court considered the application of 28 U.S.C. 1453(d)(3) and 1332(d)(9)(C), exceptions to the federal jurisdiction conferred by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub.L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. The court held that the case fell within CAFA's securities exception as one that solely involved a claim that "related to the rights, duties (including fiduciary duties), and obligations relating to or created by or pursuant to" a security. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, reversed the order of the district court, and instructed it to vacate its decision and order and remanded the matter to state court. View "The Bank of New York Mellon v. Walnut Place LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with complicity to commit assault in the first degree, attempted burglary in the first degree, and tampering with physical evidence in a juvenile proceeding. Appellant was sixteen years old at the time. The district court found there was no probable cause to believe Appellant had used a firearm in the commission of the offenses under Ky. Rev. Stat. 635.020(4) and therefore declined to order transfer of Appellant to circuit court as a youthful offender. The Commonwealth filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, asking the circuit court to order the district court to transfer Appellant as a youth offender. The circuit court granted the writ, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the writ of mandamus issued by the circuit court was not an abuse of discretion where (1) a crime committed by complicity can fall under the mandatory transfer provision of section 635.020(4), and complicity to commit an offense involving use of a firearm requires transfer when an offense involving direct use of a firearm would; and (2) the district court erred in finding that a firearm was not used in Appellant's offense. View "K.R. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Current and former African–American employees brought suit alleging that they were exposed to a racially hostile work environment in defendant's warehouses and, in response to a motion for summary judgment, submitted a detailed list of incidents, scattered sporadically over 25 years, including vulgar graffiti, overtly racist comments by coworkers, and racially motivated pranks. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly found that plaintiffs failed to show they were aware of the majority of harassment alleged by their fellow employees and correctly concluded that plaintiffs' claims should be considered individually. View "Berryman v. Supervalu Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit, charging racial discrimination in employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. 1981 and sought class certification (FRCP 23(b)(2) and 23(c)(4)) for deciding whether defendant engaged in practices that have a disparate impact on members of the class. The district court denied certification. After determining that appeal was timely, based on a renewed motion for certification made in reliance on the Supreme Court's 2011 decision, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Seventh Circuit reversed. Whether defendant's company-wide policies put blacks at a disadvantage is a question common to the class. While individual suits may be necessary to determine damages, that question could be resolved in a single proceeding, making limited class action treatment appropriate. View "McReynolds v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc." on Justia Law

Main & Associates, Inc., d/b/a Southern Springs Healthcare Facility, filed an action in the Bullock Circuit Court, on behalf of itself and a putative class of Alabama nursing homes, against Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama (BCBS), asserting claims of breach of contract, intentional interference with business relations, negligence and/or wantonness, and unjust enrichment and seeking injunctive relief. BCBS removed the case to the the federal court, arguing among other things, that Southern Springs' claims arose under the Medicare Act and that the Medicare Act, as amended by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (the MMA) completely preempted Southern Springs' state-law claims. Southern Springs moved the federal court to remand the case to the circuit court, arguing that the federal court did not have jurisdiction over its claims. The federal court granted the motion and remanded the case to the Bullock Circuit Court. After remand, BCBS moved the circuit court for a judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Southern Springs had not exhausted its administrative remedies and that the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. The circuit court denied BCBS's motion, and BCBS petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss Southern Springs' claims. Upon review, the Court concluded that Southern Springs' claims were inextricably intertwined with claims for coverage and benefits under the Medicare Act and that they were subject to the Act's mandatory administrative procedures and limited judicial review. Southern Springs did not exhaust its administrative remedies, and the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over its claims. Therefore, the Court granted BCBS's petition and issue a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to dismiss the claims against BCBS. View "Main & Associates, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class-action lawsuit against the insurance company, claiming breach of contract because the company began interpreting the "actual charges" provision of his cancer-insurance policy to mean the charges that the medical provider accepts as full payment from the primary insurer and the insured. Plaintiff claims that the policy entitles him to be paid the higher "list prices" that appear on his hospital bills before the primary insurer negotiates a lower rate. The company made payments to the insured, not directly to hospitals. The district court certified the class and issued a preliminary injunction, requiring the company to pay plaintiff according to his interpretation. Meanwhile, an Arkansas state court certified a nearly identical class, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed a settlement in that action. The Sixth Circuit vacated class certification, based on the intervening Arkansas case. The court dismissed appeal of the injunction for lack of jurisdiction because was not a decision on the merits. View "Gooch v. Life Investors Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case came from the dismissal of a putative class action filed in a California district court. The dismissal was based on a Massachusetts federal district court's final judgment certifying a nationwide class and approving a class settlement. A class member appeared through counsel as an objector in the Massachusetts case filed the present suit in California seeking to represent a nationwide class. The California complaint sought damages based in large part on the same facts alleged in the Massachusetts case, but against different defendants. The putative class was part of the same class certified in the Massachusetts case. The California defendants moved to dismiss the case based on a covenant not to sue contained in the settlement and final judgment entered in the Massachusetts case. Under that provision, the class members, including the member who filed the California suit as the named plaintiff, not only released their claims against the Massachusetts defendants but also agreed not to sue "any other person seeking to establish liability based, in whole or in part," on the claims released. The district court held that the covenant was enforceable against the named plaintiff in the California case, declined to appoint or allow a new class representative because no class had been certified, did not decide whether the covenant was enforceable against the absent members of the putative class, and dismissed. The named plaintiff appealed. Upon review, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. View "Skilstaf, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp." on Justia Law

The central issue on appeal in this case arose from an order that denied a pretrial special motion to dismiss under Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute (Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.635-670), and whether that order was appealable under the collateral order doctrine as established by Supreme Court precedent. In 2009, Defendant-Appellant attorney Scott Ferrell sent demand letters to Plaintiffs-Appellees Metabolic Research, Inc. (Metabolic), at its address in Las Vegas, Nevada, and to General Nutrition Centers, Inc. (GNC), at its address in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The demand letters purported to notify the recipients that they had violated California law by falsely advertising the properties and potential benefits of "Stemulite," which they marketed as a natural fitness supplement. Defendant represented that he was acting on behalf of three individuals and a class of similarly situated people, all of whom he alleged purchased Stemulite in California, in reliance on the supposed false advertising, and had not received the purported benefits. In his letters, Defendant set out his allegations, and concluded them with offers to compromise and allow Plaintiffs time to agree to an injunction. If Plaintiffs did not accept his offer, Defendant stated he would file suit. Metabolic filed suit in Nevada against Defendant and his putative class action plaintiffs charging them with extortion, racketeering and conspiracy. Defendant removed the case to the federal district court in Nevada, then moved to dismiss Metabolic's case based on Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute. In its order dismissing Ferrell’s motion, the district court found that Ferrell had not established that the demand letter to Metabolic constituted a good-faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition because it concluded that Nevada’s anti-SLAPP legislation only protected communications made directly to a governmental agency and did not protect a demand letter sent to a potential defendant in litigation. Finding that the Nevada legislature did not intend for its anti-SLAPP law to function as an immunity from suit, Defendant's motion was not immediately appealable. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court's denial of Defendant's special motion was not made in error. View "Metabolic Research, Inc. v. Ferrell" on Justia Law