Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Exchange is a reciprocal insurance exchange, under 40 PA. STAT. 961. Members purchase insurance policies and receive indemnification for losses out of Exchange’s pool of funds. A 2012 Complaint alleged that Exchange is owned by subscribers and has no independent officers or governing body; that Indemnity is a public corporation that serves as Exchange’s attorney-in-fact; that Indemnity is permitted to retain up to 25% of Exchange’s premiums; that the balance of premiums is to be used for insurance losses and operational costs and may be distributed to Exchange members as dividends at Indemnity’s discretion; that members who pay premiums in installments must pay service charges and are subject to late payment and policy reinstatement fees; that, beginning in 1997, Indemnity began to retained for itself service charges paid to Exchange, which belonged to Exchange; and that, beginning in 2008, Indemnity misappropriated fees, totaling more than $300 million. The complaint was filed for Exchange by certain members and “on behalf of” all other members. Contending that the words “on behalf of” converted the case into a class action, Indemnity removed the case to federal court. The district court remanded to state court. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that the case was brought under state rules that bear no resemblance to Rule 23 in that they allow for suits by entities, not a conglomerate of individuals, and does not meet the statutory definition of “class action.” View "Erie Ins. Exch. v. Erie Indem. Co" on Justia Law

Intervenors appealed the district court's denial of their motion to intervene in a suit where the lead plaintiff and other putative class members alleged that defendants had made fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions in the offering and sale of certain financial instruments which they purchased. The court held that: (1) American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah's tolling rule did not apply to the three-year statute of repose in Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77m; and (2) absent circumstances that would render the newly asserted claims independently timely, neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 nor the Rule 15(c) "relation back" doctrine permitted members of a putative class, who were not named parties, to intervene in the class action as named parties in order to revive claims that were dismissed from the class complaint for want of jurisdiction. The proposed intervenors could not circumvent Section 13's statute of repose by invoking American Pipe or Rule 15(c). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment insofar as the district court partially denied the motions to intervene. View "In re IndyMac Mortgage-Backed Sec. Litig." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed a state-law wage-and-hour class action naming CHA as a defendant. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's remand to state court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 153(c)(1). At issue was whether the two thirty-day periods described in 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) were the only periods during which the defendant could remove, or if they were merely periods during which a defendant must remove if one of the thirty-day time limits was triggered. The court concluded that sections 1441 and 1446, read together, permitted a defendant to remove outside the thirty-day periods on the basis of its own information, provided that it had not run afoul of either of the thirty-day deadlines. Accordingly, the court held that removal was not barred in this case and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Roth, et al. v. CHA Hollywood Medical Center, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed three separate class action suits alleging that defendants violated Missouri law and conspired with unknown third parties to deceive customers into throwing away medications after their expiration dates, knowing that the medications were safe and effective beyond the expiration date. Defendants appealed the district court's remand order holding that defendants failed to establish the amount in controversy requirement under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2). The court concluded that each defendant's affidavit detailing the total sales of their respective medications in Missouri met the amount in controversy requirement; even if it was highly improbable that plaintiffs would recover the amounts defendants have put into controversy, this did not meet the legally impossible standard; defendants were not required to provide a formula or methodology for calculating the potential damages more accurately, as the district court held; and defendants' affidavits were not inadmissible hearsay. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Raskas, et al. v. Johnson & Johnson, et al." on Justia Law

An agreement between American Express and merchants who accept American Express cards, requires that all of their disputes be resolved by arbitration and provides that there “shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis.” The merchants filed a class action, claiming that American Express violated section 1 of the Sherman Act and seeking treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the class action waiver was unenforceable and that arbitration could not proceed because of prohibitive costs. The Circuit upheld its reversal on remand in light of a Supreme Court holding that a party may not be compelled to submit to class arbitration absent an agreement to do so. The Supreme Court reversed. The FAA reflects an overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of contract and does not permit courts to invalidate a contractual waiver of class arbitration on the ground that the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery. Courts must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements even for claims alleging violation of a federal statute, unless the FAA mandate has been overridden by a contrary congressional command. No contrary congressional command requires rejection of this waiver. Federal antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim or indicate an intention to preclude waiver of class-action procedures. The fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy. View "Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action challenging the constitutionality of Arizona's Proposition 100. Proposition 100 commands that Arizona state courts could not set bail for serious felony offenses as prescribed by the legislature if the person charged has entered or remained in the United States illegally and if the proof was evident or the presumption great as to the charge. After reviewing the record, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and partial dismissal, concluding that plaintiffs have not raised triable issues of fact as to whether Proposition 100 and its implementing procedures violated the substantive and procedural due process guarantees of the United State's Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, nor whether the Proposition 100 laws were preempted by federal immigration law. The court concluded that the Arizona Legislature and Arizona voters passed the Proposition 100 laws to further the state's legitimate and compelling interest in seeing that those accused of serious state-law crimes were brought to trial. View "Lopez-Valenzuela v. County of Maricopa" on Justia Law

Hrivnak filed a purported class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692–1692p, and Ohio consumer-protection law, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1345.01–.99, 4165.01–04, seeking statutory, compensatory, and punitive damages exceeding $25,000, and injunctive and declaratory relief. The suit was based on the conduct of debt management companies and a law firm in dunning hi on credit card debts. The defendants made an offer of judgment of $7,000 plus costs and attorney’s fees, under Civil Rule 68. Hrivnak rejected the offer. The district court rejected the defendants’ claim that the offer rendered the suit moot. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, characterizing defendants’ argument as asserting that claims with little to no chance of success should be dismissed as moot whenever they are mixed in with promising claims that a defendant offers to compensate in full. View "Hrivnak v. NCO Portfolio Mgmt., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and a group of California residents objected to the district court's approval of settlement terms in class action lawsuits alleging that Uponor and Radiant manufactured and distributed leaky brass plumbing fixtures. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting final approval of the proposed settlement since each of the factors in Van Horn v. Trickey favored approval and in denying plaintiff's motion to intervene as untimely after weighing the ACLU of Minn. v. Tarek ibn Ziyad timeliness factors. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Ortega, et al. v. Uponor, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Sentinel for criminal contempt of court for resisting the Superior Court's order granting him a writ of habeas corpus and "using its position as a probation company to attempt to collect a debt that is not owed or due by threatening to have [plaintiff] jailed without bond." Plaintiff also alleged that Sentinel engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity under O.C.G.A. 16-14-1 et seq. Sentinel removed the suit to the district court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2). The court rejected plaintiff's arguments under CAFA; concluded that the district court did not err in shifting the burden of production to plaintiff in response to Sentinel's testimonial evidence; and concluded that plaintiff offered no citation to support the theory of corporate liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sentinel. View "McGee v. Sentinel Offender Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former employees of Amgen and AML, participated in two employer-sponsored pension plans, the Amgen Plan and the AML Plan. The Plans were employee stock-ownership plans that qualified as "eligible individual account plans" (EIAPs) under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1107(d)(3)(A). Plaintiffs filed an ERISA class action against Amgen, AML, and others after the value of Amgen common stock fell, alleging that defendants breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA. The court concluded that defendants were not entitled to a presumption of prudence under Quan v. Computer Sciences Corp., that plaintiffs have stated claims under ERISA in Counts II through VI, and that Amgen was a properly named fiduciary under the Amgen Plan. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Harris v. Amgen" on Justia Law