Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Apple alleging federal and state antitrust claims. Plaintiff alleged that Apple encoded iTS music files with its proprietary Digital Rights Management (DRM), called FairPlay, which rendered iTS music and the iPod compatible only with each other. Plaintiff also alleged claims that through certain software updates, Apple excluded competitors and obtained a monopoly in the portable digital media player (PDMP) and music download markets, which inflated Apple's music prices and deflated the value of the iPod. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's July 2009 order denying her motion to certify a class of indirect purchasers of the iPod under Rule 23(b)(3). The court concluded that, because plaintiff abandoned the individual claim for which she sought class certification, the issue of whether the district court erred in denying her motion to certify that claim for class treatment was waived. The court also concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's monopolization claim for damages based on the theory of diminution in iPod value on the ground that it was barred by Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois; properly dismissed plaintiff's claim for damages based on supracompetitive music prices; and properly dismissed plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief where plaintiff's alleged inability to play her music freely was not an "antitrust injury" that affected competition and could, therefore, not serve as the basis for injunctive relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of class certification and dismissal of plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. View "Somers v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant in this case was a franchisor and Plaintiffs were its franchisees. After Plaintiffs sued Defendant, the district court certified a class, excluding those franchisees whose agreements with Defendant contained clauses expressly requiring arbitration. While those franchisees pursued arbitration, the arbitrator imposed a stay of the arbitrations of ten of those franchisees. The district court later concluded that Defendant had violated an order requiring it to obtain judicial permission before making any motion to delay or prevent arbitration proceedings and sanctioned Defendant by admitting to the class the ten franchisees, relieving them of their obligations to arbitrate. Defendant then unsuccessfully filed a motion to reconsider the sanction and to stay the ten franchisees' judicial proceedings pending arbitration. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the district court's determination that Defendant violated the order was an abuse of discretion; and (2) therefore, there was no basis for the sanction, and Defendant's motion to stay should have been granted. View "Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that USF engaged in a fraudulent scheme by which it artificially inflated the cost component of its cost-plus billing and then disguised the proceeds of its own inflated billing through the use of purported promotional allowances. At issue on interlocutory appeal was whether the district court abused its discretion in certifying a nationwide class consisting of about 75,000 USF "cost-plus" customers. The court affirmed the district court's certification of the class, concluding that, despite the size of the class and the fact that it implicated the laws of multiple jurisdictions, the district court correctly concluded that both the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-68, and contract claims were susceptible to generalized proof such that common issues would predominate over individual issues and a class action was superior to other methods of adjudication. View "In Re: US Foodservice Inc. Pricing Litig." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer (Nichols) for breach of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and against his union for breach of its duty of fair representation. Plaintiff alleged that Nichols breached the CBA by failing to establish rest periods for workers on the continuously operating lines as required by Section 17.1 of the CBA. In this case, the union had a duty not to pursue a grievance to arbitration that it believed did not warrant such action. The court concluded that plaintiff had not raised a genuine issue of material fact on whether the union failed in its duty of fair representation on the issue before the court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the union and the employer. View "Inechien v. Nichols Aluminum, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant removed plaintiff's putative class action to federal court, contending that there was federal jurisdiction over the action under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, and 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2). Plaintiff alleged that the amount in controversy did not exceed $5 million and waived any claim by the class in excess of the amount. The district court granted plaintiff's motion to remand based on plaintiff's waiver. The court held that a lead plaintiff of a putative class could not reduce the amount in controversy on behalf of absent class members, so there was no justification for assigning to the allegation weight so significant that it affected a defendant's right to a federal forum under section 1332(d)(2). The court also held that the legal certainty standard in Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank National Association had been effectively overruled and that the proper burden of proof imposed upon a defendant to establish the amount in controversy was the preponderance of the evidence standard pursuant to Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded to the district court to apply the preponderance standard to the amount-in-controversy evidence. View " Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility Services LLC" on Justia Law

Representing a class of truck owner-operators, Walker sued Trailer Transit, a broker of trucking services, for breach of contract in Indiana state court. Trailer Transit removed the suit to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), section 1332(d)(2). Walker argued that notice of removal was untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after Trailer Transit “first ascertained” that the class’s theory of damages could result in recovery of more than $5 million. The district court denied a motion to remand. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The earliest possible trigger for removal was Walker’s response to Trailer Transit’s requests for admission seeking clarification of the theory of damages. Even that response did not affirmatively specify a damages figure under the class’s new theory, so the removal clock never actually started to run View "Walker v. Trailer Transit, Inc." on Justia Law

Buyers of Sears washing machines complained of a defect that causes mold, others complained of a control unit defect that stops the machine inopportunely. The district court denied certification of the class complaining about mold and granted certification of the class complaining about the control unit defect. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to the mold claims. The Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). The Seventh Circuit reinstated its prior order, stating that there was a single, central, common issue of liability: whether the washing machine was defective. Complications that arise from the design changes and from separate state warranty laws can be handled by creation of subclasses. View "Butlerl v. Sears, Roebuck & Co." on Justia Law

Carrera sued Bayer, claiming that Bayer falsely advertised its product One-A-Day WeightSmart as a multivitamin and dietary supplement that had metabolism-enhancing effects due to its ingredient, epigallocatechin gallate, a green tea extract. The daily dose was one tablet and the price was about $8.99 for 50 tablets. Bayer sold WeightSmart through retail stores until 2007 and did not sell directly to consumers. Carrera initially sought to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), bringing a claim under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. The court denied certification because New Jersey law did not apply to out-of-state customers. Carrera then moved to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class of Florida consumers under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. Bayer challenged certification, reasoning that class members are unlikely to have documentary proof of purchase and Bayer has no list of purchasers. The Third Circuit vacated class certification. If class members are impossible to identify without extensive and individualized fact-finding or mini-trials, a class action is inappropriate. If class members cannot be ascertained from a defendant’s records, there must be “a reliable, administratively feasible alternative,” not a method that would amount to no more than ascertaining by potential class members‟ say so.”View "Carrera v. Bayer Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed putative class-action suits over ten years ago under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. 1350, on behalf of those harmed by the South African legal regime known as "apartheid." Plaintiffs asserted that defendants aided and abetted violations of customary international law committed by the South African government by selling cars and computers to the South African government. Defendants petitioned for mandamus relief. The court concluded that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., issuance of the writ was unnecessary in this case because defendants have an adequate means of relief through a motion for judgment on the pleadings; plaintiffs' arguments that Kiobel did not apply where defendants were American citizens, or where the case involved American interests, were without merit; and, because the Kiobel decision plainly foreclosed plaintiffs' claims as a matter of law, the court need not consider whether defendants have asserted a valid basis for "collateral order" jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for mandamus relief and vacated the stay placed by the court on proceedings in the district court. View "Balintulo v. Daimler AG" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against GenOn, on behalf of a putative class of at least 1,500 individuals who own or inhabit residential property within one mile of GenOn’s 570-megawatt coal-fired electrical generation facility in Springdale, Pennsylvania. The complaint asserted state tort law claims, based on ash and contaminants settling on plaintiffs’ property. The district court dismissed, finding that because the plant was subject to comprehensive regulation under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401, it owed no extra duty to the members of the class under state tort law. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the plain language of the Clean Air Act and controlling Supreme Court precedent indicate that state common law actions are not preempted. View "Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, Genon Power Midwest, L.P." on Justia Law