Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Darren Berry filed suit against Volkswagen, alleging violations of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA). The trial court certified a class on behalf of Missouri owners and lessors of Volkswagen vehicles (Class). The action settled. After the the settlement for Class was approved and paid out, the trial court held a hearing regarding attorneys' fees. The trial court awarded Class counsel attorney's fees after determining the lodestar amount to be $3,087,320 and applying a multiplier of 2.0 for a total award of $6,174,640 in attorneys' fees. Volkswagen challenged the award of attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the lodestar amount was within the trial court's discretion; and (2) the multiplier applied to the lodestar amount was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Remanded.View "Berry v. Volkswagen Group of Am., Inc." on Justia Law

State Farm filed a complaint for negligence against Appellant, alleging that Appellant was at fault in an automobile accident with State Farm's insured. Appellant counterclaimed, alleging that State Farm was unjustly enriched as a result of having engaged in the deceptive and unlawful business practice of causing collection-style letters to be mailed in an attempt to collect unadjudicated, potential subrogation claims as debts. Appellant's counterclaim identified two putative classes. State Farm filed a motion to strike the class allegations. Rather than granting the motion to strike class allegations, the circuit court denied class certification "for the reasons stated in State Farm's motion." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court acted without due consideration of the Court's foregoing case law on typicality, commonality, and predominance and therefore abused its discretion in prematurely denying class certification at the early pleading stage of this case. Remanded.View "Kersten v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2010, plaintiff Jane Doe was contacted by detectives in the Baton Rouge Police Department and asked to identify whether she was the subject of a photograph, obtained from a video, captured by a pen camera which had been surreptitiously placed in the women’s shower/changing room of a fitness center in downtown Baton Rouge. Plaintiff was a member of a gym called “Anytime Fitness,” a fitness center owned by Southern Gyms, LLC. Further investigation by police revealed that an assistant manager and trainer at the fitness center secretly videotaped the plaintiff and other women in the women’s shower/changing room of the gym. The police told the plaintiff her image was one of four women discovered on the pen camera when the pen camera was turned over to police. Telschow was arrested and prosecuted for video voyeurism. He ultimately pleaded guilty to four counts of video voyeurism and sentenced to a nine month term of imprisonment. Ultimately the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the lower courts correctly applied the standards for analyzing class action certification set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 591, et seq. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court found the lower courts erred in concluding the plaintiff satisfied the threshold requirement of numerosity, necessary for class certification. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's judgment which granted plaintiff’s motion for class certification. View "Doe v. Southern Gyms, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and received medical treatment at Benefis Health System, Inc. Plaintiff had healthcare coverage as a TRICARE beneficiary and also had medical payments coverage through his insurance carrier, Kemper. Plaintiff's medical treatment costs totaled $2,073. Benefis accepted $662 from TRICARE as payment in full satisfaction of the bill pursuant to a preferred provider agreement (PPA) between Blue Cross Blue Shield and Benefis. Benefis subsequently received $1,866 from Kemper, upon which Benefis reimbursed TRICARE's payment in full. Plaintiff filed an individual and class action complaint, claiming that he was entitled to the additional $1,204 that Benefis received from Kemper over and above the TRICARE reimbursement rate. Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asking the district court to find Benefis breached its contract with TRICARE and that Benefis was liable for Plaintiff's damages. The district court converted the motion into a motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding (1) Plaintiff was not entitled to pocket the difference between the TRICARE reimbursement rate and the amount Benefis accepted from Kemper; and (2) Plaintiff failed to establish any damages that resulted from the alleged breach. View "Conway v. Benefis Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and first-degree sexual abuse and sentenced to life imprisonment and ten years' imprisonment, respectively. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court granted Defendant a new trial based on one ground of ineffective assistance as to the rape conviction and two grounds of ineffective assistance as to the sexual-abuse conviction. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that, based on the standard of review under Strickland v. Washington, the circuit court was not clearly erroneous in its rulings on both of Defendant's convictions.View "State v. Estrada" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mark Strawn, the plaintiff in a class action case, petitioned for an award of attorney fees and costs incurred for the appellate work done on review before the Supreme Court in the underlying matter. In addition, Strawn sought two supplemental fee awards: one for the cost of litigating the fee petition, and the other for the cost of defending against a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court after the Oregon court issued its decision. Further, Strawn sought a $5,000 incentive fee for his service on review as class representative. The issues raised by this appeal included: (1) the appropriate method for determining the amount of a reasonable fee award in a case that involved both a statutory fee-shifting award and a common-fund award; (2) the propriety of applying a multiplier to the awards; (3) how fees should be apportioned between the fee-shifting and the common-fund awards; (4) whether this court has authority to award attorney fees for work done in opposing a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court; (5) whether a court has authority to award post-opinion, prejudgment interest on court-awarded attorney fees; and (6) whether an appellate court may award a class representative a class incentive fee on appeal and review. Strawn filed a class action against Farmers raising two contractual claims (breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith) and one common law claim (fraud) in connection with auto insurance policies written by Farmers. The jury found for the class on the contractual claims and the fraud claim, and it made a single award of compensatory damages on those claims. In addition, and for the fraud claim only, the jury awarded punitive damages. The Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case to discuss the methodology appropriate to award fees based on the issues raised in the appeal, and made adjustments as deemed necessary in compliance with the limits of Oregon law.View "Strawn v. Farmers Ins. Co.  " on Justia Law

A small group of landowners sought to certify a class composed of all owners of any real property interests in a twelve-mile stretch of land located adjacent to the Canadian River to litigate alleged takings claims against the State. The trial court denied certification, finding that the landowners failed to satisfy two prerequisites required by Tex. R. Civ. P. 42(a) and any one of the three Rule 42(b) requirements. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that certain conflicts identified by the trial court prevented the landowners from satisfying Rule 42(a)(4)'s adequacy-of-representation prerequisite. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion by relying on the conflicts identified in its order denying class certification to establish that the landowners failed to satisfy Rule 42(a)(4)'s adequacy-of-representation prerequisite; and (2) the court of appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's order on the same grounds.View "Riemer v. State" on Justia Law

After his vehicle was stopped by a police officer, Defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated, and a breathalyzer test computed his blood alcohol content at close to twice the legal limit. Defendant was subsequently indicted for felony DWI. During the jury trial, the People offered into evidence documents pertaining to the routine calibration and maintenance of the breathalyzer machine used in Defendant's breath test to demonstrate it was in proper working order at the time Defendant was tested. Defendant raised a Confrontation Clause challenge to the documents, contending that he was entitled to cross-examine the authors of the records. The county court allowed the documents to be received in evidence, and Defendant was convicted of felony DWI. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that documents pertaining to the routine inspection, maintenance, and calibration of breathalyzer machines are nontestimonial, and consequently, the Confrontation Clause was not implicated in this case, and the trial judge did not err in declining Defendant's request to cross-examine the authors of the testing records before the court ruled on their admissibility.View "People v. Pealer" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a complaint against Respondent for unfair and deceptive trade practices and for common law fraud. Petitioner's complaint was based on an automobile warranty he purchased from Respondent that expired more than two years earlier than he had been led to believe. Petitioner purported to bring his action on behalf of others similarly situated. Before Petitioner filed a motion to certify the class, however, Respondent paid to extend Petitioner's warranty. The circuit court (1) denied Petitioner's motion for class certification, finding that because he had been made whole, Petitioner was no longer a member of any class; (2) granted in part Respondent's motion for summary judgment, finding Petitioner's claim moot; and (3) granted Petitioner attorney's fees for the period before and after Respondent tendered Petitioner individual relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Respondent's tender of individual compensatory relief to Petitioner did not require the court to deny class certification; (2) an award of punitive damages is not foreclosed by the tender of individual compensatory damages; and (3) an award of attorney's fees to Petitioner under a fee-shifting provision of the Consumer Protection Act is not limited to fees incurred before the tender. View "Frazier v. Castle Ford, Ltd." on Justia Law

On behalf of himself and a proposed class of others similarly situated, Plaintiff filed an action challenging the legality of Ticketmaster's collection of a service charge on a concert ticket he purchased for a concert in the city. The complaint was based on provisions of the Baltimore City Code. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer questions of law and held (1) if a ticket agency is authorized in writing by a licensed exhibitor to sell tickets as an agent of the exhibitor, the ticket agency is not required to be licensed; (2) the Code prohibits the collection of a service charge, in addition to the established price printed on the ticket, in connection with the original sale of the ticket by the exhibitor, and is not limited to ticket resales; (3) the Code does not permit anyone other than a ticket agency licensed under the Code to collect anything more for a ticket than the established price printed on the ticket plus taxes; and (4) a common law action for money had and received will lie to recover money paid in excess of that allowed by statute if the agreement pursuant to which it has been paid has not been fully consummated.View "Bourgeois v. Live Nation Entm't, Inc." on Justia Law