Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and received medical treatment at Benefis Health System, Inc. Plaintiff had healthcare coverage as a TRICARE beneficiary and also had medical payments coverage through his insurance carrier, Kemper. Plaintiff's medical treatment costs totaled $2,073. Benefis accepted $662 from TRICARE as payment in full satisfaction of the bill pursuant to a preferred provider agreement (PPA) between Blue Cross Blue Shield and Benefis. Benefis subsequently received $1,866 from Kemper, upon which Benefis reimbursed TRICARE's payment in full. Plaintiff filed an individual and class action complaint, claiming that he was entitled to the additional $1,204 that Benefis received from Kemper over and above the TRICARE reimbursement rate. Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asking the district court to find Benefis breached its contract with TRICARE and that Benefis was liable for Plaintiff's damages. The district court converted the motion into a motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding (1) Plaintiff was not entitled to pocket the difference between the TRICARE reimbursement rate and the amount Benefis accepted from Kemper; and (2) Plaintiff failed to establish any damages that resulted from the alleged breach. View "Conway v. Benefis Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and first-degree sexual abuse and sentenced to life imprisonment and ten years' imprisonment, respectively. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court granted Defendant a new trial based on one ground of ineffective assistance as to the rape conviction and two grounds of ineffective assistance as to the sexual-abuse conviction. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that, based on the standard of review under Strickland v. Washington, the circuit court was not clearly erroneous in its rulings on both of Defendant's convictions.View "State v. Estrada" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mark Strawn, the plaintiff in a class action case, petitioned for an award of attorney fees and costs incurred for the appellate work done on review before the Supreme Court in the underlying matter. In addition, Strawn sought two supplemental fee awards: one for the cost of litigating the fee petition, and the other for the cost of defending against a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court after the Oregon court issued its decision. Further, Strawn sought a $5,000 incentive fee for his service on review as class representative. The issues raised by this appeal included: (1) the appropriate method for determining the amount of a reasonable fee award in a case that involved both a statutory fee-shifting award and a common-fund award; (2) the propriety of applying a multiplier to the awards; (3) how fees should be apportioned between the fee-shifting and the common-fund awards; (4) whether this court has authority to award attorney fees for work done in opposing a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court; (5) whether a court has authority to award post-opinion, prejudgment interest on court-awarded attorney fees; and (6) whether an appellate court may award a class representative a class incentive fee on appeal and review. Strawn filed a class action against Farmers raising two contractual claims (breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith) and one common law claim (fraud) in connection with auto insurance policies written by Farmers. The jury found for the class on the contractual claims and the fraud claim, and it made a single award of compensatory damages on those claims. In addition, and for the fraud claim only, the jury awarded punitive damages. The Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case to discuss the methodology appropriate to award fees based on the issues raised in the appeal, and made adjustments as deemed necessary in compliance with the limits of Oregon law.View "Strawn v. Farmers Ins. Co.  " on Justia Law

A small group of landowners sought to certify a class composed of all owners of any real property interests in a twelve-mile stretch of land located adjacent to the Canadian River to litigate alleged takings claims against the State. The trial court denied certification, finding that the landowners failed to satisfy two prerequisites required by Tex. R. Civ. P. 42(a) and any one of the three Rule 42(b) requirements. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that certain conflicts identified by the trial court prevented the landowners from satisfying Rule 42(a)(4)'s adequacy-of-representation prerequisite. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion by relying on the conflicts identified in its order denying class certification to establish that the landowners failed to satisfy Rule 42(a)(4)'s adequacy-of-representation prerequisite; and (2) the court of appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's order on the same grounds.View "Riemer v. State" on Justia Law

After his vehicle was stopped by a police officer, Defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated, and a breathalyzer test computed his blood alcohol content at close to twice the legal limit. Defendant was subsequently indicted for felony DWI. During the jury trial, the People offered into evidence documents pertaining to the routine calibration and maintenance of the breathalyzer machine used in Defendant's breath test to demonstrate it was in proper working order at the time Defendant was tested. Defendant raised a Confrontation Clause challenge to the documents, contending that he was entitled to cross-examine the authors of the records. The county court allowed the documents to be received in evidence, and Defendant was convicted of felony DWI. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that documents pertaining to the routine inspection, maintenance, and calibration of breathalyzer machines are nontestimonial, and consequently, the Confrontation Clause was not implicated in this case, and the trial judge did not err in declining Defendant's request to cross-examine the authors of the testing records before the court ruled on their admissibility.View "People v. Pealer" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a complaint against Respondent for unfair and deceptive trade practices and for common law fraud. Petitioner's complaint was based on an automobile warranty he purchased from Respondent that expired more than two years earlier than he had been led to believe. Petitioner purported to bring his action on behalf of others similarly situated. Before Petitioner filed a motion to certify the class, however, Respondent paid to extend Petitioner's warranty. The circuit court (1) denied Petitioner's motion for class certification, finding that because he had been made whole, Petitioner was no longer a member of any class; (2) granted in part Respondent's motion for summary judgment, finding Petitioner's claim moot; and (3) granted Petitioner attorney's fees for the period before and after Respondent tendered Petitioner individual relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Respondent's tender of individual compensatory relief to Petitioner did not require the court to deny class certification; (2) an award of punitive damages is not foreclosed by the tender of individual compensatory damages; and (3) an award of attorney's fees to Petitioner under a fee-shifting provision of the Consumer Protection Act is not limited to fees incurred before the tender. View "Frazier v. Castle Ford, Ltd." on Justia Law

On behalf of himself and a proposed class of others similarly situated, Plaintiff filed an action challenging the legality of Ticketmaster's collection of a service charge on a concert ticket he purchased for a concert in the city. The complaint was based on provisions of the Baltimore City Code. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer questions of law and held (1) if a ticket agency is authorized in writing by a licensed exhibitor to sell tickets as an agent of the exhibitor, the ticket agency is not required to be licensed; (2) the Code prohibits the collection of a service charge, in addition to the established price printed on the ticket, in connection with the original sale of the ticket by the exhibitor, and is not limited to ticket resales; (3) the Code does not permit anyone other than a ticket agency licensed under the Code to collect anything more for a ticket than the established price printed on the ticket plus taxes; and (4) a common law action for money had and received will lie to recover money paid in excess of that allowed by statute if the agreement pursuant to which it has been paid has not been fully consummated.View "Bourgeois v. Live Nation Entm't, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were royalty owners entitled to receive a share of the production of natural gas in a gas field. Plaintiffs brought a class action against Anadarko Petroleum Corporation (APC) and its affiliates challenging the manner in which APC was paying royalties on natural gas production under the respective oil and gas leases. Timothy Coulter represented the plaintiff class and negotiated a settlement agreement. More than 6,000 members made up the settlement class, one of whom was Stan Boles. Boles objected to the amended class certification and the class settlement agreement negotiated by Coulter. The district court approved the settlement despite Boles' objection. Boles appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the adequacy of the class representation or the character of the settlement agreement.View "Coulter v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

Appellant BVF Partners L.P. ("BVF") appealed a Chancery Court certification of Appellee New Orleans Employees' Retirement System ("NOERS") as class representative in this action challenging the acquisition of Celera Corporation ("Celera") by Quest Diagnostics, Inc. ("Quest"). BVF also appealed the Court of Chancery's approval of a class action settlement without an opt out right for BVF between NOERS and Defendants-Appellees Richard H. Ayers, Jean-Luc Belingard, William G. Green, Peter Barton Hutt, Gail M. Naughton, Kathy Ordonez, Wayne I. Roe, Bennett M. Shapiro, Celera Corporation, Quest Diagnostics Incorporated, and Spark Acquisition Corporation ("Spark"). BVF contended that the Court of Chancery erred in certifying NOERS as the class representative, because NOERS lacked standing to represent the class. BVF argued that when NOERS sold its stock in Celera on the public market (before the merger was actually consummated and nearly a year before the Court of Chancery certified the class) NOERS no longer had a legally cognizable stake in the outcome of the litigation. BVF raised multiple other grounds for why the Court of Chancery erred in certifying NOERS as class representative, including that NOERS was uniquely susceptible to equitable defenses and was therefore an improper class representative. Even if that certification was proper, BVF argued that the Court of Chancery should have exercised its discretionary powers to allow BVF to opt out of the class in order to pursue its individual claims for monetary damages against the defendants. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Chancery that NOERS had standing to represent the class. The Court declined to adopt a rule of law that a shareholder class representative in a breach of fiduciary duty action must own stock in the corporation continuously through the final class certification. With regard to BVF's other arguments regarding NOERS' certification as class representative, the Court found them "unconvincing." The Court concluded that the Court of Chancery did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class, however, there was merit to BVF's claim that the Court of Chancery should have exercised its discretion to allow BVF to opt out of the shareholder class under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "In Re Celera Corporation Shareholder Litigation, et al. v. New Orleans Employees' Retirement System, et al." on Justia Law

The railroad was originally sued under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act in 2002 in Mississippi, where Fennell lived and worked and was allegedly exposed to asbestos. He had also worked for the railroad in Louisiana. In 2006, after discovery, the Mississippi court dismissed without prejudice. In 2009, Fennell refiled in the circuit court of St. Clair County, Illinois. The railroad sought dismissal under the interstate doctrine of forum non conveniens. The circuit court denied the motion; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that the circuit court did not consider all of the relevant factors. The citizens of St. Clair County should not be asked to bear the burden of this lawsuit. The majority of the witnesses, including treating physicians, are in Mississippi and not subject to Illinois subpoenas. Although the St. Clair County circuit court cited “almost 80 years of relevant evidence as to the defendant’s knowledge of the exposure to asbestos” that were held by the defendant’s Belleville law firm located in the county, the supreme court ruled that such documents can be copied and that this is not sufficient to tip the balance as to the proper forum.View "Fennell v. IL Cent. R.R. Co." on Justia Law