Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Two subcontractors employed by Petitioner, a homebuilder, asserted claims on behalf of a class of subcontractors whose pay Petitioner had docked when the subcontractors did not furnish proof of adequate general liability insurance coverage. The parties settled. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Petitioner would issue refunds checks, sending them to existing subcontractors as it would their paychecks or by mailing checks to the last known addresses of former subcontractors. The class representatives agreed, on behalf of the settlement class members, that refund checks not negotiated within ninety days of issuance would be void and that those and other unclaimed funds would be given to The Nature Conservancy as a cy pres award. The trial court approved the settlement and rendered final judgment accordingly. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Texas Unclaimed Property Act prohibited the imposition of a ninety-day deadline for negotiating settlement checks and the cy pres award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Act did not apply in this case and that the judgment approving the settlement agreement was binding on all settlement class members. View "Highland Homes Ltd. v. State" on Justia Law

Named plaintiffs, former FedEx drivers, represented two classes of plaintiffs comprising approximately 363 individuals who were full-time delivery drivers for FedEx in Oregon at any time between 1999 and 2009. Plaintiff class members worked for FedEx's two operating divisions, FedEx Ground and FedEx Home Delivery. FedEx contended its drivers were independent contractors under Oregon law. Plaintiffs contended they were employees. In a consolidated appeal, plaintiffs claimed that "FedEx improperly classified its drivers as independent contractors, thereby forcing them to incur business expenses and depriving them of benefits otherwise owed to employees" under Oregon law. The Ninth Circuit agreed with plaintiffs, and reversed the Multidistrict Litigation Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx Ground, its denial of plaintiff FedEx drivers' motion for partial summary judgment, and its certification of plaintiffs' classes insofar as they sought prospective relief. View "Slayman, et al v. FedEx Ground Package System" on Justia Law

The named plaintiffs represented a class comprising approximately 2300 individuals who were full-time delivery drivers for FedEx in California between 2000 and 2007. FedEx contended its drivers were independent contractors under California law. Plaintiffs contended they were employees. This appeal involved a class action originally filed in the California Superior Court in December 2005 on behalf of a class of California FedEx drivers, asserting claims for employment expenses and unpaid wages under the California Labor Code on the ground that FedEx had improperly classified the drivers as independent contractors. Plaintiffs also brought claims under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), which similarly turned on the drivers' employment status. FedEx removed to the Northern District of California based on diversity. Between 2003 and 2009, similar cases were filed against FedEx in approximately forty states. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated these FedEx cases for multidistrict litigation ("MDL") proceedings in the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana ("the MDL Court"). Plaintiffs moved for class certification. The MDL Court certified a class for plaintiffs' claims under California law. It declined to certify plaintiffs' proposed national FMLA class. Plaintiffs in all the MDL cases moved for partial summary judgment, seeking to establish their status as employees as a matter of law. In this case, FedEx cross-moved for summary judgment. The MDL Court denied nearly all of the MDL plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and granted nearly all of FedEx's motions, holding that plaintiffs were independent contractors as a matter of law in each state where employment status was governed by common-law agency principles. The MDL Court remanded this case to the district court to resolve the drivers' claims under the FMLA. Those claims were settled, and the district court entered final judgment. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging the MDL Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx on the employment status issue. FedEx conditionally cross-appealed, arguing that if we reverse the MDL Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx, we should also reverse the MDL Court's class certification decision. Upon review, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs were employees as a matter of law under California's right-to-control test. Accordingly, the Court reversed both the MDL Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx and its denial of plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to enter summary judgment for plaintiffs on the question of employment status. View "Alexander, et al v. FedEx Ground Package System" on Justia Law

The cases on appeal are among several similar actions brought by a single law firm alleging systemic underpayment in the healthcare industry in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, Pennsylvania law, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001,and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961. Nurses and other patient-care professionals, on behalf of a putative class, claimed that their employers maintained unlawful timekeeping and pay policies: under the “Meal Break Deduction Policy,” the timekeeping system automatically deducted 30 minutes of pay daily for meal breaks without ensuring that the employees actually received a break; under the “Unpaid Pre- and Post-Schedule Work Policy,” the employees were prohibited from recording time worked outside of their scheduled shifts; under the “Unpaid Training Policy,” employees were not paid for time spent at “compensable” training sessions. The district court dismissed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The overtime claim was factually inadequate: the plaintiffs “failed to allege a single specific instance in which a named Plaintiff worked overtime and was not compensated for this time.” View "Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp." on Justia Law

Before the patents expired (2012) for the individual coffee pods used in Keurig coffeemakers, defendants wanted to enter the market for Keurig‐compatible pods. In 2010 they introduced a product that used the external K‐Cup design, but did not contain a filter so that use of fresh coffee grounds was impossible. They used small chunks of freeze‐dried brewed coffee that dissolve and are reconstituted when hot water is added. The packaging stated in small font that it contained “naturally roasted soluble and microground Arabica coffee”; it never explained that soluble coffee is instant coffee or that the pods contained 95% instant coffee. The package included a warning: “DO NOT REMOVE the foil seal as the cup will not work properly in the coffee maker and could result in hot water burns.” Except to ensure that the user did not view the contents of the pod, this made no sense. Customers began to complain and were told that the pods were “not instant coffee” but “a high quality coffee bean pulverized into a powder so fine that [it] will dissolve,” which was largely false. Consumer protection lawsuits were consolidated. The district court refused to certify a class and granted summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Plaintiffs’ claims and those of the class they propose all derive from a single course of conduct. The court overlooked genuine issues of fact when it granted summary judgment. View "Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Kuda Mujeyi filed a class action suit in state court asserting claims against several defendants. The case was removed to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2). Mujeyi's claims were severed and transferred to the District of Arizona. The district court ordered plaintiff to amend her complaint to reflect the severance and she did, then she moved to remand the action to state court under one of the exceptions to CAFA jurisdiction under section 1332(d)(4). The district court granted plaintiff's motion under section 1332(d)(3), determining the citizenship of the plaintiff class by considering the class as pleaded in plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (SAC). The court concluded that, for the purpose of considering the applicability of the exceptions to CAFA jurisdiction, the district court should have determined the citizenship of the proposed plaintiff class based on plaintiff's complaint as of the date the case became removable. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Doyle v. OneWest Bank, FSB" on Justia Law

Illinois insurance regulators permitted WellPoint to acquire RightCHOICE health insurance. WellPoint caused RightCHOICE Insurance to withdraw from the Illinois market. WellPoint offered the policyholders costlier UniCare policies as substitutes. Those who chose not to pay the higher premiums had to shop for policies from different insurers, which generally declined to cover pre-existing conditions. Former RightCHOICE policyholders filed a purported class action. The district court declined to certify a class and entered judgment against plaintiffs on the merits. No one appealed. Absent certification as a class action, the judgment bound only the named plaintiffs. Their law firm found other former policyholders and sued in state court. Defendants removed the suit under 28 U.S.C. 1453 (Class Action Fairness Act); the proposed class had at least 100 members, the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million, and at least one class member had citizenship different from at least one defendant. Plaintiffs sought remand under section 1332(d)(4), which says that the court shall “decline to exercise” jurisdiction if at least two-thirds of the class’s members are citizens of the state in which the suit began and at least one defendant from which “significant relief” is sought is a citizen of the same state. The district court declined remand, declined to certify a class, and again rejected the case on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that “Counsel should thank their lucky stars that the district court did not sanction them under 28 U.S.C. 1927 for filing a second suit rather than pursuing the first through appeal." View "Phillips v. Wellpoint Inc." on Justia Law

A group of employees filed class and collective actions against Tyson Foods, Inc., seeking unpaid wages for time spent on pre- and post-shift activities. After the employees obtained a sizeable verdict and fee award, Tyson unsuccessfully moved for judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, Tyson: (1) challenged the judgment and denial of the motion for judgment as a matter of law; and (2) argued the fee award was excessive. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded, after review, that plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of undercompensation and the district court acted within its discretion in setting the fee award. View "Garcia, et al v. Tyson Foods, et al" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the district court's decision to certify five related class action suits where plaintiffs in each case generally alleged that EQT and CNX have unlawfully deprived the class members of royalty payments from the production of coalbed methane gas (CBM) in Virginia. The court granted defendants' petition to appeal the five orders granting class certification and concluded that the district court abused its discretion when it certified the five classes. The court held that the district court's analysis lacked the requisite rigor to ensure that the requirements of Rule 23 were satisfied by any of the certified classes. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "EQT Production Co. v. Adair" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against defendant for failure to pay overtime wages, among other causes of action. The complaint alleged that the putative class members were non-exempt employees who chauffeured vehicles for defendant, and that defendant failed to compensate them for periods when they were required to remain on-call in between trips transporting clients. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the trial court's denial of their motion for class certification. The court reversed because the trial court's analysis of the numerosity factor was incorrect; the trial court improperly considered the merits of defendant's affirmative defenses; and the trial court denied plaintiffs due process by failing to grant them an adequate opportunity to perform discovery on and brief certification issues. View "Hendershot v. Ready to Roll Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law