Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, appellants, and cross-respondents were consumers who purchased vehicles from defendant, respondent, and cross-appellant Raceway Ford. Plaintiffs raised numerous causes of action based on laws proscribing certain acts against consumers, unfair competition, and deceptive business practices, bringing both individual claims and claims on behalf of two certified classes. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Raceway and against plaintiffs on all causes, except that a single plaintiff was granted rescission on a single cause of action. Separately, the trial court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to Raceway. In consolidated appeals, plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s judgment on the merits (case No. E054517) and fee order (case No. E056595); Raceway cross-appealed regarding one aspect of the trial court’s fee order. In their appeal, plaintiffs specifically argued that, as a matter of law, Raceway’s previous practice of “backdating” second or subsequent contracts for sale of a vehicle to the original date of sale violated the Automobile Sales Finance Act (also known as the Rees-Levering Motor Vehicle Sales and Finance Act (ASFA)), the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and the Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The Court of Appeal agreed that the practice of backdating could have resulted in inaccurate disclosures to class members, thereby violating the ASFA, at least in some cases. On the record, however, the Court declined to order entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff class, rather reversed the trial court’s judgment in favor of Raceway with respect to plaintiffs’ backdating claims. Plaintiffs also appealed the judgment in favor of Raceway with respect to claims of a second certified class, consisting of Raceway customers who purchased used diesel vehicles from Raceway and who were charged fees for smog checks and smog certifications that were only properly applicable to purchases of gasoline vehicles. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment with respect to plaintiffs’ smog fee claims. Additionally, plaintiffs appealed the judgment in favor of Raceway on certain individual plaintiffs’ claims that Raceway violated the ASFA by failing to provide them with copies of their credit applications. The Court found plaintiffs’ evidence in support of these claims was insufficient to overturn the trial court's decision, so that ruling was also affirmed. Lastly, plaintiffs appealed the judgment in favor of Raceway with respect to claims under the UCL and the CLRA brought by plaintiff Francisco Salcedo in his individual capacity. The trial court found in favor of Mr. Salcedo on his claim of fraud, and granted him the remedy of rescission, though it declined to award any punitive damages. Plaintiffs contended that the judgment in Mr. Salcedo’s favor on his fraud claim established as a matter of law that he should also have judgment entered in his favor on his UCL and CLRA claims. The Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed. The basis for the trial court’s award of fees to Raceway was, in part, undermined by the Court's partial reversal of the judgment. The case was therefore remanded with respect to Raceway's claims in light of remand on other issues. View "Raceway Ford Cases" on Justia Law

William Glick filed a class action suit against Raymond Wohl, in his official capacity of the clerk of the municipal court, among other defendants, seeking declaratory and equitable relief related to Glick's municipal court sentences he alleged to be void for imposing unlawfully excessive court costs. The common pleas court determined that Glick’s class action against Wohl was viable, declared that multiple costs assessed against Glick as part of his sentence were unlawful, and held that Glick and other class members who had been assessed unlawful costs were owed a refund. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the class action was not viable, and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Wohl. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the relief requested by Glick in his class action was in substance a request to vacate a portion of a judgment of the municipal court; and (2) because a court of common pleas has no power to vacate an order rendered by a municipal court, summary judgment should have been granted in favor of Wohl. Remanded. View "Lingo v. State" on Justia Law

In case no. 1120010, CVS Caremark Corporation; American International Group, Inc.; National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA; AIG Technical Services, Inc.; and American International Specialty Lines Insurance Company appealed a trial court order certifying as a class action the fraud claims asserted by plaintiffs John Lauriello; James O. Finney, Jr.; Sam Johnson; and the City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System. In case no. 1120114, the plaintiffs cross-appealed the same class-certification order, alleging that, though class treatment was appropriate, the trial court erred in certifying the class as an "opt-out" class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., rather than a "mandatory" class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. Finding no reversible error in either case, the Supreme Court affirmed in both. View "John Lauriello et al. v. CVS Caremark Corporation et al. " on Justia Law

The purported class action against Apple alleged: violations of Business and Professions Code sections 17200, 17500; breach of express warranty; violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code 1792); negligence; negligent misrepresentation; and unjust enrichment. The complaint alleges that Apple falsely represented the iPhone 3G to be “twice as fast” as the previous version of the iPhone and that the problems with the iPhone 3G are not related to the ATTM network, but with the device itself.” The lawsuit was preceded by federal litigation, raising similar but not identical claims. In 2009, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) transferred the actions to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The district court dismissed, for failure to join AT&T Mobility—the cellular network carrier for the iPhone 3G—as a necessary party under Code of Civil Procedure section 389, subdivision (a). Based on that decision, the California trial court dismissed. The appeals court reversed, finding that ATTM is not a necessary party.View "Van Zant v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

Quest provides diagnostic and clinical testing. In general, it tests a patient’s specimens upon the request of a referring physician. Once Quest bills a patient’s insurance provider, the provider reviews the claim and sends Quest an Explanation of Benefits (EOB) or an Electronic Remittance Advice (ERA), which informs Quest of the amount, if any, that the patient is responsible for paying. Quest then sends the patient a bill, and, if no response is received, it may turn the bill over to a collection agency. Plaintiffs in a putative class action claimed that Quest billed patients in excess of the amount stated on the EOB or ERA. The district court denied certification as to all four proposed classes and granted summary judgment against an individual plaintiff, as to her state law claims of consumer fraud and unjust enrichment. The Third Circuit affirmed. The court properly found that individual inquiries would be required to determine whether an alleged overbilling constituted unjust enrichment for each class member. View "Grandalski v. Quest Diagnostics Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in an accident while driving a business vehicle owned by Mattress King, Inc. and insured by Mountain West Farm Bureau. Plaintiff, whose personal vehicles were insured by Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois, filed a claim with Safeco for medical payment benefits. Plaintiff received medical payment benefits from Safeco and an undisclosed amount of underinsured motorist benefits from Mountain West. Believing Safeco wrongfully refused to pay additional claimed benefits, Plaintiff brought a class action suit against Safeco. The district court ultimately ruled in favor of Safeco. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the “other insurance” clauses in Plaintiff’s automobile liability policy were valid and, as applied in this case, did not constitute de facto subrogation.View "Scheafer v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill." on Justia Law

Allstate appealed the district court's grant of class certification to plaintiff and 800 other Allstate employees in California who alleged that Allstate has a practice or unofficial policy of requiring its claims adjusters to work unpaid off-the-clock overtime in violation of California law. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion determining that three common questions contained the "glue" necessary to say that "examination of all the class members' claims for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question[s]" raised by the plaintiffs' complaint. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering the class certification order and did not violate Allstate's due process rights where the order preserved Allstate's opportunity to present individualized defenses to damages claims and the district court's approval of statistical sampling among class members to determine liability did not violate Allstate's due process rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendants–Appellants Abercrombie & Fitch Co., Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., and J.M. Hollister LLC, d/b/a Hollister Co. (collectively, Abercrombie) appealed several district court orders holding that Hollister clothing stores violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Plaintiff–Appellee Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition (CCDC) is a disability advocacy organization in Colorado. In 2009, CCDC notified Abercrombie that Hollister stores at two malls in Colorado violated the ADA. Initial attempts to settle the matter were unsuccessful, and this litigation followed. Abercrombie took it upon itself to correct some barriers plaintiff complained of: it modified Hollister stores by lowering sales counters, rearranging merchandise to ensure an unimpeded path of travel for customers in wheelchairs, adding additional buttons to open the adjacent side doors, and ensuring that the side doors were not blocked or locked. However, one thing remained unchanged: a stepped, porch-like structure served as the center entrance at many Hollister stores which gave the stores the look and feel of a Southern California surf shack. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's judgment: affirming the court's denial of Abercrombie's summary judgment motion and certification of a class. However, the Court reversed the district court's partial grant, and later full grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs, and vacated the court's permanent injunction: "each of the district court’s grounds for awarding the Plaintiffs summary judgment [were] unsupportable. It was error to impose liability on the design of Hollister stores based on 'overarching aims' of the ADA. It was also error to impose liability based on the holding that the porch as a 'space' must be accessible. Finally, it was error to hold that the porch must be accessible because it is the entrance used by a 'majority of people.'" View "CO Cross-Disability Coalition, et al v. Abercrombie & Fitch, et al" on Justia Law

Two subcontractors employed by Petitioner, a homebuilder, asserted claims on behalf of a class of subcontractors whose pay Petitioner had docked when the subcontractors did not furnish proof of adequate general liability insurance coverage. The parties settled. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Petitioner would issue refunds checks, sending them to existing subcontractors as it would their paychecks or by mailing checks to the last known addresses of former subcontractors. The class representatives agreed, on behalf of the settlement class members, that refund checks not negotiated within ninety days of issuance would be void and that those and other unclaimed funds would be given to The Nature Conservancy as a cy pres award. The trial court approved the settlement and rendered final judgment accordingly. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Texas Unclaimed Property Act prohibited the imposition of a ninety-day deadline for negotiating settlement checks and the cy pres award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Act did not apply in this case and that the judgment approving the settlement agreement was binding on all settlement class members. View "Highland Homes Ltd. v. State" on Justia Law

Named plaintiffs, former FedEx drivers, represented two classes of plaintiffs comprising approximately 363 individuals who were full-time delivery drivers for FedEx in Oregon at any time between 1999 and 2009. Plaintiff class members worked for FedEx's two operating divisions, FedEx Ground and FedEx Home Delivery. FedEx contended its drivers were independent contractors under Oregon law. Plaintiffs contended they were employees. In a consolidated appeal, plaintiffs claimed that "FedEx improperly classified its drivers as independent contractors, thereby forcing them to incur business expenses and depriving them of benefits otherwise owed to employees" under Oregon law. The Ninth Circuit agreed with plaintiffs, and reversed the Multidistrict Litigation Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx Ground, its denial of plaintiff FedEx drivers' motion for partial summary judgment, and its certification of plaintiffs' classes insofar as they sought prospective relief. View "Slayman, et al v. FedEx Ground Package System" on Justia Law