Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Mary Hall, the personal representative of the estate of Adolphus Hall, Sr., and Anaya McKinnon, the personal representative of the estate of Wanzy Lee Bowman appealed the Jefferson Circuit Court's order dismissing their complaint filed against Environmental Litigation Group, P.C., a law firm ("ELG"). The plaintiffs filed a complaint in against ELG, requesting a declaratory judgment and alleging one count of unjust enrichment and one count of breach of contract. The plaintiffs asserted those claims on behalf of the estates they represented and on behalf of "others similarly situated as a class action pursuant to Rule 23," Ala. R. Civ. P. In the 1990s, ELG agreed to represent hundreds of clients who had been exposed to asbestos, including Adolphus Hall and Bowman; ELG entered into an attorney-employment agreement with each client; pursuant to that agreement, ELG agreed to "take all legal steps necessary to enforce the said tort claim," and in return ELG would receive 40% of amounts collected from any settlement or judgment as its fee; the agreement also permitted ELG to reimburse itself for reasonable expenses related to the clients' claims. The "crux" of the plaintiffs' claims is that ELG breached the attorney-employment agreement by allegedly taking as an attorney fee more than 40% of the settlement proceeds. ELG filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' appeal, arguing that the Supreme Court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' appeal because "[o]nly the Alabama State Bar has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute between the parties." The Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint, and affirmed the denial of ELG's motion to dismiss.View "Hall v. Environmental Litigation Group, P.C. " on Justia Law

Facing asbestos-related personal injury lawsuits filed in the 1980s, a group of producers of asbestos and asbestos-containing products formed the Center for Claims Resolution to administer such claims on behalf of its Members. About 20 Members negotiated and signed the Producer Agreement, which established and set forth the mechanics of the Center and the obligations of the Members. After G-I failed to pay its contractually-calculated share of personal injury settlements and Center expenses, U.S. Gypsum and Quigley were obligated to pay additional sums to cover G-I’s payment obligations. G-I filed for bankruptcy and the Center, U.S. Gypsum, and Quigley each filed a proof of claim, seeking to recover for G-I’s nonpayment under the Producer Agreement. The Center settled its claim with G-I. The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment in G-I’s favor. The district court affirmed. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that the Producer Agreement permits the Former Members to pursue a breach of contract action against G-I for its failure to pay contractually-obligated sums due to the Center, in light of their payment of G-I’s share. View "In re: G-I Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Before the Supreme Court, three actions: two class actions and a qui tam action brought in the name of the state of Michigan involving allegations that multiple pharmacies systematically violated MCL 333.17755(2) by improperly retaining savings that should have been passed on to customers when dispensing generic drugs in the place of their brand-name equivalents. Furthermore, plaintiffs argued that violations of section 17755(2) necessarily resulted in violations of the Health Care False Claim Act (HCFCA) and the Medicaid False Claim Act (MFCA) when pharmacists submitted reimbursement claims to the state for Medicaid payments that they were not entitled to receive. "The inferences and assumptions required to implicate defendants [were] simply too tenuous for plaintiffs' claims to survive summary judgment. Moreover, plaintiffs' overbroad approach of identifying all transactions in which a generic drug was dispensed fail[ed] to hone in on the only relevant transactions - those in which a generic drug was dispensed in place of a brand-name drug." The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ construction of MCL 333.17755(2) and its holding that plaintiffs' pleadings were sufficient to survive summary judgment, vacated the remainder of the Court of Appeals' judgment, and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. View "Michigan ex rel Gurganus v. CVS Caremark Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a Ralston Purina Company shareholder when Ralston and Nestle Holdings, Inc. entered into a merger agreement providing that, at the time of the merger, Ralston stock would be converted and Ralson shareholders would receive payments. Plaintiff was not paid until four days after the stock was converted. Ten years later, Plaintiff filed a class action petition alleging that Nestle breached the agreement by failing to timely pay shareholders. The trial court dismissed the petition as barred by the five-year statute of limitations in Mo. Rev. Stat. 516.120(1), which applies to all actions upon contracts except those mentioned in Mo. Rev. Stat. 516.110. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not applying the ten-year statute of limitations in section 516.110, which applies to all actions “upon any writing…for the payment of money.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the five-year statute applied in this case; and (2) Plaintiff’s argument that his petition was timely because the five-year limitations period was tolled by a pending class action against Nestle in another state was without merit.View "Rolwing v. Nestle Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

A purported class action alleged that Beachwood Hair Clinic violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, by disseminating more than 37,000 unsolicited fax advertisements in 2005 and 2006. Facing more than $18 million in statutory damages, Beachwood and its insurer, Acuity, agreed to a $4-million class settlement with the Ohio-based class representative, Siding. The settlement stipulated that separate litigation between Acuity and Siding would resolve a $2-million coverage dispute under Beachwood’s policy. Siding sought a declaratory judgment under Beachwood’s policy. The district court granted summary judgment to Acuity denying coverage. The Sixth Circuit vacated, finding that Siding did not establish diversity jurisdiction, which requires an amount in controversy greater than $75,000, 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). Unable to identify a singular interest exceeding $75,000 in the remaining $2-million coverage dispute, Siding sought to aggregate its interest with putative class members to satisfy that requirement, or to have the court consider the value of the policy dispute from Acuity’s perspective: $2 million. Acuity suggested ancillary jurisdiction via the settlement judgment in the underlying class action. The court rejected all arguments.View "Siding & Insulation Co. v. Acuity Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, invoking federal diversity jurisdiction, alleging that Defendant, Raytheon Company, negligently exposed Plaintiffs and others similarly situated to beryllium. Plaintiffs’ principal theory of liability was that the beryllium exposure caused subcellular change. Plaintiffs alternatively argued that a cause of action for medical monitoring under Massachusetts law does not require a showing of subcellular or other physiological change. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because no named Plaintiff or any class member had as yet contracted beryllium sensitization, the first manifestation of subcellular change resulting from beryllium exposure, Plaintiffs’ first claim failed; and (2) Plaintiffs did not preserve a claim under their alternative theory. View "Genereux v. Raytheon Co." on Justia Law

Defendants appealed an order certifying a class and a subclass of inmates in Arizona's prison system who claim that they are subject to systematic Eighth Amendment violations. Defendants argued that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that plaintiffs have demonstrated commonality and typicality under Rule 23(a). The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that plaintiffs' claims depend upon common questions of law or fact that are answerable in one stroke. Here, plaintiffs are all inmates in ADC custody and each declares that he or she is being exposed, like all other members of the putative class, to a substantial risk of serious harm by the challenged ADC policies. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court did not err in determining that plaintiffs have satisfied the commonality and typicality requirement of Rule 23(a). Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a single injunction and declaratory judgment could provide relief to each member of the proposed class and subclass. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Parsons v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against Coverall, a janitorial franchising company, alleging that Coverall misclassified its California franchises as independent contractors and that Coverall breached its franchise agreements. After the parties settled, a sole objector filed an objection to the proposed settlement. The court concluded that the objector presented no evidence that the district court abused its discretion in declining further adjustment from the lodestar amount; the district court acted within its proper discretion when it found that the settlement contained significant benefits for plaintiffs beyond the cash recovery, and that the award, at about the third of the lodestar amount, was reasonable; the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec. factors supported the conclusion that the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate; the district court has no obligation to make explicit monetary valuations of injunctive remedies; the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the settlement term that objectors be available for depositions; and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it approved the settlement agreement consistent with the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1715(b), notice requirement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's approval of the proposed class action settlement under Rule 23 and the award of attorneys' fees to the attorneys of the proposed class.View "Laguna v. Coverall North America" on Justia Law

A 2006 class action against Pella, a window manufacturer, alleged that certain windows had a design defect that allowed water to enter behind exterior aluminum cladding and damage the wooden frame and the house itself. The district judge certified a class for customers who had already replaced or repaired their windows, seeking damages and limited to six states, and another for those who had not, seeking only declaratory relief nationwide. Initially, there was one named plaintiff, Saltzman. His son-in-law, Weiss, was lead class counsel. Weiss is under investigation for multiple improprieties. The Seventh Circuit upheld the certifications. Class counsel negotiated a settlement in 2011 that directed Pella to pay $11 million in attorneys’ fees based on an assertion that the settlement was worth $90 million to the class. In 2013, before the deadline for filing claims, the district judge approved the settlement, which purports to bind a single nation-wide class of all owners of defective windows, whether or not they have replaced or repaired the windows. The agreement gave lead class counsel “sole discretion” to allocate attorneys’ fees; Weiss proposed to allocate 73 percent to his own firm. Weiss removed four original class representatives who opposed the settlement; their replacements joined Saltzman in supporting it. Named plaintiffs were each compensated $5,000 or $10,000 for their services, if they supported the settlement. Saltzman, as lead class representative, was to receive $10,000. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reversed, referring to “eight largely wasted years,” the need to remove Saltzman, Weiss, and Weiss’s firm as class representative and as class counsel, and to reinstate the four named plaintiffs.View "Riva v. Pella Corp." on Justia Law

The flea-and-tick “spot-on products” at issue claim that their active ingredient works by topical application to a pet’s skin rather than through the pet’s bloodstream. According to the manufacturers, after the product is applied to one area, it disperses over the rest of the pet’s body within one day because it collects in the oil glands and natural oils spread the product over the surface of the pet’s skin and “wick” the product over the hair. The plaintiffs alleged false advertising based on statements that the products are self-dispersing and cover the entire surface of the pet’s body when applied in a single spot; that they are effective for one month and require monthly applications to continue to work; that they do not enter the bloodstream; and that they are waterproof and effective after shampooing, swimming, and exposure to rain or sunlight. The district court repeatedly referred to a one-issue case: whether the product covers the pet’s entire body with a single application. The case management order stated that the manufacturers would bear the initial burden to produce studies that substantiated their claims; the plaintiffs would then have to refute the studies, “or these cases will be dismissed.” The manufacturers objected. The plaintiffs argued that the plan would save time, effort, and money. The manufacturers submitted studies. The plaintiffs’ response included information provided by one plaintiff and his adolescent son and an independent examination of whether translocation occurred that detected the product’s active ingredient in a dog’s bloodstream. The district court concluded that the manufacturers’ studies substantiated their claims and denied all of plaintiffs’ discovery requests, except a request for consumer complaints, then granted the manufacturers summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The doctrines of waiver and invited error precluded challenges to the case management plan.View "Simms v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC" on Justia Law