Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Arch based upon allegations of numerous violations by Arch of the California Labor Code. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the denial of her motion to remand this matter to the Superior Court after Arch removed it pursuant to the provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1446, 1453(b). The court reversed the district court's determination that it had diversity jurisdiction over the action and remanded. The court held that where a plaintiff files an action containing class claims as well as non-class claims, and the class claims do not meet the CAFA amount-in-controversy requirement while the nonclass claims, standing alone, do not meet diversity of citizenship jurisdiction requirements, the amount involved in the non-class claims cannot be used to satisfy the CAFA jurisdictional amount, and the CAFA diversity provisions cannot be invoked to give the district court jurisdiction over the non-class claims. View "Yocupicio v. PAE Grp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Arch based upon allegations of numerous violations by Arch of the California Labor Code. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the denial of her motion to remand this matter to the Superior Court after Arch removed it pursuant to the provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1446, 1453(b). The court reversed the district court's determination that it had diversity jurisdiction over the action and remanded. The court held that where a plaintiff files an action containing class claims as well as non-class claims, and the class claims do not meet the CAFA amount-in-controversy requirement while the nonclass claims, standing alone, do not meet diversity of citizenship jurisdiction requirements, the amount involved in the non-class claims cannot be used to satisfy the CAFA jurisdictional amount, and the CAFA diversity provisions cannot be invoked to give the district court jurisdiction over the non-class claims. View "Yocupicio v. PAE Grp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs described a predatory lending scheme affecting numerous borrowers nationwide, allegedly masterminded by Shumway, a residential mortgage loan business operating through other entities and title companies, to offer high-interest mortgage-backed loans to financially strapped homeowners. As a non-depository lender, Shumway was subject to fee caps and interest ceilings imposed by state mortgage lending laws. Plaintiffs claimed that, to circumvent those limitations, Shumway formed associations with banks, including CBNV and Guaranty, which were depository institutions. Plaintiffs alleged that CBNV and Guaranty uniformly misrepresented the apportionment and distribution of settlement and title fees on their HUD–1 Settlement Statement forms. The district court certified a nationwide class of individuals who received residential mortgage loans from CBNV. Two previous appeals involved certification of settlement classes. In a third appeal, the Third Circuit rejected arguments that there was a fundamental class conflict that undermines the adequacy of representation provided by class counsel; that the court conditionally certified the class and thus erred; and that the putative class does not meet the ascertainability, commonality, predominance, superiority, or manageability requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. View "In re: Community Bank of N. Va." on Justia Law

The plaintiff alleged consumer fraud by the seller of a dietary supplement, and the district court certified a plaintiff class of individuals “who purchased Instaflex within the applicable statute of limitations of the respective Class States for personal use until the date notice is disseminated,” under Rule 23(a) and (b)(3). The court rejected defendant’s argument that Rule 23(b)(3) implies a heightened ascertainability requirement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting an implicit requirement under Rule 23 that a class must be defined clearly and that membership be defined by objective criteria rather than by, for example, a class member’s state of mind. In addressing this requirement, courts have sometimes used the term “ascertainability.” Class definitions fail this requirement when they were too vague or subjective, or when class membership was defined in terms of success on the merits (fail-safe classes). This class satisfied “ascertainability” View "Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of the settlement of a securities class action brought on behalf of the purchasers of certain common stock of a corporation. Those who objected to the settlement and appealed the rejection of their objection argued that they were given too little time to register objections with the district court and that the district court should not have approved the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded to class counsel. The First Circuit (1) affirmed the district court’s rejection of the objections at issue, as the objectors had notice in fact and a sufficient opportunity to have any of their objections heard by the court before it approved the settlement; and (2) dismissed the objectors’ appeal from the court orders approving the settlement and award of counsel fees, as the objectors had no standing to complain about the fee award. View "Hill v. State Street Bank Corp." on Justia Law

The class action complaint at the heart of this case alleged violations of the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971 based on Dick’s alleged practice of requesting personal information from consumers during credit card transactions. The litigants reached a settlement providing for class members to receive vouchers for discounts off any merchandise purchases. The initial complaint listed Plaintiff’s counsel of record as California attorney Sean Reis of the law firm of Edelson McGuire, LLP, and several out-of-state attorneys with the notation “[p]ro hac vice admittance to be sought.” The out-of-state attorneys included Joseph Siprut of Siprut PC in Chicago, Illinois. Reis signed the complaint and signed an amended complaint filed in June 2011. While accepting responsibility for monitoring the pro hac vice application, Reis was not aware the application had been denied and assumed the application had been granted. Once the proposed class action settlement had been reached, the parties set a hearing date for an unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the settlement. While preparing for this hearing, Siprut and his staff reviewed the file and were unable to locate an order granting the pro hac vice application. After learning of the status of the pro hac vice application, Reis filed a new application to admit Siprut pro hac vice. The trial court issued a tentative ruling denying the second pro hac vice application. Citing rule 9.40(b) of the California Rules of Court, the court stated that application would be denied due to the “great number of pro hac vice applications” that Joseph Siprut had made during the past year. Siprut appeared at a December 2012 hearing along with Todd Atkins, an attorney from Siprut PC, who was a member of the California State Bar. Reis did not appear. The court, affirming the tentative ruling, denied the pro hac vice application on the ground that Siprut had made 12 pro hac vice applications in the prior 11 months and there were no special circumstances under rule 9.40(b) of the California Rules of Court which would support granting the application. Reis ultimately filed a consent to associate Atkins as counsel of record for plaintiff. Upon settlement of the class, plaintiff's counsel moved for fees. The trial court found that two of a class of 232,000 submitted claims for the merchandise credit. The court could find “absolutely no benefit really to anybody based on your claims record” and noted that most of the attorney fees sought were incurred by two out-of-state attorneys who had never been admitted pro hac vice. Final approval was granted to the settlement. In a supplemental briefing, plaintiff's counsel suggested the court grant Sirput's pro has vice application for admission nunc pro tunc to the date of first application. Counsel's application for fees was ultimately denied, and on appeal, argued the trial court erred in denying the total amount ($210,000) of fees. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of $11,000. The Court further affirmed the trial court's decision to reduct the amount of the plaintiff incentive award. View "Golba v. Dick's Sporting Goods" on Justia Law

Real parties in interest filed putative class claims against Safeway and Vons for violations of the Labor Code and the unfair competition law (UCL), Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200 et seq. The trial court certified a class for purposes of the UCL claim based on the theory that Safeway and Vons had a practice of never paying premium wages for missed meal breaks when required. Safeway and Vons seek a writ directing the trial court to vacate the grant of certification and to enter a new order denying certification. The court denied the petition, concluding that the trial court did not err in certifying real parties' UCL claims for class treatment where real parties demonstrated that the existence of the labor practice and the fact of damage were matters suitable for class treatment. View "Safeway, Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Purchasers of notebook computers, manufactured by HP, filed a class action, alleging that certain notebook computers manufactured by HP contained inverters that HP knew would likely fail and cause display screens to dim and darken at some point before the end of the notebook’s useful life. They claimed violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), the Consumer Legal Remedies 2 Act (CLRA), unjust enrichment and breach of express warranty. After years of litigation, the trial court ultimately made a “no merits” determination as to the CLRA claim, and granted HP’s motion for summary judgment as to the remaining claims. The court of appeal affirmed class certification; reversed the summary adjudication of UCL claims and the no merits determination as to certain CLRA claims; and affirmed summary adjudication of some breach of express warranty claims, while reversing others. View "Rutledge v. Hewlett-Packard" on Justia Law

Consumers from six states filed suit, alleging that Volvo sold certain vehicles with defective sunroof drainage systems. The Third Circuit vacated the grant of class certification after holding that unnamed, putative class members need not establish Article III standing. The class certification opinion rejected plaintiffs’ proposal of a nationwide class and the application of New Jersey law to all claims, and directed that “the law of the state of each subclass should be applied to the subclass’s claims,” but the court did not identify which claims would be subject to class treatment. The court remanded to allow the district court to define the class membership, claims, and defenses, and so that it may rigorously analyze predominance in the first instance. View "Neale v. Volvo Cars N. Am." on Justia Law

In 2013, hackers attacked Neiman Marcus and stole the credit card numbers of its customers. In December 2013, the company learned that some of its customers had found fraudulent charges on their cards. On January 10, 2014, it publicly announced that the cyberattack had occurred and that between July 16 and October 30, 2013, and approximately 350,000 cards had been exposed to the hackers’ malware. Customers filed suit under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). The district court dismissed, ruling that the individual plaintiffs and the class lacked Article III standing. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiffs identified some particularized, concrete, redress able injuries, as a result of the data breach. View "Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC" on Justia Law