Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed claims individually and on behalf of three putative classes against Defendant seeking damages and injunctive relief under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Prior to the parties’ agreed-upon deadline for the class certification motion that Plaintiff announced it would pursue, Defendant tendered to Plaintiff an offer for judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. Four days after receiving the offer, Plaintiff moved for class certification. The unaccepted offer was subsequently withdrawn due to Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the offer. Thereafter, Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of matter jurisdiction, arguing that its unaccepted and withdrawn Rule 68 offer resolved any case or controversy between the parties, thereby mooting Plaintiff’s claims. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that a rejected and withdrawn offer of settlement of the named plaintiff’s individual claims in a putative class action made before the named plaintiff moves to certify a class does not moot the named plaintiff’s claims and divest the court of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Bais Yaakov of Spring Valley v. ACT, Inc." on Justia Law

The district court, in evaluating whether it had jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), over the removed action, analyzed this consolidated case as though it remained two separate class actions, and concluded that CAFA’s local controversy exception applied to the first-filed class action, Bridewell-Sledge v. Blue Cross of California, but that the exception did not apply to the second-filed class action, Crowder v. Blue Cross of California. The court held that it was improper for the district court to view Bridewell-Sledge and Crowder as two separate class actions after they had been consolidated by the state court. In this case, the Bridewell-Sledge/Crowder consolidated class action should have been viewed by the district court as a single class action when evaluating jurisdiction under CAFA. Once it is recognized that the two cases became one, it is clear that CAFA’s local controversy exception applies to the consolidated class action, and, therefore, the district court was required to remand the entire Bridewell-Sledge/Crowder consolidated class action to state court. View "Bridewell-Sledge v. Blue Cross of CA" on Justia Law

The named plaintiffs purchased Align, Procter & Gamble’s probiotic nutritional supplement, and found that the product did not work as advertised—that it did not promote their digestive health. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violations of state unfair or deceptive practices statutes because it has not been proven scientifically that Align promotes digestive health for anyone. The district court certified five single-state classes from California, Illinois, Florida, New Hampshire, and North Carolina under FRCP 23(b)(3) comprised of “[a]ll consumers who purchased Align . . . from March 1, 2009, until the date notice is first provided to the Class.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed class certification. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the proposed class to be sufficiently ascertainable; there is significant evidence that Plaintiffs could use traditional models and methods to identify class members. View "Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co." on Justia Law

In 2010, Southwest Airlines stopped honoring certain in-flight drink vouchers issued to customers who had bought “Business Select” fares. Customers filed suit, seeking to represent a class of similarly situated plaintiffs. The parties reached a settlement to provide replacement drink vouchers to all class members, and injunctive relief constraining how Southwest could issue future vouchers. The parties negotiated an agreement on fees for class counsel. The court certified the class and approved the settlement’s class relief components, but awarded counsel a smaller fee than requested. Two class members objected, arguing that the settlement was unfair to the class because it was too generous to class counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The “coupon settlement” provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1712, allowed the court to award attorney fees based on the lodestar method rather than the value of the redeemed coupons. While the fee aspects of the settlement include troublesome features, the settlement provides class members essentially complete relief. The financial and professional relationship between lead class counsel and one lead plaintiff created a potential conflict of interest that should have been disclosed, but another lead plaintiff had no conflict and the class received essentially complete relief, so there was no basis for decertification or rejecting the settlement. The court instead removed that plaintiff’s $15,000 incentive award and reduced the lawyer’s fee. View "Markow v. Southwest Airlines Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Michael Parnow, Shawn Lisenby, Bob Andrade, Gabriel Bautista, and Saiyaz Abdul filed a class action against Universal Protection Service, LP and Universal Services of America, Inc. (collectively, UPS). Plaintiffs worked as armed security guards at the Yolo County Superior Court, under the employ of UPS. As part of their job, they have to provide equipment, such as guns, handcuffs, and radios, and have to pay the costs to maintain their certification to work as armed guards, but they are not reimbursed for equipment or training costs. When they filed an administrative complaint, they were all fired except plaintiff Lisenby, and none were paid their wages. The trial court granted a stipulated stay, pending the outcome of a then-pending case in the California Supreme Court. After the Supreme Court issued its decision, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint as a “representative action” under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) and also petitioned to compel class-wide arbitration. The agreement listed a number of disputes that were covered, including “any state or local statutes and ordinances relating to wage and hour or wage payment matters.” It excluded employees covered by collective bargaining agreements, and disputes involving workers compensation and unemployment insurance. UPS answered with a general denial, coupled with various affirmative defenses, including that the class action claims were barred by the arbitration agreement. UPS also filed a cross-complaint seeking a declaration that: (1) the trial court, not the arbitrator, should decide whether class action relief was barred by the arbitration agreement; and (2) that the arbitration agreement barred class actions. After plaintiffs answered the cross-complaint, UPS moved to compel individual arbitration and stay the proceedings. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, in part arguing that under American Arbitration Association (AAA) Rules, whether class arbitrations were permitted was a matter for the arbitrator to decide. Plaintiffs obtained judicial notice of the AAA Rules. The trial court denied the motion to compel individual arbitration, and stayed the suit pending the arbitration. UPS petitioned for a writ of mandate, seeking to set aside the order compelling it to submit to arbitration. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the agreements’ incorporation by reference of the AAA Rules vested the arbitrator with the power to decide the disputed issue. The alternative writ was discharged, the stay (issued previously) was vacated, and the petition for mandate was denied. View "Universal Protection Service v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

More than 200 foreign agricultural workers allege they were exposed to the pesticide DBCP on banana farms throughout Central America, in the 1960s through the 1980s, resulting in health problems. Litigation began in 1993 with a putative class against Dole and related companies in Texas state court. Numerous suits were filed (and consolidated) in 2011 in the Eastern District of Louisiana against Dole and others. The court agreed granted Dole summary judgment based on the statute of limitations; the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Meanwhile, in 2012, several actions were filed in the District of Delaware against the same defendants and alleging the same causes of action. Dole moved to dismiss the Delaware lawsuits, arguing for the application of the first-filed rule. The court held that the rule applied while the case was on appeal to the Fifth Circuit and dismissed, reasoning that “one fair bite at the apple is sufficient.” Delaware subsequently dismissed other defendants. The Third Circuit affirmed: where there is federal concurrent jurisdiction over a matter, “the court which first ha[d] possession of the subject must decide it.” Plaintiffs conceded that the Delaware cases were “materially identical” to those previously filed in Louisiana. Concurrent jurisdiction existed at the time. View "Chavez v. Dole Food Co., Inc" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from actions filed by holders of Argentina's bonds after the Republic of Argentina defaulted on sovereign debt. After previous panels of this court twice vacated aggregate judgments entered by the district court in favor of plaintiff classes, the court remanded with specific instructions. The district court, however, certified expanded plaintiff classes. The court concluded that the district court erred in following Hickory Sec. Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina's (Seijas II) mandate where, even though it did not expressly preclude recertification, Seijas II cannot be read to have permitted the district court to disregard the court's instructions and expand the plaintiff classes as a solution to a problem for which the court had already prescribed a specific response. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's orders and remanded. View "Puricelli v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from actions filed by holders of Argentina's bonds after the Republic of Argentina defaulted on sovereign debt. After previous panels of this court twice vacated aggregate judgments entered by the district court in favor of plaintiff classes, the court remanded with specific instructions. The district court, however, certified expanded plaintiff classes. The court concluded that the district court erred in following Hickory Sec. Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina's (Seijas II) mandate where, even though it did not expressly preclude recertification, Seijas II cannot be read to have permitted the district court to disregard the court's instructions and expand the plaintiff classes as a solution to a problem for which the court had already prescribed a specific response. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's orders and remanded. View "Puricelli v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

Burglars stole four desktop computers from Advocate Health and Hospitals Corporation’s Illinois administrative offices. The computers contained unencrypted private data relating to approximately four million Advocate patients. Six of those patients brought a putative class action alleging that Advocate did too little to safeguard their information, asserting claims for willful and negligent violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681. The district court dismissed the FCRA claims for failure to state a claim. It also found that four of the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because their injuries were too speculative; the thieves had stolen their information but had not yet misused it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Using information internally does not count as “furnishing … to third parties,” so the Act’s reasonable‐procedures provision did not apply, and the FCRA claims were properly dismissed. View "Tierney v. Advocate Health & Hosp. Corp." on Justia Law

Burglars stole four desktop computers from Advocate Health and Hospitals Corporation’s Illinois administrative offices. The computers contained unencrypted private data relating to approximately four million Advocate patients. Six of those patients brought a putative class action alleging that Advocate did too little to safeguard their information, asserting claims for willful and negligent violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681. The district court dismissed the FCRA claims for failure to state a claim. It also found that four of the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because their injuries were too speculative; the thieves had stolen their information but had not yet misused it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Using information internally does not count as “furnishing … to third parties,” so the Act’s reasonable‐procedures provision did not apply, and the FCRA claims were properly dismissed. View "Tierney v. Advocate Health & Hosp. Corp." on Justia Law