Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and other class members, settled a class action suit against Robert Half for $19 million. David Brennan, a member of the class objected to the settlement and the trial court overruled his objections, approving the settlement. Brennan appealed. The court concluded that the class notice did not violate the class members' due process rights; the trial court's method for calculating attorneys' fee was proper and the award was reasonable; and the inclusion of a clear sailing provision in the settlement agreement did not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of class counsel. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order approving the settlement and entering final judgment. View "Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l" on Justia Law

Defendants manufacture vitamins and nutritional supplements, including glucosamine pills, designed to help people with joint disorders, such as osteoarthritis. Several class action suits were filed under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2), claiming violations of states’ consumer protection laws by making false claims. Eight months later, class counsel negotiated a nationwide settlement that was approved with significant modifications. The settlement requires Rexall to pay $1.93 million in fees to class counsel, plus $179,676 in expenses, $1.5 million in notice and administration costs, $1.13 million to the Orthopedic Research and Education Foundation, $865,284 to the 30,245 class members who submitted claims, and $30,000 to the six named plaintiffs ($5,000 apiece) Class members, led by the Center for Class Action Fairness, objected. The Seventh Circuit reversed, characterizing the settlement as “a selfish deal between class counsel and the defendant.” While most consumers of glucosamine pills are elderly and bought the product in containers with labels that recite the misrepresentations, only one-fourth of one percent of them will receive even modest compensation; for a limited period the labels will be changed, in trivial respects. The court questioned: “for conferring these meager benefits class counsel should receive almost $2 million?” View "Pearson v. NBTY, Inc." on Justia Law

Smith sued Greystone, a debt collector, alleging violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692–92p, and seeking statutory damages and compensatory damages for emotional distress. The district judge certified it as a class action, but the suit was transferred and the new judge decertified the class. Another judge dismissed, ruling that it had been moot since November 2009, when Greystone offered Smith $1,500 plus costs and attorneys’ fees. The Seventh Circuit vacated. A controversy exists when the plaintiff wants more, or different, relief than the defendant is willing to provide. The district judge decided that Smith’s compensatory damages could not exceed $500, but, while an excessive demand may lead to sanctions for frivolous litigation, it does not diminish the court’s jurisdiction. A court must resolve the merits unless the defendant satisfies the plaintiff’s demand. An offer that the defendant or the judge believes sufficient, but which does not satisfy the plaintiff’s demand, does not justify dismissal. View "Smith v. Greystone Alliance LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action against Walgreens, alleging that Walgreens violated employees' rights to meal breaks. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for class certification. The court concluded that the trail court used the right analysis to analyze plaintiff's motion where the trial court correctly applied the Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior court holding. Brinker adopted the "make available" standard and rejected the "ensure" standard where the employer merely must make meal breaks available, rather than ensure employees take breaks. The trial court said that Walgreens must make breaks available for its employees, but the employer need not ensure employees actually take the meal breaks. In this case, plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his motions through an expert opinion, emails, and declarations. The evidence was too weak to convince the trial court and the trial court's evaluations were valid. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re Walgreen Co. Overtime Cases" on Justia Law

Class representatives sued Kentucky real estate firms, alleging violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, by participating in a horizontal conspiracy to fix commissions charged in Kentucky real estate transactions at an anti-competitive rate. The certified class consists of people who sold residential real estate in Kentucky from 2001 to 2005, and used the services of defendants. Several defendants settled. The district court entered summary judgment for remaining defendants, excluding the opinions of plaintiffs’ experts with respect to whether collusion among the defendants was the likely economic explanation of the pricing of commissions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that although the plaintiffs produced a good deal of circumstantial evidence that would support a theory of collusion, the conduct at issue was also consistent with permissible competition. View "Hyland v. HomeServices of America, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Brett Woods and Kathleen Valdes were state employees and representatives of a class of New Mexico state and local government employees who alleged they paid for insurance coverage through payroll deductions and premiums pursuant to a policy issued by Standard Insurance Company (Standard), but did not receive the coverage for which they paid and, in some cases, were denied coverage entirely. Plaintiffs filed suit in New Mexico state court against three defendants: Standard, an Oregon company that agreed to provide the subject insurance coverage; the Risk Management Division of the New Mexico General Services Department (the Division), the state agency that contracted with Standard and was responsible for administering benefits under the policy; and Standard employee Martha Quintana, who Plaintiffs allege was responsible for managing the Division’s account with Standard and for providing account management and customer service to the Division and state employees. Plaintiffs' ninety-one-paragraph complaint, stated causes of action against Standard and the Division for breach of contract and unjust enrichment; against Standard for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and Unfair Practices Act violations; and against Standard and Ms. Quintana for breach of the New Mexico Trade Practices and Fraud Act. The issue this appeal presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether remand to the state court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) was required under either of two CAFA provisions: the state action provision, which excludes from federal jurisdiction cases in which the primary defendants are states; or the local controversy exception, which requires federal courts to decline jurisdiction where, among other things, there is a local defendant whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by plaintiffs and from whom plaintiffs seek significant relief. The Court concluded that neither provision provided a basis for remand, and therefore reversed the decision of the magistrate judge remanding the case to state court. But because the Tenth Circuit could not determine whether Defendants have established the amount in controversy required to confer federal jurisdiction, the case was remanded to the district court for the resolution of that issue. View "Woods v. Standard Insurance Co." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed suit seeking to represent a class of salaried managerial employees who worked at JCS restaurants in California on claims they had been misclassified as exempt employees and were entitled to overtime pay. The trial court subsequently permitted additional plaintiffs to join the lawsuit. The trial court denied class certification based on the ground that plaintiffs failed to establish that their claims were typical of the class, they could represent the class, common questions predominated the claims, and a class action is the superior means of resolving the litigation. The court concluded, however, that the class is adequately represented by plaintiffs and these claims are typical of the class; the trial court failed to adequately assess the means by which plaintiffs' theory of recovery could be proved through resolution of common questions of fact and law; the trial court must reconsider whether class certification provides a superior method of resolving plaintiffs' claim, and therefore, the court reversed the order denying class certification and remanded for further proceedings. View "Martinez v. Joe's Crab Shack Holdings" on Justia Law

IntelliGender sold and advertised the IntelliGender Prediction Test as an accurate predictor of a fetus's gender using the mother's urine sample. The district court approved a Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), settlement between a nationwide certified class of purchasers of the Test and IntelliGender. The State subsequently filed an enforcement action against IntelliGender under the State's Unfair Competition and False Advertising Laws, largely based on the same claims as the class action. The court concluded that the district court correctly denied IntelliGender's motion to enjoin the State's enforcement action in its entirety where IntelliGender had not met its burden of showing that the CAFA class action settlement could bind the State in its sovereign capacity, where it asserted both public and private interests. The court agreed that a CAFA class action settlement, though approved by the district court, does not act as res judicata against the State in its sovereign capacity, even though many of the same claims are included in both actions. Because the State action is brought on behalf of the people, it implicates the public's interests as well as private interests, and therefore the remedial provisions sweep much more broadly. The court concluded, however, that the State is precluded from seeking the same relief sought in the CAFA class action where IntelliGender provided notice to the appropriate parties of the class action and the State chose not to participate. Therefore, the district court erred in denying IntelliGender's motion to enjoin the State's claims for restitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "State of California v. IntelliGender" on Justia Law

In 2006, several borrowers sued their lender, CashCall, Inc., alleging CashCall monitored their telephone conversations without their knowledge or consent. Over CashCall's objections, the trial court certified a class on one of the claims, an alleged violation of Penal Code section 632, which imposes liability on a "person" who intentionally "eavesdrops upon or records [a] confidential communication" and engages in this conduct "without the consent of all parties." After class certification, CashCall successfully moved for summary adjudication on the section 632 claim. The trial court found as a matter of law a corporation does not violate the statute when one of its supervisory employees secretly monitors a conversation between a customer and another corporate employee, reasoning that two employees are a single "person" within the meaning of the statute. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the statute applies even if the unannounced listener is employed by the same corporate entity as the known recipient of the conversation, concluding the trial court's statutory interpretation was inconsistent with section 632's language and purpose. The Court also rejected CashCall's alternative argument that summary adjudication was proper because the undisputed facts established the telephone conversations were not "confidential communication[s]." On remand, CashCall moved to decertify the class on grounds that the issue whether any particular class member could satisfy a reasonable-expectation test (as the Court discussed in its earlier opinion) required an assessment of numerous individual factors (including those identified in the earlier opinion) and these individual issues predominate over any remaining common issues, making a continued class action unmanageable. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing CashCall did not meet its burden to establish changed circumstances necessary for class decertification and, alternatively, common issues continued to predominate in the case. The court granted the decertification motion. Plaintiffs appealed the decertification, but finding no error in that decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Kight v. CashCall" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, filed a first amended class action complaint alleging that Gentry Homes, Ltd. constructed Plaintiffs’ home without adequate high wind protection. Gentry filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to a provision in the Home Builder’s Limited Warranty (HBLW) between Gentry and Plaintiffs. The circuit court ordered Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims against Gentry but severed and struck an arbitrator-selection provision for potential conflict of interest. The intermediate court of appeals concluded that the circuit court should have enforced the HBLW’s arbitrator-selection provision. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and affirmed the circuit court orders, holding (1) the ICA erred in required a party challenging an arbitrator-selection provision to show evidence of “actual bias”; and (2) in resolving a challenge to an arbitrator-selection provision, the “fundamental fairness” standard should be applied, and under this standard, the arbitrator-selection provision was fundamentally unfair. View "Nishimura v. Gentry Homes, Ltd." on Justia Law