Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Judon was injured while riding in a commercial passenger vehicle that was insured by Travelers. Judon sought first-party medical benefits of $7,636.40. Travelers paid $5,000, up to the policy’s first-party medical benefits limit. Judon filed a class-action complaint in state court, alleging that Pennsylvania law required that the policy offer up to $25,000 in first-party medical benefits. Judon alleged that “there are hundreds of members of the class” who were wrongfully denied payment of first-party benefits. Travelers removed to federal court, under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), 1453, arguing that the parties were minimally diverse; the proposed class consisted of at least 100 putative members; and the amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000. The district court remanded, finding that CAFA’s numerosity and amount-in- controversy requirements were disputed and placing the burden of proof on Travelers to establish jurisdiction. The Third Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. Judon’s complaint unambiguously pleaded that the numerosity requirement was satisfied, so the court should have placed the burden of proof on Judon to show, to a legal certainty, that the numerosity requirement was not satisfied. The court correctly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard to the amount-in-controversy requirement. View "Judon v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

The 965 plaintiffs were people who borrowed money from Countrywide in the mid-2000’s. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on the permissive joinder statute (Code of Civil Procedure Section 378). Had this case been filed prior to 2005, in all probability it would have been filed as a class action (in 2005, Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)). Plaintiffs' third amended complaint alleged that in the mid-2000’s, defendant Countrywide Financial Corporation developed a two-prong business strategy to increase its profits: Countrywide would use captive real estate appraisers to provide dishonest appraisals that would inflate home prices beyond levels that would otherwise prevail in an honest market; then Countrywide would induce its borrowers to take loans Countrywide knew they couldn’t afford by misleading them as to their ability to pay their loans, including misrepresenting key terms of the loans themselves. Plaintiffs alleged Countrywide did this because it had no intention of keeping the loans on its books, but intended to bundle them into saleable tranches and sell them to investors. This appeal raised two questions of state law: (1) despite the rather staggering number of joined plaintiffs, did the third amended complaint allege, to track the statutory language of section 378, the “same . . . series of transactions” that would entail litigation of at least one common question of law or fact; and (2) whether California's procedures governing permissive joinder were up to the task of managing mass actions like this one. The Court of Appeal answered "yes" to both questions: a few years after section 378’s enactment in 1927, the California Supreme Court declared the statute’s same-series-of-transactions language is to be construed broadly in favor of joinder, and there are sufficient common questions of law and fact in this case to satisfy section 378, including whether a mortgage lender has a duty to its borrowers not to encourage “high ball,” dishonest appraisals and whether Countrywide really had a deliberate strategy of placing borrowers into loans it “knew” they couldn’t afford. While the Court reversed the judgment dismissing all but one plaintiff for misjoinder, the Court emphasized that on remand the trial court would have to consider a variety of procedural tools with which to organize this case into appropriate and manageable subclaims and subclasses. "While the irony of requiring the case to be divided into tranches has not escaped as, we are confident the trial court can handle the task." View "Petersen v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

In 2002, Warren Lester and hundreds of other plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Exxon Mobil Corp. and others seeking personal injury damages allegedly caused by exposure to naturally occurring radioactive material (“NORM”) and other hazardous materials at various Louisiana pipeyards operated by Intracoastal Tubular Services, Inc. (“ITCO”). A flight of several plaintiffs, including John Oleszkowicz, was severed and transferred to the 24th Judicial District Court, at which point the only remaining defendants were ITCO and Exxon. The jury considered each of the plaintiffs’ compensatory claims for increased risk of cancer, as well as a claim for exemplary damages pursuant to former La. Civ. Code art. 2315.3. During the course of trial, the district court instructed the jurors that plaintiffs could bring a “new lawsuit” in the event they actually contracted cancer. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded damages for the increased risk of cancer. Oleszkowicz was personally awarded $115,000 in compensatory damages. Significantly, the jury did not award exemplary damages to the plaintiffs for increased risk of cancer, based on a finding that Exxon did not engage in wanton or reckless conduct in the storage, handling, or transportation of hazardous or toxic substances. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment on appeal, and the Supreme Court denied writs. Several months after the verdict, Oleszkowicz was diagnosed with prostate cancer. As a result, he filed the instant suit against Exxon and others, alleging his cancer stemmed from the same NORM exposure at ITCO’s pipeyard. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the plaintiff’s claim for punitive and exemplary damages was barred by res judicata and, if so, whether “exceptional circumstances” existed to justify not applying res judicata to bar the claim, as set forth in La. Rev. Stat. 13:4232(A). Although the court of appeal cited “exceptional circumstances” to justify relief from the res judicata effect of the jury’s verdict on the issue of punitive damages, the Supreme Court found no such “exceptional circumstances” exist under the facts of this case and reversed the appellate court's ruling. View "Oleszkowicz v. Exxon Mobil Corp." on Justia Law

Accretive provides cost control, revenue cycle management, and compliance services to non-profit healthcare providers. Accretive and Fairview entered into a Revenue Cycle Operations Agreement (RCA), accounting for about 12% of Accretive’s revenue during the class period, and a Quality and Total Cost of Care (QTCC) contract, promoted as the future for healthcare services. In 2012, the Minnesota Attorney General sued Accretive for noncompliance with healthcare, debt collection, and consumer protection laws. Accretive wound down its RCA contract short of its term, expecting a loss of $62 to $68 million. The AG released a damaging report on Accretive’s business practices. Fairview cancelled its QTCC contract. Accretive’s stock fell from over $24 to under $10 per share. Plaintiffs filed a class action under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, alleging that Accretive concealed its practices to artificially inflate its common stock. The parties negotiated a settlement of $14 million: $0.20 per share ($0.14 with attorneys’ fees and expenses deducted). Notice was sent to 34,200 potential class members. Only one opted out; only Hayes filed an objection. At the fairness hearing, the district court granted approval, awarding attorneys’ fees of 30% and expenses of $63,911.14. Hayes did not attend. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hayes v. Accretive Health, Inc." on Justia Law

Colorado Golf Club Holding Company LLC (CGC Holding), Harlem Algonquin LLC and James Medick proposed certification of a class action suit. They alleged a group of lenders conspired to create a fraudulent scheme to obtain non-refundable up-front fees in return for loan commitments , and misrepresented their ability and their objective to make good on the promises to meet certain financing obligations as part of a scheme to entice borrowers to pay the up-front fees. The class intended to offer generalized proof that the lenders concealed the financial history of Sandy Hutchens, the principal defendant, and his use of pseudonyms, to preserve the superficial integrity of the operation. The borrowers argued that had they known about this pretense, no putative class member would have taken part in the financial transactions that caused each to lose its up-front fees, amounting to millions of dollars of cumulative losses. The ultimate issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether the class could pursue claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). In opposing the claims, the lenders argued that each class member would have to demonstrate that it relied on the lenders’ misrepresentations or omissions to satisfy RICO’s causation element, making a single trial unwieldy and unworkable. The Tenth Circuit held that the lenders were wrong in this respect: RICO class-action plaintiffs are not entitled to an evidentiary presumption of a factual element of a claim. The Court agreed with the district court that a class could be certified in this context. Plaintiffs' theory sufficiently allayed any concerns about Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that common issues predominate over those idiosyncratic to individual class members. The Tenth Circuit affirmed certification of the class, but reversed the district court with regard to certification decision as to the lenders’ law firm and lawyers, Broad and Cassel, Ronald Gache and Carl Romano. Because several claims were not properly before the Court in this interlocutory appeal, the Court declined to address: (1) whether plaintiffs’ claims constituted an impermissible extraterritorial application of RICO; (2) whether the plaintiffs could prove proximate cause; or (3) whether the district court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over certain defendants. View "CGC Holding v. Gache" on Justia Law

In plaintiff-appellant Dagmar Hale's second appeal in a class action against Sharp Healthcare and Sharp Grossmont Hospital (collectively, Sharp), she argued Sharp unfairly charged her and other uninsured patients more for emergency services than the fees it accepted from patients covered by private insurance or governmental plans. In the first appeal, the Court of Appeal partially reversed a judgment of dismissal following a demurrer. The trial court thereafter certified the class. After engaging in discovery, Sharp moved to decertify the class arguing a class action was inappropriate based on lack of ascertainability and lack of predominantly common issues. The trial court considered the evidence presented and found there was no reasonable means to ascertain the members of class without individual inquiries of more than 120,000 patient records and continued class treatment was not appropriate because individualized issues, rather than common issues, predominate, particularly with respect to whether or not class members are entitled to recover damages. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order decertifying the class. View "Hale v. Sharp Healthcare" on Justia Law

Elsinore, LLC purchased a property located within the Peccole Ranch planned community that was subject to a lien for unpaid community-association assessments. Elsinore paid the outstanding association dues and then sold the property. Thereafter, Elsionre filed a complaint against Peccole Ranch with the Nevada Real Estate Division (NRED) on behalf of itself and a class of property owners. Peccole Ranch then filed a district court action against Elsinore. Elsinore counterclaimed for declaratory relief and damages on bhealf of itself and the identified class. Peccole Ranch filed a third-party complaint against Nevada Association Services (NAS), one of its agents, seeking indemnification and contribution for any damages that Elsinore and the class recovered from Peccole Ranch. NAS and Peccole Ranch moved for summary judgment against Elsinore's counterclaims for damages on the basis that the voluntary payment doctrine barred Elsinore’s and the class members’ claims. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court granted mandamus relief, holding that the voluntary payment doctrine was a complete defense to Elsinore’s claims, and therefore, the district court erred by denying NAS and Peccole Ranch’s motion for summary judgment. View "Nev. Ass'n Servs. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a proposed class action in Florida state court against BLP, alleging that BLP sent unsolicited faxes in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(C), and its implementing regulations. BLP removed to federal court and BLP served each named plaintiff an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. BLP then moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that the unaccepted Rule 68 offers rendered the case moot. The court concluded that a plaintiff's individual claim is not mooted by an unaccepted Rule 68 offer of judgment, and a proffer that moots a named plaintiff's individual claim does not moot a class action in circumstances like those presented in this case, even if the proffer comes before the plaintiff has moved to certify the class. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the action. View "Jeffrey M. Stein D.D.S., et al. v. Buccaneers Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

In 2008, Attorney David Landay submitted to appellant Rite Aid of Pennsylvania, Inc., an "authorization" on behalf of an individual, requesting copies of the that person's pharmacy records. In response to the requests, Rite Aid sent invoices for $50 to both Landay and PC&G (collectively, "Appellees") for "professional services rendered." Appellees paid the invoices, and Rite Aid provided the requested copies of the pharmacy records. In 2010, Appellees filed a class action against Rite Aid. In Count I of the complaint, Appellees claimed that Rite Aid breached an implied agreement between the parties and Rite Aid that Rite Aid would provide copies of its records to its customers in a manner consistent with Pennsylvania law, limiting the amount that may be charged to the estimated actual and reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the reproduction of the requested records. Specifically, Appellees maintained that Rite Aid's act of charging a flat fee for the reproduction of records violated Section 6152(a)(2)(i) of the Medical Records Act (MRA). In Count II of their complaint, Appellees requested a declaratory judgment that the MRA prohibited Rite Aid from charging more than the reasonable expenses it incurred to reproduce the requested records, and, further, precluded Rite Aid from charging a flat fee. In this discretionary appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the MRA applied to the reproduction of records by pharmacies, and, if so, whether, and under what circumstances, pharmacies may charge customers a flat fee for the reproduction of records. The Court held that the Act did not apply to pharmacies, and, as a result, it did not address the flat fee issue. View "Landay v. Rite Aid" on Justia Law

In these three putative class actions, Plaintiffs, current or former tenants of separate apartment buildings, sought damages for rent overcharges. All plaintiffs initially sought treble damages but then waived that demand. At issue was whether Plaintiffs’ claims could properly be brought as class actions. Defendants argued, among other things, that these actions were to “recover a penalty” because, even without trebling, the remedy provided by the Rent Stabilization Law (RSL) 26-516 is a penalty. In each case, the Appellate Division certified a question to the Court of Appeals. The Court answered (1) N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b), which prohibits any claim for penalties to be brought as a class action, permits otherwise qualified plaintiffs to utilize the class action mechanism to recover compensatory overcharges even though the RSL 26-516 does not specifically authorize class action recovery and imposes treble damages upon a finding of willful violation; and (2) maintaining these actions as class actions does not contravene the letter or the spirit of the C.P.L.R. or the RSL. View "Borden v. 400 E. 55th St. Assoc., L.P." on Justia Law