Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Ashley Tamas appealed a trial court order sustaining defendants Safeway, Inc. and Lucerne Foods, Inc.'s (collectively Safeway) demurrer to Tamas’ proposed class action complaint without leave to amend. In her complaint, Tamas alleged Safeway was culpable for misbranding its Lucerne brand of Greek yogurt as "yogurt" because the food’s ingredients included "milk protein concentrate" (MPC), which is not included on the list of allowable optional ingredients for "yogurt" as defined by the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The trial court disagreed, concluding that MPC was an allowable ingredient in yogurt, because the restrictive regulation relied upon by Tamas had been stayed, and the FDA had informally agreed to allow the use of MPC in yogurt until the stay was resolved. The Court of Appeal affirmed: "The glacial pace at which the FDA has moved in attempting to resolve those concerns and redraft a new formal regulation did not, as Tamas seems to suggest, operate as a stealth reenactment of the stayed rule." View "Tamas v. Safeway" on Justia Law

Alleging illegal tip pooling Conners filed a collective action against her former employer (a restaurant) under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The employer then implemented a new arbitration policy that requires all employment-related disputes between current employees and the employer to be resolved though individual arbitration. The policy purports to bind all current employees who did not opt out; each employee received an opt-out form. Citing public policy, the district court declared the policy unenforceable insofar as it could prevent current employees from joining this collective action. On interlocutory appeal, the Eighth Circuit vacated, holding that former employees like Conners lack standing under Article III of the United States Constitution to challenge the arbitration agreement, which applied only to current employees. View "Conners v. Gusano's Chicago Style Pizzeria" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dione Aguirre appealed an order denying class certification. Plaintiff sued defendants Amscan Holdings, Inc., and PA Acquisition, doing business as Party America (collectively, Party America) on behalf of herself and similarly situated individuals, alleging Party America violated Civil Code the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971 (Civil Code section 1747 et seq.) by routinely requesting and recording personal identification information, namely ZIP Codes, from customers using credit cards in its retail stores in California. The trial court found that plaintiff's proposed class of "[a]ll persons in California from whom Defendant requested and recorded a ZIP code in conjunction with a credit card purchase transaction from June 2, 2007 through October 13, 2010" was not an ascertainable class due to "plaintiff's inability to clearly identify, locate and notify class members through a reasonable expenditure of time and money [. . .] bars her from litigating this case as a class action." Plaintiff appealed, arguing the trial court erred in determining the class was not ascertainable based upon the finding that each individual class member was not specifically identifiable from Party America's records (and thus, notice to the class could not be directly provided to class members.) The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in determining the proposed class was not ascertainable and erred in its conclusion. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Aguirre v. Amscan Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

The law firm of Leeds, Morelli & Brown, representing 587 plaintiffs with discrimination claims against their employer, Nextel Communications, agreed with Nextel to set up a dispute resolution process whereby all of the plaintiffs’ claims against Nextel would be resolved without litigation. After most of the cases were settled through that process, a group of Nextel employees sued on behalf of the entire class of the firm’s Nextel clients against both the law firm and Nextel, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice, and breach of contract. The Second Circuit vacated dismissal of the case. On remand the district court certified a class under FRCP(b)(3), applying New York law to all of the class members’ claims, even though the class members came from 27 different states, and holding that common issues predominated over any individual issues, even though prior state court litigation indicated that for Colorado class members, individual waivers of the law firm’s conflict of interest could have vitiated defendants’ liability. The Second Circuit vacated: the district court erred in its choice‐of‐law analysis, and a proper analysis makes clear that the individual issues in this case will overwhelm common issues. View "Johnson v. Nextel Communications Inc." on Justia Law

The district court certified a nationwide class action, alleging that Nestlé and Waggin’ Train sold dog treats that injured the dogs. The parties reached a settlement, to which the district court has given tentative approval pending a fairness hearing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). That hearing is scheduled for June 23, 2015. The order tentatively approving the settlement enjoins all class members from prosecuting litigation about the dog treats in any other forum. One case affected by this injunction has been pending for two years in Missouri, and was certified as a statewide class action before the federal suit was certified as a national class action. Curts, the certified representative of the Missouri class, intervened to protest the injunction, citing 28 U.S.C. 2283, the AntiInjunction Act. The Seventh Circuit stayed the injunction, noting that the district judge did not explain why he entered the injunction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(A) provides that every order issuing an injunction must “state the reasons why it issued.” An injunction that halts state litigation is permissible only if it satisfies section 2283 in addition to the traditional factors. The district judge was silent about everything that matters. View "Adkins v. Nestle Purina PetCare Co." on Justia Law

In connection with a 1998 nationwide, securities-fraud class action initiated against MedPartners, Inc., a physician-practice-management/pharmacy-benefits-management corporation and the predecessor in interest to CVS Caremark Corporation, the Jefferson Circuit Court certified a class that included the plaintiffs in this case. Based on the alleged financial distress and limited insurance resources of MedPartners, the 1998 litigation was concluded in 1999 by means of a negotiated "global settlement," pursuant to which the claims of all class members were settled for an amount that purportedly exhausted its available insurance coverage. Based on representations of counsel that MedPartners lacked the financial means to pay any judgment in excess of the negotiated settlement and that the settlement amount was thus the best potential recovery for the class, the trial court, after a hearing, approved the settlement and entered a judgment in accordance therewith. Thereafter, MedPartners (now Caremark) allegedly disclosed, in unrelated litigation, that it had actually obtained (and thus had available during the 1998 litigation) an excess-insurance policy providing alleged "unlimited coverage" with regard to its potential-damages exposure in the 1998 litigation. In 2003, John Lauriello, seeking to be named as class representative, again sued Caremark and insurers American International Group, Inc.; National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA; AIG Technical Services, Inc.; and American International Specialty Lines Insurance Company in the Jefferson Circuit Court, pursuant to a class-action complaint alleging misrepresentation and suppression, specifically, that Caremark and the insurers had misrepresented the amount of insurance coverage available to settle the 1998 litigation and that they also had suppressed the existence of the purportedly unlimited excess policy. In case no. 1120010, Caremark and the insurers appealed the circuit court's order certifying as a class action the fraud claims asserted by Lauriello, James Finney, Jr.; Sam Johnson; and the City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System. In case no. 1120114, the plaintiffs cross-appealed the same class-certification order, alleging that, though class treatment was appropriate, the trial court erred in certifying the class as an "opt-out" class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., rather than a "mandatory" class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court in both cases. View "CVS Caremark Corporation et al. v. Lauriello et al." on Justia Law

A class of Netflix DVD subscribers filed a consolidated amended class action against Netflix and Walmart, claiming that a promotion agreement whereby Walmart transferred its online DVD-rental subscribers to Netflix and Netflix agreed to promote Walmart’s DVD sales business was anti-competitive. The district court approved of a settlement between Walmart and the class of Netflix subscribers whereby Walmart agreed to pay a total amount of $27,250,000. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) approving the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate; (2) certifying the settlement class; and (3) awarding attorneys’ fees of twenty-five percent of the overall settlement fund. View "Frank v. Netflix, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individuals representing a class of Netflix subscribers, contended that a promotion agreement whereby Walmart transferred its online DVD-rental subscribers to Netflix and Netflix agreed to promote Walmart’s DVD sales business violated the Sherman Act by illegally allocating and monopolizing the online DVD rental market. The district court granted summary judgment for Netflix and awarded Netflix $710,194 in costs. The Ninth Circuit (1) affirmed the district court’s summary judgment, holding that Plaintiffs did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether they suffered antitrust in-jury-in-fact on a theory that they paid supracompetitive prices for their DVD-rental subscriptions because Netflix would have reduced its subscription price but for its allegedly anticompetitive product; and (2) affirmed in part and reversed in part the award of costs, holding that certain charges for “data upload” and “keywording” were not recoverable as costs for making copies under 28 U.S.C. 1920(4). Remanded for consideration of whether costs were properly awarded for “professional services.” View "Resnick v. Netflix, Inc." on Justia Law

Eva Mies sought class action certification in order to sue her former employer, Sephora U.S.A., Inc. (Sephora), on behalf of employees who, like her, worked as "Specialists" in Sephora’s California retail stores. Mies claims Sephora misclassified Specialists as exempt from certain provisions of California labor law and, as a result, failed to pay overtime wages and failed to compensate them for missed meal periods. However, after crediting evidence that all Specialists did not engage in the same tasks to the same extent, the trial court denied class certification, concluding individualized issues, not common ones, would predominate the determination of liability. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court used proper legal criteria in assessing class certification and substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings. The Court also conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. View "Mies v. Sephora U.S.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against Philip Morris Companies Inc. and Philip Morris Inc., alleging that Philip Morris violated the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA) by falsely advertising that its Marlboro Lights cigarettes were safer and contained less tar and nicotine than other cigarettes. The circuit court certified Plaintiffs’ class action, concluding that common issues among all class members predominated over any individual issues and that a class action was a superior method of resolving the claim. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order certifying the class, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class, as common issues predominated, a class action was a superior method of adjudication, and the class was ascertainable. View "Philip Morris Cos., Inc. v. Miner" on Justia Law