Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

A packaging error reversed the sequence of Qualitest birth control pills contained within each package, resulting in a less effective dosage. Qualitest executed nationwide recalls reaching 3.2 million packs of pills. Plaintiffs, alleging that they were harmed, filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, alleging that similarly-situated plaintiffs are residents of 28 different states “whose claims arise out of a common set of operative facts . . . and which claims have been filed together . . . for purposes of case management on a mass tort basis.” The defendants removed the action to federal court as a “mass action” under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(11). The district court remanded, concluding that CAFA precluded federal jurisdiction because plaintiffs did not propose to try their claims jointly. Cases that are consolidated or coordinated only for pretrial purposes are explicitly exempted from CAFA’s mass action provision. The Third Circuit reversed, finding federal jurisdiction proper under CAFA. The language plaintiffs held out as disclaiming their intent to seek a joint trial was not sufficiently definite to prevent removal. Where more than 100 plaintiffs file a single complaint containing claims involving common questions of law and fact, a proposal for a joint trial will be presumed unless an explicit, unambiguous disclaimer is included. View "Ramirez v. Vintage Pharmaceuticals LLC" on Justia Law

Three health care workers sued their hospital employer in a putative class and private attorney general enforcement action for alleged Labor Code violations and related claims. In this appeal, their primary complaint was the hospital illegally allowed its health care employees to waive their second meal periods on shifts longer than 12 hours. A statute required two meal periods for shifts longer than 12 hours. But an order of the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) authorized employees in the health care industry to waive one of those two required meal periods on shifts longer than 8 hours. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal’s review centered on the validity of the IWC order. In its first opinion in this case, the Court concluded the IWC order was partially invalid to the extent it authorized second meal break waivers on shifts over 12 hours, and the Court reversed. After the California Supreme Court granted the hospital’s petition for review in “Gerard I,” that court transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate the decision and to reconsider the cause in light of the enactment of Statutes 2015, chapter 506 (Sen. Bill No. 327 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.); SB 327). Upon reconsideration the Court of Appeal concluded the IWC order was valid and affirmed. View "Gerard v. Orange Coast Memorial Medical Center" on Justia Law

The City settled a class action suit in 2012, Chakhalyan v. City of Los Angeles, alleging that the City had an unlawful practice of charging a trash disposal fee to customers living in multi-unit dwellings who received no trash disposal services from the City. Another class action asserted similar allegations, Cunningham v. City of Los Angeles. Brian Cunningham, did not opt out of the Chakhalyan class or exclude himself from the settlement. After finalization and settlement in Chakhalyan, the City successfully moved for summary judgment of Cunningham's claims, but permitted Cunningham to amend the complaint to add two additional named plaintiffs. The trial court agreed with the City that these plaintiffs' claims were now moot and granted summary judgment for the City. The court affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs' individual claims were moot because a court could grant them no further relief beyond what they have already received; unlike other cases in which the "pick off" exception has been applied, here, the injunctive relief provisions in the Chakhalyan stipulated settlement and judgment required the City to reimburse plaintiffs and other putative class members; the City complied with this obligation before plaintiffs filed the second amended complaint naming them as parties; and, under these particular circumstances, the "pick off" exception does not apply. View "Schoshinksi v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases, shareholders of a publicly traded corporation (Plaintiffs) filed a complaint claiming that a merger transaction proposed by the board of directors would result in the effective sale of the corporation for an inadequate price. The superior court allowed Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding that the board owed no fiduciary duty directly to the shareholders and that the action was necessarily derivative. At issue on appeal was whether Plaintiffs must bring their claims against the members of the corporation’s board of directors as a derivative action on behalf of the corporation or may bring it directly on their own behalf. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the injury claimed by Plaintiffs, and the alleged wrong causing it, fit squarely within the framework of a derivative action; and (2) Plaintiffs’ claim was properly dismissed because they did not bring their claim as a derivative action. View "International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local No. 129 Benefit Fund v. Tucci" on Justia Law

The district court certified eight classes, consisting of persons in Illinois and Missouri who take eye drops manufactured by six pharmaceutical companies for treatment of glaucoma. Plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ eye drops are unnecessarily large and wasteful, in violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/1, and the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 407.010, so that the price of the eye drops is excessive and that the large eye drops have a higher risk of side effects. There was no claim that members of the class have experienced side effects or have been harmed because they ran out of them early. The Seventh Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss. The court noted possible legitimate reasons for large drops, the absence of any misrepresentation or collusion, and that defendants’ large eye drops have been approved by the FDA for safety and efficacy. “You cannot sue a company and argue only ‘it could do better by us,’” nor can one bring a suit in federal court without pleading that one has been injured. The plaintiffs allege only “disappointment.” View "Eike v. Allergan, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, retail grocers, filed putative class actions against two large full-line wholesale grocers, alleging that the wholesalers' contract to exchange retailer supply agreements constituted market allocation in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Plaintiffs formed the Midwest Class and the New England Class, each class having an Arbitration Subclass of retailers who had arbitration agreements with their current (post-swap) wholesaler. The district court dismissed the purported representatives of the Arbitration Subclasses and the court reversed. At that point, the district court had rejected the proposed Midwest and New England classes and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court reversed, ordering the district court to consider a narrower Midwest class. On remand, Colella moved to intervene to join Village Market, the New England Arbitration Subclass representative, in seeking to certify a narrower New England class. The district court denied the motion and announced that it would not consider any new class of New England plaintiffs. The court concluded that it does not have discretion to hear Village Market's appeal under Rule 23(f). The court explained that an order that leaves class-action status unchanged from what was determined by a prior order was not an order granting or denying class action certification. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Colella's motion to intervene as time-barred. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Colella's Super Market, Inc. v. SuperValu, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, retail grocers, filed putative class actions against two large full-line wholesale grocers, alleging that the wholesalers' contract to exchange retailer supply agreements constituted market allocation in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Plaintiffs formed the Midwest Class and the New England Class, each class having an Arbitration Subclass of retailers who had arbitration agreements with their current (post-swap) wholesaler. Each Arbitration Subclass filed suit against only its previous wholesaler, with which it no longer had a current arbitration agreement. The district court dismissed the Arbitration Subclasses from the case. On remand, the district court rejected the wholesalers' alternate successors-in-interest theory and the wholesaler's third alternate theory that they could directly enforce their previous arbitration agreements because some of the conduct at issue occurred when the previous agreements were still in effect. The court concluded that the district court did not err by rejecting the successors-in-interest theory where the court was not aware of any authority supporting the proposition that a predecessor-in-interest bears a sufficiently close relationship to a successor-in-interest such that the predecessor-in-interest can compel arbitration under an agreement to which only the successor-in-interest is a signatory. The court rejected the direct enforcement argument, concluding that wholesalers may not directly enforce the arbitration agreements to which they are no longer signatories. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Millennium Operations v. SuperValu" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that defendants operated a racketeering enterprise through which they performed and billed for unnecessary heart procedures. The district court dismissed the case. At issue on appeal was whether the Class Action Fairness Act's local-controversy provision, (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(4), precluded the district court from exercising federal-question jurisdiction. If not, the court must decide whether plaintiffs alleged that they were injured in their "business or property," under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1964(c). The court affirmed the denial of plaintiffs' motion to remand because CAFA's local-controversy provision does not prohibit district courts from exercising federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331. However, the court vacated the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss because plaintiffs alleged economic injuries that were recoverable under RICO. View "Blevins v. Seydi V. Aksut, M.D." on Justia Law

In June 2000, the Franklin Circuit Court entered a final judgment approving a settlement agreement in “Taff v. Caremark, Inc.,” a class-action lawsuit against the corporate predecessor of the petitioner, Caremark Rx, LLC ("Caremark). Approximately 16 years later, in July 2016, Taff class counsel moved the trial court to enter an order requiring Caremark to produce for them certain information regarding the members of the Taff class so that Taff class counsel could notify those members of a proposed settlement in a separate class-action lawsuit pending against Caremark at the Jefferson Circuit Court, “Johnson v. Caremark Rx, LLC,” in which some of the members of the Taff class might be able to file claims. The trial court ultimately granted Taff class counsel's request and ordered Caremark to produce the requested information. Caremark petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate that order. “The jurisdiction retained by the trial court after it entered its final judgment in Taff is limited to interpreting or enforcing that final judgment; the trial court could not extend its jurisdiction over any matter somehow related to the June 2000 final judgment in perpetuity by simply declaring it so.” The Court therefore granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Caremark Rx, LLC" on Justia Law

Wright was arrested by Calumet City police, without a warrant, based on the murder of one individual and the shooting of others. Wright admitted to having a gun. At a minimum, he was to be charged with felony unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, but the prosecutor instructed the officers to wait to charge Wright until lab results came back establishing whether his gun matched casings and bullets at the scene. After being in custody for 55 hours, Wright sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the city violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to provide him with a judicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours of his arrest. The next day, a judge made a probable cause finding. In the section 1983 action, Wright sought class certification, asserting that the city had a policy or practice authorizing officers to detain persons arrested without a warrant for up to 72 hours before permitting the arrestee to appear before a judge. The city made an offer of judgment. Despite accepting that Rule 68 offer, granting him relief as to "all claims brought under this lawsuit,” Wright appealed the denial of certification of a proposed class of “[a]ll persons who will in the future be detained.” He did not appeal with respect to persons who had been detained. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, finding that Wright is not an aggrieved person with a personal stake in the case as required under Article III of the Constitution. View "Wright v. Calumet City" on Justia Law