Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a class-action suit against their former employer, Huntington Bank, alleging that the Bank failed to pay overtime compensation as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201-219. Plaintiffs moved to conditionally certify a class of all current and former employees whose primary job duty consisted of “underwriting,” or “providing [Huntington’s] credit products to customers after reviewing and evaluating the loan applications against [the Bank’s] credit standards and guidelines that governed when to provide those credit products to those customers.” The court certified a smaller class of underwriters. The court found, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, that those who worked with residential-loan products are administrative employees and not entitled to overtime pay. Their job duties related to the general business operations of the Bank, and they exercised discretion and independent judgment when performing those duties. View "Lutz v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) against their employer, FTS, a cable-television business for which the plaintiffs work or worked as cable technicians. The district court certified the case as an FLSA collective action, allowing 293 other technicians to opt in. FTS Technicians are paid pursuant to a piece-rate compensation plan; each assigned job is worth a set amount of pay, regardless of the amount of time it takes to complete the job. FTS Technicians are paid by applying a .5 multiplier to their regular rate for overtime hours. They allege that FTS implemented a company-wide time-shaving policy that required its employees to systematically underreport their overtime hours. Technicians either began working before their recorded start times, recorded lunch breaks they did not take, or continued working after their recorded end time. Technicians also presented documentary evidence and testimony showing that FTS’s time-shaving policy originated with FTS’s corporate office. A jury returned verdicts in favor of the class, which the district court upheld before calculating and awarding damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed certification of the case as a collective action and a finding that sufficient evidence supports the verdicts, but reversed the calculation of damages. View "Monroe v. FTS USA, LLC" on Justia Law

United Foods & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1473 filed a class action against Hormel Foods Corporation alleging that Hormel violated Wisconsin wage and hour laws by failing to pay employees for time spent putting on and taking off company-required clothing and equipment before and after shifts at one of Hormel’s canning plants. The circuit court ruled in favor of the Union, ordered Hormel to compensate its employees for time spent “donning” and “doffing” the required clothing and equipment, and awarded the class monetary damages of $195,087. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Hormel is required to compensate its employees for the 5.7 minutes per day spent donning and doffing the clothing and equipment at the beginning and end of the day; and (2) the required donning and doffing of clothing and equipment at the beginning and end of the day does not fall within the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex, as the wages involved are not a “trifle” either for the employees or Hormel. View "United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Hormel Foods Corp." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a settlement agreement entered into by BP and a class of parties harmed by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Claimants filed a “Motion for Authority to File Wetlands Claims” with the district court, invoking the district court’s supervisory authority over the interpretation and implementation of the settlement agreement. Claimants asked the district court to either determine that all seven of their claims were formally submitted in July 2012 before the six-month deadline had passed or excuse the missed six-month deadline and allow them to file claims anew. The district court denied the motion in a summary order. The court declined to deem claimants to have submitted claims on the parcels at issue in July 2012. The settlement agreement clearly designates the claim form as the manner in which claims should be submitted, and no claim forms were submitted for the two parcels at issue in July 2012, or at any time before the six-month window had closed. The court also declined to exercise any discretion it may have to excuse claimants’ failure to meet the six-month deadline. Finally, the court rejected claimants' due process claim as forfeited. Regardless, the enforcement of a properly noticed deadline generally does not effect a due process violation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re: Deepwater Horizon" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellee Guardian Interlock Network, Inc. installed an ignition interlock device in plaintiff-appellant, Nathan Heath's car. The device allowed Heath to start the vehicle if his breath/alcohol concentration did not meet or exceed a pre-set amount. Because Heath's monthly payment for rental, insurance of the device, taxes, and monthly maintenance exceeded the $25.00 "maintenance fee" cap set forth in 47 O.S. Supp. 2013 section 6-212.3, he brought a class action lawsuit in the District Court of Oklahoma County against Guardian Interlock Inc., alleging that its fees were excessive. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit and Heath appealed. After review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the $25.00 maintenance fee cap set forth did not preclude the collection of other fees such as rental fees, taxes, or insurance/damage waiver fees. View "Heath v. Guardian Interlock Network, Inc." on Justia Law

Columbia stores natural gas in Medina Field, a naturally-occurring system of porous underground rock, pumping gas into the Field during summer, during low demand, and withdrawing it during winter. Medina is among 14 Ohio gas storage fields used by Columbia. Columbia received a federal Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, 15 U.S.C. 717f, and was required to compensate those who own part of the Field by contractual agreement or eminent domain. The owners allege that Columbia stored gas for an indeterminate time without offering compensation and then offered $250 per lot. Each Medina owner rejected this offer. Columbia did not bring eminent domain proceedings. Other Ohio landowners accused Columbia of similar behavior and filed the Wilson class action in the Southern District of Ohio, including the Medina owners within the putative class. The Medina owners filed suit in the Northern District. Both actions claim trespass and unjust enrichment under Ohio law, and inverse condemnation under the Natural Gas Act. The Wilson suit also seeks damages for “native” natural gas Columbia takes when it withdraws its own gas. Columbia filed a counterclaim in Wilson, seeking to exercise eminent domain over every member of the putative class and join the Medina owners. The Northern District applied the first-to-file rule and dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The rule does apply, but dismissal was an abuse of discretion given jurisdictional and procedural hurdles to having the Medina claims heard in Wilson. View "Baatz v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC" on Justia Law

Warner Chilcott, a brand-name drug manufacturer that owns the patent covering Loestrin 24 Fe, and Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., which sought to introduce a generic version of Loestrin 24, entered into a settlement agreement wherein Watson agreed to delay entry of its generic version of Loestrin 24 in exchange for favorable side deals. Thereafter, Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. announced that it would introduce a generic version of Loestrin 24. Warner and Lupin settled on terms similar to those between Warner and Watson. Two putative classes of plaintiffs brought antitrust claims that the settlement agreements were violations of the Sherman Act and constituted illegal restrains on trade under FTC v. Actavis. At issue in this case was whether such settlement agreements are subject to federal antitrust scrutiny where they do not involve reverse payments in pure cash form. The district court dismissed, concluding that Actavis applies only to monetary reverse payments and that Plaintiffs had alleged the existence of non-cash reverse payments only. The First Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the district court erred in determining that non-monetary reverse payments do not fall under the scope of Actavis. Remanded. View "In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs obtained residential mortgage loans from M&T to finance the purchase of their homes and, because the loans exceeded 80% of the value of the residences, agreed to pay for private mortgage insurance. As is customary, M&T selected the insurers who, in turn, reinsured the insurance policy with M&T Reinsurance, M&T’s captive reinsurer. Beginning in 2011, counsel sent letters to Plaintiffs advising that they were investigating claims concerning M&T’s captive mortgage reinsurance. Plaintiffs agreed to be part of a lawsuit against M&T and filed a putative class action complaint alleging violations of the anti-kickback and anti-fee-splitting provisions of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2607, and unjust enrichment. After discovery, the court granted M&T summary judgment, finding the claims time-barred and that Plaintiffs could not equitably toll the limitations period because none of them had exercised reasonable diligence in investigating any potential claims under RESPA. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the one-year statute of limitations runs “from the date of the occurrence of the violation,” View "Cunningham v. M&T Bank Corp." on Justia Law

In 2002, Plaintiffs commenced a proposed class action civil rights suit against the County of Rensselaer. The County invoked Selective Insurance Company’s duty to provide a defense under the policies that the company sold to the County. Selective agreed to defend the County in the action, subject to the insurance policy limits and the deductible. Selective’s counsel and the County agreed to settle the actions for $1,000 per plaintiff, determined to be slightly more than 800 individuals in total, with attorney fees also being recoverable. Selective abided by the terms of the settlement. The County, however, refused to pay Selective more than a single deductible payment. Selective then commenced this action for money damages, arguing that each class member was subject to a separate deductible. Supreme Court concluded that a separate deductible payment applied to each class member and that all legal fees should be allocated to one policy. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the class action suit did not constitute one occurrence under the relevant policies’ definition of “occurrence” and that the attorney’s fees generated in defending that suit were properly allocated to the named plaintiff. View "Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. County of Rensselaer" on Justia Law

Named Plaintiffs filed an amended class-action complaint challenging the city of Cleveland’s imposition of fines against vehicle lessees. The trial court granted Cleveland’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Plaintiffs had waived the right to pursue judicial remedies by paying their fines and failing to appeal their citations. The trial court also denied Plaintiffs’ class-certification motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. On remand, the trial court granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The court also granted class certification. Cleveland appealed the class certification order, arguing that res judicata precluded class relief. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Plaintiffs’ failure to appeal their traffic violations through Cleveland’s administrative process did not bar them from pursuing equitable and declaratory relief in the trial court. The Supreme Court vacated in part the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the court of appeals erred in deciding that res judicata barred Plaintiffs’ claims, in the absence of a final, appealable order from the trial court addressing that question. Remanded. View "Lycan v. Cleveland" on Justia Law