Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Real parties in interest filed putative class claims against Safeway and Vons for violations of the Labor Code and the unfair competition law (UCL), Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200 et seq. The trial court certified a class for purposes of the UCL claim based on the theory that Safeway and Vons had a practice of never paying premium wages for missed meal breaks when required. Safeway and Vons seek a writ directing the trial court to vacate the grant of certification and to enter a new order denying certification. The court denied the petition, concluding that the trial court did not err in certifying real parties' UCL claims for class treatment where real parties demonstrated that the existence of the labor practice and the fact of damage were matters suitable for class treatment. View "Safeway, Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Purchasers of notebook computers, manufactured by HP, filed a class action, alleging that certain notebook computers manufactured by HP contained inverters that HP knew would likely fail and cause display screens to dim and darken at some point before the end of the notebook’s useful life. They claimed violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), the Consumer Legal Remedies 2 Act (CLRA), unjust enrichment and breach of express warranty. After years of litigation, the trial court ultimately made a “no merits” determination as to the CLRA claim, and granted HP’s motion for summary judgment as to the remaining claims. The court of appeal affirmed class certification; reversed the summary adjudication of UCL claims and the no merits determination as to certain CLRA claims; and affirmed summary adjudication of some breach of express warranty claims, while reversing others. View "Rutledge v. Hewlett-Packard" on Justia Law

Consumers from six states filed suit, alleging that Volvo sold certain vehicles with defective sunroof drainage systems. The Third Circuit vacated the grant of class certification after holding that unnamed, putative class members need not establish Article III standing. The class certification opinion rejected plaintiffs’ proposal of a nationwide class and the application of New Jersey law to all claims, and directed that “the law of the state of each subclass should be applied to the subclass’s claims,” but the court did not identify which claims would be subject to class treatment. The court remanded to allow the district court to define the class membership, claims, and defenses, and so that it may rigorously analyze predominance in the first instance. View "Neale v. Volvo Cars N. Am." on Justia Law

In 2013, hackers attacked Neiman Marcus and stole the credit card numbers of its customers. In December 2013, the company learned that some of its customers had found fraudulent charges on their cards. On January 10, 2014, it publicly announced that the cyberattack had occurred and that between July 16 and October 30, 2013, and approximately 350,000 cards had been exposed to the hackers’ malware. Customers filed suit under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). The district court dismissed, ruling that the individual plaintiffs and the class lacked Article III standing. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiffs identified some particularized, concrete, redress able injuries, as a result of the data breach. View "Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were laborers who worked on the construction and rehabilitation of two multi-family housing projects. Plaintiffs filed this wage and hour action and moved for certification of a proposed class including all laborers, tradesmen, and craftsmen who worked for Monfric, Inc., the general contractor, or its subcontractors and who were not paid prevailing wages during the construction and rehabilitation of the housing projects. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate numerosity of the proposed class. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Plaintiffs failed to establish that their proposed class was so numerous as to make joinder of its remaining members in a single action impracticable. View "Morrow v. Monfric" on Justia Law

Avio claimed that Alfoccino violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(C), (b)(3), by hiring B2B to send unsolicited facsimile advertisements to Avio and a class of similarly situated persons. The district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing and found that Avio could not prove Alfoccino was vicariously liable for B2B’s transmission of the faxes. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Avio demonstrated standing. Though the TCPA does not expressly state who has a cause of action to sue under its provisions, its descriptions of prohibited conduct repeatedly refer to the “recipient” of the unsolicited fax, and in enacting the TCPA, Congress noted that such fax advertising “is problematic” because it “shifts some of the costs of advertising from the sender to the recipient” and “occupies the recipient’s facsimile machine so that it is unavailable for legitimate business messages while processing and printing the junk fax.” FCC regulations define “sender” with respect to the TCPA’s prohibition of unsolicited fax advertisements as being “the person or entity on whose behalf a facsimile unsolicited advertisement is sent or whose goods or services are advertised or promoted in the unsolicited advertisement,” indicating that primary, not vicarious liability attaches to Alfoccino. View "Imhoff Inv., LLC v. Alfoccino, Inc." on Justia Law

Wal-Mart is the country’s largest private employer, operating approximately 3,400 stores and employing more than one million people. In 2001, named plaintiffs filed a putative class action (Dukes) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, on behalf of all former and current female Wal-Mart employees. In 2011 the Supreme Court reversed certification of the nationwide class of current Wal-Mart employees under Rule 23(b)(2), finding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate questions of law or fact common to the class. The district court then held that all class members who possessed right-to-sue letters from the EEOC could file suit on or before October 28, 2011. Six unnamed Dukes class members filed suit, alleging individual and putative class claims under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of current and former female employees in Wal-Mart Region 43. . The district court dismissed the claims as time-barred. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The timely filing of a class-action complaint commences suit and tolls the statute of limitations for all members of the putative class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action; the suit is not barred by the earlier litigation. View "Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, hired as unpaid interns on the Fox Searchlight-distributed film "Black Swan," claimed compensation as employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and New York Labor Law. The district court granted plaintiff Glatt and Footman's motion for partial summary judgment, certified plaintiff Antalik's New York class, and conditionally certified Antalik's nationwide collective. The court agreed with defendants that the proper question is whether the intern or the employer is the primary beneficiary of the relationship, and the court proposed a list of non‐exhaustive factors to aid courts in answering that question. Because the district court limited its review to the six factors in DOL’s Intern Fact Sheet, the court remanded for the district court to permit the parties to submit additional evidence. Even if Antalik established that Fox had a policy of replacing paid employees with unpaid interns, it would not necessarily mean that every Fox intern was likely to prevail on her claim that she was an FLSA employee under the primary beneficiary test, the most important issue in each case. Assuming some questions may be answered with generalized proof, they are not more substantial than the questions requiring individualized proof. Because the most important question in this litigation cannot be answered with generalized proof, the court vacated the district court’s order certifying Antalik’s proposed class and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Finally, for substantially the same reasons as with respect to Antalik’s Rule 23 motion, the court vacated the district court’s order conditionally certifying Antalik’s proposed nationwide collective action and remanded for further proceedings. View "Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from an order denying certification of a class of approximately 26,000 nonexempt California current and former employees of Chipotle regarding what plaintiffs allege, among other things, is Chipotle‘s policy to require employees to purchase slip-resistant shoes from a vendor, Shoes for Crews, in order to work at Chipotle‘s restaurants. The court concluded that the trial court‘s order denying plaintiffs‘ class certification motion and granting Chipotle‘s motion to deny class certification is a nonappealable order because the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Lab. Code, 2698 et seq., claims remain in the trial court and the "death knell" doctrine does not apply under these circumstances. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Munoz v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, CE filed a class action suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, against King. King had commercial general liability and umbrella policies from three insurance companies, but all three disclaimed any obligation to defend or indemnify, based on provisions in the policies that appeared to exempt liability under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act from coverage. The district court certified the class. On remand, CE and King agreed to settle the case for $20 million, the limit of the insurance policies. Their agreement, approved by the district court, provided that only one percent of the judgment ($200,000) could be executed against King. Upon learning of the proposed settlement, the insurers sought a state court declaratory judgment. A state court ruled that the insurance policies do not cover liability under the Act, but CE is appealing that decision. After the settlement agreement in the federal case, but before its approval, the insurers moved to intervene under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a), (b), hoping to delay approval of the settlement until there was a state-court determination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to intervene as untimely. View "Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. King Supply Co., LLC" on Justia Law