Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries
Ballard RN Center, Inc. v. Kohll’s Pharmacy & Homecare, Inc.
In 2010, plaintiff filed a complaint and sought class certification, alleging that defendant sent unsolicited fax advertisement, violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. 227) and the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/2) and constituting common-law conversion of toner and paper. Each count included class allegations indicating that plaintiff was filing on behalf of a class estimated at over 40 individuals. Defendant unsuccessfully sought summary judgment solely on count I (federal Act), alleging that on three separate occasions it tendered an unconditional offer of payment exceeding the total recoverable damages, rendering the claim moot. The court reasoned that defendant did not offer tender on count I before plaintiff moved for class certification and rejected defendant’s argument that the motion was merely a “shell” motion. The appellate court affirmed certification of the class on counts II and III but reversed class certification on count I, agreeing that plaintiff’s initial motion for class certification, filed concurrently with its complaint, was an insufficient “shell” motion. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court decision, holding that its precedent did not impose any explicit requirements on the motion for class certification, let alone a heightened evidentiary or factual basis for the motion. View "Ballard RN Center, Inc. v. Kohll's Pharmacy & Homecare, Inc." on Justia Law
Patrickson v. Dole Food Co.
This case involved dibromochloropropane, a powerful nematode worm killer, and the litigation was multi-jurisdictional. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment against Plaintiffs and in favor of Defendants on statute of limitations grounds. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. At issue on certiorari was (1) whether the filing of a putative class action in another jurisdiction operated to toll the state of Hawaii’s statute of limitations, and (2) if so, at what point did such tolling end? The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings, holding (1) the filing of a putative class action in another jurisdiction does toll the statute of limitations in the state of Hawaii because such “cross-jurisdictional tolling” supports a purpose of class action litigations, which is to avoid a multiplicity of suits; (2) under the circumstances of this case, cross-jurisdictional tolling ended when the foreign jurisdiction issued a final judgment that unequivocally dismissed the putative class action; and (3) Plaintiffs’ complaint was timely filed within the applicable limitations period and, therefore, was not time-barred. View "Patrickson v. Dole Food Co." on Justia Law
Green Valley Landowners Ass’n v. City of Vallejo
The Lakes Water System (LWS), created in the late 1800s-early 1900s, provides Vallejo with potable water. After completing a diversion dam and the Green Line for transmission, the city created two reservoirs, Lake Frey and Lake Madigan, which were soon insufficient to meet demand. The city began storing water in hills above Napa County’s Gordon Valley and constructed the Gordon transmission line. The city acquired easements from some property owners by agreeing to provide “free water.” The city also agreed to provide potable water to other nonresident customers. In the 1950s, the city obtained water rights from the Sacramento River Delta and contracted for water from the Solano Project. In 1992, water quality from Lake Curry ceased to meet standards and the city closed the Gordon Line. In 1992 the city passed an ordinance shifting the entire cost of LWS to 809 nonresident customers, so that their rates increased by 230 percent. The city passed additional rate increases in 1995 and 2009. Plaintiff, representing a purported class of nonresident LWS customers, alleges the city has grossly mismanaged and neglected LWS, placing the burden on the Class to fund a deteriorating, inefficient, and costly system, spread over an “incoherent service area” and plaintiff did not become aware of unfunded liabilities until 2013 The court of appeal affirmed dismissal; plaintiff cannot state any viable claims alleging misconduct by the city. View "Green Valley Landowners Ass'n v. City of Vallejo" on Justia Law
Miranda v. Anderson Enters., Inc.
Miranda is a former employee of Anderson Enterprises; Hansen is the company’s general manager. During his employment, Miranda signed an “Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy” by which agreed to arbitrate all employment claims and waived the right to arbitrate claims as a class or collective action. In 2013, Miranda filed a purported class action lawsuit, asserting wage and hour claims, including a Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA; Lab. Code, 2698) claim. The trial court found the arbitration agreement valid and enforceable, dismissed the class and representative claims without prejudice based on the arbitration agreement’s waiver, directed Miranda to arbitrate his individual claims, and stayed the superior court proceedings pending completion of arbitration of the individual claims. The court of appeal reversed as to the representative PAGA claim, based on a subsequently-issued California Supreme Court opinion, Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC (2014), under which the waiver is unenforceable. The court noted that Miranda had represented that he would not pursue his individual claims through arbitration and concluded that the PAGA ruling was, therefore, appealable. View "Miranda v. Anderson Enters., Inc." on Justia Law
Aisola v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp.
Plaintiffs, alleging to be putative class members of multiple class actions, have filed their own individual suits against the defendant, Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens). Plaintiffs were residents of, and owned homes in, St. Bernard Parish at the time Hurricane Katrina. Their properties were insured under policies of all-risk or homeowners insurance by defendant. Plaintiffs originally filed suit against Citizens on December 3, 2009, seeking contractual and bad faith damages arising out of Citizens’ handling of their property damage claims related to Hurricane Katrina. Citizens excepted on grounds of prescription and lis pendens. At issue is whether the doctrine of lis pendens barred plaintiffs’ suits where the plaintiffs were not named parties in the first-filed class actions. The Supreme Court found the trial court erred in overruling the defendant’s exception of lis pendens. View "Aisola v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp." on Justia Law
Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc.
Plaintiff, a truck driver, filed a putative class action complaint against his employer, Rich Voss Trucking, Stevens Creek Quarry, and Richard Voss, alleging wage and hour violations. Plaintiff contended that defendants were his joint employers and the employers of all similarly situated non-exempt current and former employees of defendants and asserted failure to provide required meal periods and rest periods, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to pay minimum wage, failure to pay all wages due to discharged or quitting employees, failure to maintain required records, failure to indemnify employees for necessary expenditures incurred in the discharge of duties, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and unfair and unlawful business practices. Plaintiff alleged a cause of action under the Private Attorneys General Act for a representative action for civil penalties. He filed a separate complaint, alleging disability and national origin discrimination and retaliation. The court of appeal reversed denial or class certification and remanded for an explanation of the reasoning for the denial. View "Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Class Action, Labor & Employment Law
Tallman v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court
Three petitioners sued their former employer and certain of its agents and associates (collectively, “Employer”) asserting minimum wage and overtime claims individually and on behalf of others similarly situated. The district court entered orders compelling individual arbitration of Petitioners’ claims and denying their motions for class certification. Each petitioner signed the same long-form arbitration agreement, which included a clause waiving the right to initiate or participate in class actions. Petitioners sought extraordinary writ relief, contending that Employer’s failure to countersign the long-form agreement made it unenforceable, that the class action waiver violated state and federal law, and, in the case of one petitioner, Employer waived its right to compel arbitration by litigating with him in state and federal court. The Supreme Court denied writ relief, holding that Petitioners’ arguments were unavailing and that the district court did not err in compelling individual arbitration of their claims. View "Tallman v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law
Pulaski & Middleman, LLC v. Google, Inc.
Google's AdWords program is an auction-based program through which advertisers would bid for Google to place their advertisements on websites. Pulaski and others filed a putative class action alleging that Google misled them as to the types of websites on which their advertisements could appear. On appeal, Pulaski challenged the district court's denial of class certification, holding that on the claim for restitution, common questions did not predominate over questions affecting individual class members. The court held that a court need not make individual determinations regarding entitlement to restitution. Instead, restitution is available on a class wide basis once the class representative makes the threshold showing of liability. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in holding that such individual questions would predominate. In Yokoyama v. Midland National Life Insurance Co., the court held that damage calculations alone cannot defeat certification. The court concluded that Yokoyama remains the law of the court and the district court erred in not following the rule in Yokoyama. Finally, the court concluded that the proposed method for calculating restitution was not “arbitrary” under Comcast Corp. v. Behrend. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Pulaski & Middleman, LLC v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Class Action, Internet Law
Cobell v. Jewell
This appeal arose out of the Department of the Interior’s misadministration of Native American trust accounts and an ensuing complex, nationwide litigation and settlement. The class action representatives appealed the district court's denial of compensation for expenses incurred during the litigation and settlement process. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of additional compensation for expenses for the lead plaintiff because the district court expressly wrapped those costs into an incentive award given to her earlier. However, the district court erred in categorically rejecting as procedurally barred the class representatives’ claim for the recovery of third-party payments, and remanded for the district court to apply its accumulated expertise and discretion to the question of whether third-party compensation can and should be paid under the Settlement Agreement. View "Cobell v. Jewell" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Class Action, Native American Law
REVI, LLC v. Chicago Title Ins. Co.
Insured filed a complaint alleging that Insured had breached a title insurance policy. Insured also alleged that Insurer had acted in bad faith and requested an award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 38.2-209. Insured demanded a jury trial “on all counts so triable.” Insurer sought to have the trial judge, rather than the jury, consider the issues of bad faith and attorney’s fees. The jury was permitted to award attorney’s fees. The jury found in favor of Insured and awarded $442,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs. The trial court judge vacated the jury’s award of attorney’s fees and costs, ruling that section 38.2-209(A) requires a judge, not a jury, to determine whether an insurer committed a bad faith breach of an insurance contract warranting an award of attorney’s fees. Reconsidering the evidence de novo, the judge then concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Insurer had acted in bad faith. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a judge, not a jury, must determine whether an insurer has acted in bad faith under the policy; and (2) section 38.2.209(A) does not implicate the right to a jury trial under Va. Const. art. I, 11. View "REVI, LLC v. Chicago Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law