Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit, charging racial discrimination in employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. 1981 and sought class certification (FRCP 23(b)(2) and 23(c)(4)) for deciding whether defendant engaged in practices that have a disparate impact on members of the class. The district court denied certification. After determining that appeal was timely, based on a renewed motion for certification made in reliance on the Supreme Court's 2011 decision, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Seventh Circuit reversed. Whether defendant's company-wide policies put blacks at a disadvantage is a question common to the class. While individual suits may be necessary to determine damages, that question could be resolved in a single proceeding, making limited class action treatment appropriate. View "McReynolds v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc." on Justia Law

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400, states receive federal funding for education of disabled children if local schools provide a "free appropriate public education" to all resident children with disabilities. Local districts must identify children with disabilities, determine whether they require special-education services, and develop individualized education programs (IEPs) tailored to each student's specific needs. In 2001, students with disabilities sued Milwaukee Public Schools and the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, alleging IDEA violations. The case became focused on "child find" requirements. DPI settled by agreeing to order MPS to meet compliance benchmarks. The district court approved the settlement over MPS's objection and ordered MPS to set up a court-monitored system to identify disabled children who were delayed or denied entry into the IEP process, implement hybrid IEP meetings, and craft compensatory-education remedies. The Seventh Circuit vacated the class-certification order and liability and remedial orders. IDEA claims are highly individualized, making the case unsuitable for class-action treatment. The claims lack commonality required by Rule 23(a)(2). DPI's settlement was vacated as requiring more of MPS than DPI had the statutory authority to demand. View "Jamie S., v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action, alleging violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b), and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/1, based on denial of overtime pay. For the IMWL claim, the district court certified two classes: "hourly" and "assistant branch manager." The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the certification order did not comply with the commonality requirement of FRCP 23(c)(1)(B). The court referred to the 2011 Supreme Court decision, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, and concluded that the defendant's unofficial policy concerning overtime provided the "common answer" that will potentially resolve the case. View "Ross v. RBS Citizens N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a two-year wireless service agreement with First Cellular in 2005. The company was acquired by defendant, which began dismantling and reorganizing. Plaintiff initially agreed to defendant's terms, but later filed a class action, claiming breach of contract for rendering his phone and equipment useless and refusing to honor the features and prices of the First Cellular Agreement. He also claimed deceptive rade practices under Illinois law and civil conspiracy. The district court denied defendant's motion to compel arbitration. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that defendant's arbitration clause applies because part of the claims are based on services and products received under defendant's contract. Defendant's contract unambiguously covers any dispute "arising out of" or "relating to the services and equipment." If a contract provides for arbitration of some issues, any doubt concerning the scope of the arbitration clause is resolved in favor of arbitration as a matter of federal law, 9 U.S.C. 2. View "Gore v. Alltel Comm'cns, LLC" on Justia Law

The Federal Trade Commission found that a merger between a health system and a hospital violated the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. Plaintiffs sought treble damages and certification of a class of patients and third-party payors who allegedly paid higher prices for care. Under FRCP 23(b)(3), a class may be certified only if questions of law and fact common to members predominate over questions affecting only individuals in the class. Plaintiffs proposed to rely on economic and statistical methods used by the FTC and defendant's economic experts to analyze antitrust impact. The "difference-in-differences" method estimates price increases resulting from exercise of market power rather than from other factors. The district court denied certification, concluding that the expert had not shown that his methodology could address impact on a class-wide basis. The Seventh Circuit granted interlocutory appeal, vacated, and remanded. Although plaintiffs' expert initially believed that the health system did increase prices uniformly across all services, he acknowledged that it might not have done so, and explained how his methodology could show impact to the class despite such complications. The degree of uniformity the court demanded is not required; "it is important not to let a quest for perfect evidence become the enemy of good evidence." View "Messner v. Northshore Univ. Healthsystem" on Justia Law

Class actions charged defendant, a credit-reporting agency, with violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681, by selling consumer credit information to advertisers. The actions were consolidated and settled for $75 million. Class counsel appealed approval of a settlement with members of the class who filed individual claims in state court, that allowed defendant, after paying the settlements, to be reimbursed out of the $75 million class settlement fund. The law firm (Watts) that represented the individual claimants, did nothing to create the fund out of which the settlements will be paid, but stands to receive from $10 to $15 million in attorneys’ fees out of the class settlement fund. Class counsel argued that it should receive a portion of Watts' fees on the ground that class counsel contributed to the creation of the fund. The Seventh Circuit deemed Watts' motion as one to add it as a party and granted the motion. Watts wants to be an appellee to defend its right to attorneys' fees from the fund that its clients (individual claimants) agreed to pay, according to the court, but doesn't want to be a party that could be ordered to disgorge some of the fees, should class counsel prevail. View "In re: Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litigation" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit consolidated two cases involving transfer to courts in another country. One is an appeal from an order to transfer cases involving vehicular accidents allegedly caused by tires installed on vehicles in Latin America, from the Southern District of Indiana to the courts of Mexico. Its i a suit by Mexican citizens arising from the death of another Mexican citizen in an accident in Mexico. The second involves transfer, to Israel, of suits against manufacturers of blood products used by hemophiliacs, which turned out to be contaminated by HIV; it was brought by Israeli citizens infected by the products in Israel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the transfers. Noting the existence of apparently dispositive precedent, the court referred to "ostrich-like tactic of pretending that potentially dispositive authority against a litigant's contention does not exist." View "Gonzalez-Servin v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

The district court certified a class in a suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005), 47 U.S.C. 227. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for the court re-evaluate the gravity of class counsel’s misconduct and its implications for the likelihood that class counsel will adequately represent the class. The district court concluded that "only the most egregious misconduct" by the law firm representing the class "could ever arguably justify denial of class status." The court must weigh the firm's misleading statements and the risk that the firm is in this case purely for itself and not for the benefits that the suit if successful might confer on the class. View "Creative Montessori Learning Centers v. Ashford Gear LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, seeking to enjoin defendant from sending unsolicited text messages to cellphone users and damages. He estimated that more than 1,000 people had received these messages and requested damages fixed by the Act, $500 for each violation. The court could award three times that amount, up to $1,500 for each violation, if it determined that defendant acted "willfully and knowingly." Within a month, defendant sent a letter offering to settle the case by giving plaintiff and up to 10 other affected people $1,500 for each text message received, plus court costs, and offering to stop sending unsolicited text messages to mobile subscribers. Plaintiff did not respond. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the offer mooted the claim. To allow a case, not certified as a class action and with no motion for class certification even pending, to continue in federal court when the sole plaintiff no longer maintains a personal stake would defy the limits on federal jurisdiction. View "Damasco v. Clearwire Corp." on Justia Law

The Illinois Attorney General filed suit against eight manufacturers of LCD panels for violations of the Illinois Antitrust Act, claiming that the defendants unlawfully inflated prices on LCD products sold to the state, its agencies, and residents. The complaint sought injunctive relief, civil penalties, and treble statutory damages for the state as a purchaser and, as parens patriae, for harmed residents. Defendants removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), 1453. The district court granted a motion to remand. The Seventh Circuit denied appeal, rejecting defendants' characterization of the parens patriae case as a disguised class action or mass action. View "LG Display Co., Ltd. v. Madigan" on Justia Law