Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

In 2010-2011 several hundred plaintiffs filed 10 lawsuits in Illinois state courts against Abbott, for personal injuries they allege were caused by Depakote, a prescription. Plaintiffs moved the Supreme Court of Illinois to consolidate and transfer their cases to St. Clair County, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 384; the Supreme Court has not ruled. Abbott removed each of the cases to federal court, asserting that the motion to consolidate brought the cases under the “mass action” provision of the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(11)(B)(i), which allows the removal of any case where 100 or more people propose to try their claims jointly. Cases filed in St. Clair and Madison counties were removed to the Southern District of Illinois and cases filed in Cook County were removed to the Northern District; plaintiffs moved to remand in both courts. The Northern District denied plaintiffs’ motion to remand. The Seventh Circuit held that removal was proper, rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that they did not propose a joint trial because their motion to consolidate did not address how the trials of the various claims in the cases would be conducted, other than proposing that they all take place in St. Clair County.View "Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Alexander" on Justia Law

In 2008, plaintiffs were inmates at the Indianapolis jail, which was operated by CCA under contract with the Marion County Sheriff’s Department. They claimed that the jail provided inadequate medical care and exposed inmates to inhumane living conditions so egregious that they amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court certified a class, but dismissed claims that the jail failed to provide adequate medical care, that the conditions of confinement inside the jail were inhumane, and that the procedures in the jail violated inmates’ rights under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and later entered summary judgment for CCA on the remaining issues. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that CCA had produced an affidavit indicating that complained-of problems had been resolved. View "Kress v. CCA of TN, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2005 brokers sued Merrill Lynch under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII raising claims of racial discrimination and seeking to litigate as a class. They alleged that the firm’s “teaming” and account-distribution policies had the effect of steering black brokers away from the most lucrative assignments and prevented them from earning compensation comparable to white brokers. That litigation is ongoing. Three years later, Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch, and the companies introduced a retention-incentive program that would pay bonuses to Merrill Lynch brokers corresponding to their previous levels of production. Brokers filed a second class-action suit. The district court dismissed. The court held that the retention program qualified as a production-based compensation system within the meaning of the section 703(h) exemption and was protected from challenge unless it was adopted with “intention to discriminate because of race.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(h). The court then held that the complaint’s allegations of discriminatory intent were conclusory. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is not enough to allege that the bonuses incorporated the past discriminatory effects of Merrill Lynch’s underlying employment practices. The disparate impact of those employment practices is the subject of the first lawsuit, and if proven, will be remedied there. View "McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc." on Justia Law

Holocaust survivors and heirs of other Holocaust victims sued, alleging that the Hungarian National Bank and Hungarian National Railway participated in expropriating property from Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust. Railway plaintiffs claimed subject matter jurisdiction under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(3), and assert: takings in violation of international law, aiding and abetting genocide, complicity in genocide, violations of customary international law, unlawful conversion, unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and accounting. Bank plaintiffs claimed subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA expropriation and waiver exceptions, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(1) and assert: genocide, aiding and abetting genocide, bailment, conversion, constructive trust, and accounting. They sought certifications as class actions, seeking to have the railway held responsible for approximately $1.25 billion, and the bank held jointly and severally responsible with private banks for approximately $75 billion. The district court declined to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit held that it had appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and remanded with instructions that plaintiffs either exhaust available Hungarian remedies identified by defendants or present a legally compelling reason for failure to do so. The court should allow jurisdictional discovery with respect to whether the railway is engaged in “commercial activity” in the U.S. View "Abelsz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank" on Justia Law

Holocaust survivors and heirs of other Holocaust victims sued, alleging that defendant banks participated in expropriating property from Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust. Invoking subject-matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1330(a), the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.1350, and federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, they alleged: genocide, aiding and abetting genocide, bailment, conversion, constructive trust, and accounting. Plaintiffs sought certification as a class action and asked that each bank be held jointly and severally responsible for damages of approximately $75 billion. This case and a parallel case against the Hungarian national railway have produced nine appeals and mandamus petitions. The district court declined to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit, noting that such a decision would ordinarily not be reviewable, stated that: “This is the rare case, however, in which it is appropriate for this court to exercise its discretion to issue a writ of mandamus to confine the district court to the exercise of its lawful jurisdiction” The court cited the extraordinary scale of the litigation, the inherent involvement with U.S. foreign policy, and the “crystal clarity” of the lack of foundation for exercising general personal jurisdiction over the banks. View "Abelesz v. OTP Bank" on Justia Law

Walsh is a nationwide builder; superintendents have discretion over hiring and pay of hourly workers. Walsh has rules against racial discrimination but superintendents are generally in charge. Plaintiffs worked for Walsh in 2002 and earlier and claimed that superintendents practiced, or tolerated, racial discrimination. Plaintiffs submitted a statistics indicating that black workers were less likely to work overtime; contended that some superintendents used words such as “nigger” or failed to prevent journeymen from doing so; and claimed that derogatory graffiti appeared in toilets or break sheds. Walsh claims that these were the work of subcontractors’ employees and that sites had different superintendents whose practices differed. The district court certified hostile work environment and overtime classes for the 262 Walsh sites in the Chicago area. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The 12 named plaintiffs cannot represent either class, since none worked for Walsh after 2002, but the classes extend into the indefinite future. The overtime class defined members as persons who did not earn more “because of their race.” Using a future decision on the merits to specify the scope of the class makes it impossible to determine who is in the class until the case ends. Plaintiffs may choose to propose site- or superintendent-specific classes. View "Bolden v. Walsh Constr. Co." on Justia Law

Three named plaintiffs in a class action suit to enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b) and parallel state laws appealed the district court’s decertification of the classes. Proceeding as individual lawsuits by the three plaintiffs, the case settled, reserving plaintiffs’ right to appeal the decertification. The Seventh Circuit denied a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. If appeals such as this were held to be precluded on standing grounds, there would be no judicial economies, since if the named plaintiffs settle after denial of class certification and then exit the scene another member of the class can step forward and take the quitters’ place. View "Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff found a $20 parking citation on his windshield and initiated a class action, claiming that the inclusion of personal information, such as his driver's license number, address, and weight, violated the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2721, which generally makes it unlawful to disclose personal information contained in a motor vehicle record. The district court dismissed and the Seventh Circuit initially affirmed. On rehearing, en banc, the court reversed, holding that the DPPA’s general rule of non-disclosure of personal information held in motor vehicle records and its overarching purpose of privacy protection must inform a proper understanding of the other provisions of the statute. Any disclosure must comply with those legitimate uses of information identified in the statutory exceptions. The Village’s placement of protected personal information in view of the public constituted a disclosure regulated by the statute, regardless of whether plaintiff can establish that anyone actually viewed it. View "Senne v. Vill. of Palatine" on Justia Law

Travelers sought a declaratory judgment that they had no duty to defend their insured, Rogan Shoes, in an Illinois state court class action for violations of the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681c(g), which prohibits businesses from including on sales receipts the expiration date or more than the last five digits of the purchaser’s credit or debit card and authorizes damages of up to $1,000 per unlawful receipt. The suit sought statutory damages of $387 million. Rogan settled for $16 million; the settlement specified that the judgment would be satisfied only through proceeds from Travelers’ policies, with the exception of $50,000 to cover legal costs. Rogan assigned its claims and rights to payments under the policies. The state court approved the settlement. A state court citation to discover assets was served on Travelers’ agent. The district court dismissed the declaratory judgment action on the ground that parallel state proceedings were pending. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the case did not satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1332(a), because Rogan had assigned its interests in its policies to class members, none of whom individually claim a share of more than $75,000. View "Travelers Prop. Cas. & Travelers Indem. Co. v. Good" on Justia Law

In a class action under ERISA, the district court partially decertified the class, 3000 to 3500 members (57 to 71 percent). Plaintiffs appealed under Rule 23(f), which authorizes a court of appeals to “permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action certification.” After holding that an order materially altering a previous order granting or denying class certification is within the scope of Rule 23(f), the Seventh Circuit denied the appeal for failure to satisfy the criteria for a Rule 23(f) appeal. View "Matz v. Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan" on Justia Law