Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

OneBeacon and AMICO were insurers of the B.F. Goodrich and, among others, were liable for environmental cleanup at the Goodrich plant in Calvert City, Kentucky. AMICO settled with Goodrich, but OneBeacon’s predecessor went to trial. A state court jury found for Goodrich, and OneBeacon was ordered to pay $42 million in compensatory damages and $12 million in attorney fees. The state court also denied OneBeacon's request for settlement credits to reflect amounts paid by other insurers, such as AMICO, through settlements with Goodrich. OneBeacon sought equitable contribution; AMICO removed to federal court. The district court granted AMICO summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Ohio policy favoring settlements provides that a settled policy is exhausted for purposes of equitable contribution; the court declined to address whether Ohio law permits interclass contribution actions or whether the jury finding of bad faith bars equitable relief. View "OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Mortgage Electronic is a third party in a foreclosure action, based on its assignment of a mortgage. The case was remanded from federal to Kentucky state court. Mortgage Electronic sought permission to appeal to the Sixth Circuit (28 U.S.C. 1453(c)). The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), allows the court to accept an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying a motion to remand a class action if the application for leave to appeal is timely. The Sixth Circuit granted the petition and affirmed, noting that it has previously held that third-party defendants may not remove an action not under the Act. The Act's reference to "any defendant," in context, does not change the rule: a third-party defendant cannot seek removal of a state court action under the Act.View "In re: Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

The named plaintiffs are Ohio residents who purchased front-loading washing machines manufactured by defendant. Within months after their purchases, the plaintiffs noticed the smell of mold or mildew emanating from the machines and from laundry washed in the machines. One plaintiff found mold growing on the sides of the detergent dispenser, another saw mold growing on the rubber door seal, despite allowing the machine doors to stand open. They filed suit, alleging tortious breach of warranty, negligent design, and negligent failure to warn. The district court certified a class comprised of Ohio residents who purchased one of the specified machines in Ohio primarily for personal, family, or household purposes and not for resale (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3)). The Sixth Circuit affirmed class certification, with proof of damages reserved for individual determination. Plaintiffs’ proof established numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation. Common questions predominate over individual ones and class action is a superior method to adjudicate the claims.View "Glazer v. Whirlpool Corp." on Justia Law

The attorney represented more than 400 plaintiffs in a class action related to the diet drug Fen-Phen. Lawyers’ fees were to be limited to 30 percent of the clients' gross recovery. The case settled for almost $200 million. Plaintiffs together received $74 million, 37 percent of the settlement; $20 million was used to establish Kentucky Fund for Healthy Living. The attorney served on the Fund’s board, for which he received $5,350 monthly. The attorney knew that the Kentucky Bar Association was investigating fee division in the case and possible unauthorized practice of law by his paralegal. The attorney subsequently applied to renew his malpractice insurance and answered "no" to questions about possible pending claims and investigations. The policy excluded coverage for dishonest acts and omissions. Members of the class subsequently filed malpractice claims and were awarded $42 million. The insurer sought a declaration that it was entitled to rescind the policy. The district court granted the insurer summary judgment and awarded $233,674.49 for its outlay on defense costs. Class members intervened to protect their ability to recover. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Disbarment constituted a sufficient "regulatory ruling" under the dishonesty exclusion clause and there were material misrepresentations on the application. View "Continental Cas. Co. v. Law Offices of Melbourne Mills" on Justia Law

Plaintiff rented a car, drove 64 miles in one day, refilled the fuel tank, and returned the car to the same location from which he rented the car. In addition to rental and other fees that he does not dispute, he was charged a $13.99 fuel service fee that he challenged by filing a putative class action, claiming breach of contract, fraud, and unjust enrichment. Defendant claimed that, because plaintiff drove fewer than 75 miles during the rental period, to avoid the charge he was required to return the car with a full fuel tank and to submit a receipt. The district court dismissed, finding that the contract was not ambiguous. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the voluntary payment doctrine.View "Salling v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Current and former African–American employees brought suit alleging that they were exposed to a racially hostile work environment in defendant's warehouses and, in response to a motion for summary judgment, submitted a detailed list of incidents, scattered sporadically over 25 years, including vulgar graffiti, overtly racist comments by coworkers, and racially motivated pranks. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly found that plaintiffs failed to show they were aware of the majority of harassment alleged by their fellow employees and correctly concluded that plaintiffs' claims should be considered individually. View "Berryman v. Supervalu Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class-action lawsuit against the insurance company, claiming breach of contract because the company began interpreting the "actual charges" provision of his cancer-insurance policy to mean the charges that the medical provider accepts as full payment from the primary insurer and the insured. Plaintiff claims that the policy entitles him to be paid the higher "list prices" that appear on his hospital bills before the primary insurer negotiates a lower rate. The company made payments to the insured, not directly to hospitals. The district court certified the class and issued a preliminary injunction, requiring the company to pay plaintiff according to his interpretation. Meanwhile, an Arkansas state court certified a nearly identical class, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed a settlement in that action. The Sixth Circuit vacated class certification, based on the intervening Arkansas case. The court dismissed appeal of the injunction for lack of jurisdiction because was not a decision on the merits. View "Gooch v. Life Investors Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Two members of a program advertised as providing healthcare discounts to consumers sued, seeking to represent a class of 30,850. They claimed violations of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act as well as Ohio’s common law prohibition against unjust enrichment in that healthcare providers listed in the discount network that had never heard of the program, and that newspaper advertisements, designed to look like news stories were deceptive. The district court exercised jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), which grants jurisdiction over class actions in which the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million and the parties are minimally diverse. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The consumer-protection laws of many states, not just of Ohio, govern the claims and there are many factual variations among the claims, making a class action neither efficient nor workable nor above all consistent with the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. View "Pilgrim v. Universal Health Card, LLC" on Justia Law

Following a 2007 train derailment and three-day fire that allegedly exposed a small Ohio town to cancer-causing agents, plaintiffs sought damages on behalf of a putative class. Plaintiffs' expert testified that the normal background level of dioxin is four parts per trillion and that the range within area homes was from 11.7 to 274 ppt. A doctor testified about increased risk of cancer. The district court granted summary judgment for the train company, finding that plaintiffs had not established general or specific causation and, as a matter of law, any increased risk of cancer or other diseases was too insignificant to warrant the court's ordering a lengthy period of medical monitoring. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the absence of conclusive medical evidence that plaintiffs faced even a one-in-a-million increased risk of cancer.

Plaintiffs Carol Metz and others filed a putative class action against fifty-five banks, including Fifth Third. The claims arose out of a Ponzi scheme involving bogus promissory notes. Five months later, attorney Daniel Morris filed a motion to intervene on behalf of his clients. Attached to the motion was a complaint similar to Metz's complaint except it was premised on promissory notes issued by different entities. The district court granted the motion to intervene. After the district court had dismissed Fifth Third with prejudice, Morris filed an intervenors' complaint against Fifth Third. The complaint was virtually identical to the complaint attached to the motion to intervene Morris filed earlier. The district court dismissed the claims with prejudice and granted Fifth Third's request for sanctions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the imposition of sanctions, holding (1) the district court's imposition of sanctions under the bad faith standard was proper; (2) the record set forth sufficient evidence to support the district court's decision; (3) the district court properly sanctioned Morris under its inherent authority even though Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 also applied; (4) the district court did not deny Morris due process; and (5) the amount of fees awarded was not excessive.