Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Goldman Sachs appealed from an order of the district court denying their motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's claims of gender discrimination. Plaintiff and others alleged that Goldman Sachs engaged in a continuing pattern and practice of discrimination based on sex against female employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law, Administrative Code of the City of New York 8-107 et seq. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the arbitration clause in her agreement must be invalidated because arbitration would preclude her from vindicating a statutory right. The court disagreed and held that the district court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration where plaintiff had no substantive statutory right to pursue a pattern-or-practice claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former customers of Sterling Foster, for which Bear Stearns, as a clearing broker, performed certain settlement and record-keeping functions, alleged that Bear Stearns violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), by participating in Sterling Foster's market manipulation scheme. Bear Stearns pursued this interlocutory appeal from a decision and order of the district court granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs' motion for certification of a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). The court concluded that plaintiffs' allegations failed to trigger a duty of disclosure to Sterling Foster's clients such that the Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States presumption of reliance applied. Therefore, plaintiffs failed to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Levitt v. J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this consolidated action sought relief on behalf of two large putative classes - one whose members bought auction rate securities and one whose members issued them - alleging that defendants triggered the market's collapse by conspiring with each other to simultaneously stop buying auction rate securities for their own proprietary accounts. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' complaints pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The court affirmed, holding that plaintiffs' complaints did not successfully allege a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Although the court did not reach the district court's implied-repeal analysis under Credit Suisse Securities (USC) LLC v. Billing, the district court was ultimately correct that the complaints failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Citigroup, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of its complaint for failure to state a claim. At issue was whether plaintiff had stated plausible claims under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77a et seq. The court held that allegations in the complaint stated a plausible claim that the offering documents for the security misstated the applicable underwriting standards in violation of sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15. The court also held that the alleged misstatements were not immaterial as a matter of law. Finally, the court vacated the district court's holding that plaintiff, even as the representative of a proposed class, lacked standing to pursue claims based on securities in which it had not invested. Rather than addressing this issue, the court instructed the district court to reconsider it in light of the court's intervening opinion in NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman Sachs & Co. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Jersey Carpenters Health Fund v. The Royal Bank of Scotland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, on behalf of a purported class of similarly situated employees, appealed from the district court's dismissal of their claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, and the New York Labor Law (NYLL), NYLL 663(1). Plaintiffs alleged that CHS failed to compensate them adequately for time worked during meal breaks, before and after scheduled shifts, and during required training sessions. The court affirmed the dismissal of the FLSA and RICO claims for failure to state a claim. The court affirmed the dismissal of the NYLL overtime claims, which have the same deficiencies as the FLSA overtime claims. However, because the district court did not explain why plaintiffs' NYLL gap-time claims were dismissed with prejudice, the court vacated that aspect of the judgment and remanded for further consideration. View "Lundy v. Catholic Health System of Long Island Inc." on Justia Law

Kentucky commenced this action in Kentucky state court against Purdue, alleging that Purdue violated Kentucky law by misleading health care providers, consumers, and government officials regarding the risks of addiction associated with the prescription drug OxyContin, which Purdue manufactures, markets, and sells. Following transfer from the Eastern District of Kentucky to the Southern District of New York, the district court granted Kentucky's motion to remand, concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the suit did not meet the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005's (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, requirements. Purdue appealed the remand order under 28 U.S.C. 1453(c)(1). The court held that the district court correctly determined that Kentucky's action was not a class action as defined in CAFA, and therefore the case was properly remanded. Accordingly, the petition for leave to appeal was denied. View "Purdue Pharma, L. P. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky" on Justia Law

In this action under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651, and the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283, the court considered whether, following the approval of a federal class action settlement, the district court properly enjoined a state court action for legal malpractice directed at counsel for the plaintiff class. The court held that the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act could not form the basis for the district court's injunction of the state court action, as the limited circumstances in which the injunction of an in personam action could be appropriate "in aid of" the court's jurisdiction were not present in this case. The court also concluded that where, as here, the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the reasonableness of counsel's representation, a subsequent malpractice action could be enjoined under the relitigation exception. View "Barroway v. Computer Assoc., et. al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit against defendants on behalf of themselves and similarly situated plaintiffs, alleging, inter alia, that defendants engaged in unlawful, unfair, and deceptive practices through unauthorized enrollment practices known as "post transaction marketing" and "data pass." At issue was whether plaintiffs were bound to arbitrate their dispute with defendants as a consequence of an arbitration provision that defendants asserted was part of a contract between the parties. The court concluded that despite some limited availability of the arbitration provision to plaintiffs, they were not bound to arbitrate this dispute. In regards to the email at issue, under the contract law of Connecticut or California - either of which could apply to this dispute - the email did not provide sufficient notice to plaintiffs of the arbitration provision, and plaintiffs therefore could not have assented to it solely as a result of their failure to cancel their enrollment in defendants' service. In regards to the hyperlink at issue, the court concluded that defendants forfeited the argument that plaintiffs were on notice of the arbitration provision through the hyperlink by failing to raise it in the district court. View "Schnabel et al. v. Trilegiant Corp. et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order dismissing a putative securities class action brought under sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1993, 15 U.S.C. 77k, l(a)(20, o, on behalf of all persons who acquired certain mortgage-backed certificates issued under the same allegedly false and misleading shelf registration statement, but sold in 17 separate offerings by 17 unique prospectus supplements. The court held that plaintiff had class standing to assert the claims of purchasers of certificates backed by mortgages originated by the same lenders that originated the mortgages backing plaintiff's certificates, because such claims implicated "the same set of concerns" as plaintiff's claims. The court further held that plaintiff need not plead an out-of-pocket loss in order to allege a cognizable diminution in the value of an illiquid security under section 11. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the district court and remanded with further instructions to reinstate plaintiff's sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 claims to the extent they were based on similar or identical misrepresentations in the Offering Documents associated with certificates backed by mortgages originated by the same lenders that originated the mortgages backing plaintiff's certificates. View "Neca-Ibew Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman Sachs & Co." on Justia Law

Hecht sued UCB, a debt collector alleging violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by placing telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity, 15 U.S.C. 1692d(6), and by failing to disclose in its initial communication that the debt collector was attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained would be used for that purpose. The district court dismissed, finding that the suit was precluded under the doctrine of res judicata because Hecht alleged facts and violations already litigated, settled, and disposed of by a final judgment. The Second Circuit reversed. The prior judgment does not bar Hecht’s claims because she had a due process right to notice of that suit and the manner of providing notice, publication of the notice in a single issue of USA Today, was inadequate.View "Hecht v. United Collection Bureau, Inc." on Justia Law