Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Ohio

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Steve Maddox and eight other named relators (collectively, Maddox) brought this original action in mandamus against the village of Lincoln Heights and several of the village’s officials (collectively, the village). Maddox alleged that several classes of people who work for or have worked for the village had not been provided employee benefits owed to them and requested a writ directing the village to provide the withheld benefits. The parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement consisting of money payments to class members. The Supreme Court referred the case to mediation, with instructions for the parties to attempt an out-of-court settlement without court approval, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to preside over this monetary settlement because no class had yet been certified and nothing prevented the parties from settling the case without the approval of the Court. View "State ex rel. Maddox v. Village of Lincoln Heights" on Justia Law

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A circuit court in Boone County, Kentucky entered a multimillion dollar judgment against Stanley Chesley, a former attorney, for his conduct in a class action lawsuit that eventually settled. Chesley filed suit in Ohio state court seeking an injunction to prevent Respondents from collecting on the judgment and to relitigate the case. The Hamilton County Common Pleas Court Judge Robert Ruehlman acted outside its jurisdiction to repeatedly shield Chesley and his assets from creditors. Relator Angela Ford filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to preclude Judge Ruehlman from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the Hamilton County case. The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of prohibition and ordered the judge to vacate his orders, holding that Judge Ruehlman had no statutory authority to grant relief in this case. View "State ex rel. Ford v. Ruehlman" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed a class action complaint alleging that Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) failed timely to record in the appropriate county recorder’s office the satisfaction of her residential mortgage within ninety days after payoff, as required by Ohio Rev. Code 5301.36(B). After the class was certified, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) issued a cease-and-desist order (consent order) to Fannie Mae. Fannie Mae moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the FHFA consent order did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the consent order did not preclude the trial court from exercising jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C. 4635(b), the federal statute governing judicial review of FHFA orders; but (2) 12 U.S.C. 4617(j)(4) barred the trial court from ordering Fannie Mae to pay damages under section 5301.36(C) while Fannie Mae is under FHFA’s conservatorship. View "Radatz v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n" on Justia Law

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Named Plaintiffs filed an amended class-action complaint challenging the city of Cleveland’s imposition of fines against vehicle lessees. The trial court granted Cleveland’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Plaintiffs had waived the right to pursue judicial remedies by paying their fines and failing to appeal their citations. The trial court also denied Plaintiffs’ class-certification motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. On remand, the trial court granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The court also granted class certification. Cleveland appealed the class certification order, arguing that res judicata precluded class relief. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Plaintiffs’ failure to appeal their traffic violations through Cleveland’s administrative process did not bar them from pursuing equitable and declaratory relief in the trial court. The Supreme Court vacated in part the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the court of appeals erred in deciding that res judicata barred Plaintiffs’ claims, in the absence of a final, appealable order from the trial court addressing that question. Remanded. View "Lycan v. Cleveland" on Justia Law