Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Appellants John Doe, Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 3 separately sued Respondents the Bishop of Charleston and the Bishop of the Diocese of Charleston in his official capacity (respondents). The cases were consolidated, and respondents moved to dismiss on the pleadings. The trial court granted the motion. In 2007, respondents entered into a class action settlement agreement (the settlement) to settle the claims of "[a]ll individuals born on or before August 30, 1980 who, as minors, were sexually abused at any time by agents or employees of the Diocese of Charleston" as well as their spouses and parents, except those whose claims had been independently resolved. The settlement established a fund from which awards would be made to claimants who established their sexual abuse claims by arbitration. Appellants alleged they did not receive notice of the settlement. In 2009, after the claims and opt-out period provided for in the settlement had expired, they brought suit alleging claims of the type covered by the settlement. After careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the language of the settlement did not waive its res judicata effect as to future claimants, so that appellants were not entitled to treatment as class claimants; (2) however, dismissal on the pleadings was not warranted on the questions whether appellants were deprived of notice or adequate representation in the underlying class settlement and, if so, whether the statute of limitations was tolled on their claim of negligent supervision. If appellants could establish on remand that they were denied due process owing to lack of notice or because of inadequate representation in the class action proceedings, and that the statute of limitations was tolled, the Supreme Court held that they could proceed on their claims. View "Doe v. The Bishop of Charleston" on Justia Law

State Farm filed a complaint for negligence against Appellant, alleging that Appellant was at fault in an automobile accident with State Farm's insured. Appellant counterclaimed, alleging that State Farm was unjustly enriched as a result of having engaged in the deceptive and unlawful business practice of causing collection-style letters to be mailed in an attempt to collect unadjudicated, potential subrogation claims as debts. Appellant's counterclaim identified two putative classes. State Farm filed a motion to strike the class allegations. Rather than granting the motion to strike class allegations, the circuit court denied class certification "for the reasons stated in State Farm's motion." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court acted without due consideration of the Court's foregoing case law on typicality, commonality, and predominance and therefore abused its discretion in prematurely denying class certification at the early pleading stage of this case. Remanded.View "Kersten v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2010, plaintiff Jane Doe was contacted by detectives in the Baton Rouge Police Department and asked to identify whether she was the subject of a photograph, obtained from a video, captured by a pen camera which had been surreptitiously placed in the women’s shower/changing room of a fitness center in downtown Baton Rouge. Plaintiff was a member of a gym called “Anytime Fitness,” a fitness center owned by Southern Gyms, LLC. Further investigation by police revealed that an assistant manager and trainer at the fitness center secretly videotaped the plaintiff and other women in the women’s shower/changing room of the gym. The police told the plaintiff her image was one of four women discovered on the pen camera when the pen camera was turned over to police. Telschow was arrested and prosecuted for video voyeurism. He ultimately pleaded guilty to four counts of video voyeurism and sentenced to a nine month term of imprisonment. Ultimately the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the lower courts correctly applied the standards for analyzing class action certification set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 591, et seq. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court found the lower courts erred in concluding the plaintiff satisfied the threshold requirement of numerosity, necessary for class certification. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's judgment which granted plaintiff’s motion for class certification. View "Doe v. Southern Gyms, LLC" on Justia Law

The railroad was originally sued under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act in 2002 in Mississippi, where Fennell lived and worked and was allegedly exposed to asbestos. He had also worked for the railroad in Louisiana. In 2006, after discovery, the Mississippi court dismissed without prejudice. In 2009, Fennell refiled in the circuit court of St. Clair County, Illinois. The railroad sought dismissal under the interstate doctrine of forum non conveniens. The circuit court denied the motion; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that the circuit court did not consider all of the relevant factors. The citizens of St. Clair County should not be asked to bear the burden of this lawsuit. The majority of the witnesses, including treating physicians, are in Mississippi and not subject to Illinois subpoenas. Although the St. Clair County circuit court cited “almost 80 years of relevant evidence as to the defendant’s knowledge of the exposure to asbestos” that were held by the defendant’s Belleville law firm located in the county, the supreme court ruled that such documents can be copied and that this is not sufficient to tip the balance as to the proper forum.View "Fennell v. IL Cent. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a developer, helped construct a planned development (the "community"). The community HOA sued the developers, sellers, and builders of the development, including Petitioner, on behalf of the individual homeowners, alleging construction-defect-based claims for breach of implied and express warranties and negligence. Thereafter, the community HOA filed a motion for the district court to determine that its claims satisfied the class action requirements of Nev. R. Civ. P. 23. The district court concluded that the HOA did not need to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 and thus allowed the action to proceed without conducting a class action analysis. Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus or prohibition, claiming that the district court acted arbitrarily and capriciously by refusing to undertake a class action analysis. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition to the extent that it directed the district court to analyze the Rule 23 factors in this case. In so doing, the Court clarified the application of D.R. Horton v. District Court when a homeowners' association seeks to litigate construction-defect claims on behalf of its members under Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3102(1)(d).View "Beazer Homes Holding Corp. v. Dist. Court " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in these consolidated cases to resolve an issue of first impression: whether a member of a putative class was entitled to the suspension of prescription provided for in La. C.C.P. art. 596 when an independent, individual lawsuit is filed prior to a ruling on the class certification issue. The respective district courts in each of these cases sustained exceptions of prescription, dismissing plaintiffs' individual lawsuits filed prior to a resolution of the class certification issue in class action proceedings in which the plaintiffs were putative members. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissals, finding that the filing of an individual lawsuit by a member of a putative class prior to a ruling on the class certification issue operates as an "opt out" of the class action and a forfeiture of the suspension provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 596. After reviewing the relevant statutory provisions, the Supreme Court found that because plaintiffs were members of a class asserted in a class action petition, they were entitled to the benefits of the suspension of prescription provided under La. C.C.P. art. 596, notwithstanding that they also filed individual actions prior to a resolution of the class certification issue. As a result, the Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts sustaining exceptions of prescription to the petitions of the plaintiffs and remanded these matters to the respective district courts for further proceedings.View "Duckworth v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law