Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a class action on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated, alleging that USSA committed numerous violations of California labor laws, including, inter alia, requiring them to work through their meal periods. On appeal, USSA challenged the district court's certification of the meal break sub-class on the grounds that plaintiffs have not established "commonality," as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2), or "predominance," as required under Rule 23(b)(3). The court concluded that plaintiffs' claims would yield a common answer that was "apt to drive the resolution of the litigation," as required by Rule 12(b)(3). The court agreed with the district court that the "nature of the work" inquiry would be a common one, focused on the legality of a single-guard staffing model, rather than a site-by-site inquiry; concluded that common issues of law or fact would predominate; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Rule 12(b)(3) was satisfied where plaintiffs' claims "will prevail or fail in unison" as required by the rule. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Abdullah v. U.S. Security Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

This case concerned the 2011 NFL lockout. Active NFL players filed a class action suit (Brady suit) against the NFL, alleging violations of the federal antitrust laws and other claims. Retired NFL players also filed suit against the NFL and its teams, alleging antitrust violations (Eller I suit). After both actions were consolidated, the Brady suit was settled, the players re-designated the NFLPA as their collective bargaining agent, the NFL and NFLPA signed a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) incorporating the settlement terms, the Brady plaintiffs dismissed their action, the lockout ended, and the 2011 NFL season commenced. Carl Eller and other retired NFL players (plaintiffs) then filed this class action (Eller II) against the NFLPA and others. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and plaintiffs appealed, alleging claims for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage under Minnesota law. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of a prospective separate contractual relation with the NFL that would provide more than the increased benefits provided in the 2011 CBA. Even if plaintiffs alleged a reasonable expectation of prospective contractual relations or economic advantage with the NFL, plaintiffs failed to allege facts proving that defendants improperly or wrongfully interfered with these advantageous prospects. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Eller, et al. v. NFL Players Assoc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, New York Life, both individually and on behalf of a putative class of insurance agents. Plaintiff alleged state law claims seeking unpaid overtime wages and recovery of improper deductions, as well as statutory liquidated damages under New York Labor Law. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of his complaint based on the "home state exception" to federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). The court held that the home state exception was not jurisdictional and must be - and in this case was - raised within a reasonable time. Further, the 2011 amendment to New York Labor Law was not retroactive and the district court's grant of partial summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's overtime claim was correct. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Gold v. New York Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued their employer on behalf of themselves and “similarly situated” individuals, alleging that the employer violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, by failing to ensure that they were paid for time worked during meal breaks. Notice was directed to potential collective-action members, and individuals opted into the lawsuit. FLSA collective actions are subject to “opt-ins,” unlike class actions under FRCP 23, under which those not wishing to be included must “opt out” after the class is certified. After preliminary discovery, the district court dismissed the claims of the opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice; at the request of the remaining plaintiffs, the court dismissed remaining claims with prejudice to enable appellate review. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the named plaintiffs lack final orders appealable under 28 U.S.C. 1291. Plaintiffs attempted to short-circuit the procedure for appealing an interlocutory order that is separate from, and unrelated to, the merits of the case. They could have obtained review of the decertification order by proceeding to final judgment on the merits of their individual or could have asked the trial court to certify their interlocutory orders for appeal. View "Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Medical Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer (Nichols) for breach of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and against his union for breach of its duty of fair representation. Plaintiff alleged that Nichols breached the CBA by failing to establish rest periods for workers on the continuously operating lines as required by Section 17.1 of the CBA. In this case, the union had a duty not to pursue a grievance to arbitration that it believed did not warrant such action. The court concluded that plaintiff had not raised a genuine issue of material fact on whether the union failed in its duty of fair representation on the issue before the court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the union and the employer. View "Inechien v. Nichols Aluminum, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

E&Y appealed from the district court's order denying its motion to dismiss or stay proceedings, and to compel arbitration, in a putative class action brought by its former employees. At issue on appeal was whether an employee could invalidate a class-action waive provision in an arbitration agreement when that waiver removed the financial incentive for her to pursue a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq. The court held that the FLSA did not include a "contrary congressional command" that prevented a class-action waiver provision in an arbitration agreement from being enforced by its terms. The court also held that, in light of the supervening decision of the Supreme Court in American Express Co v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the employee's argument that proceeding individually in arbitration would be "prohibitively expensive" was not a sufficient basis to invalidate the action waiver provision at issue here under the "effective vindication doctrine." Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former employees of Amgen and AML, participated in two employer-sponsored pension plans, the Amgen Plan and the AML Plan. The Plans were employee stock-ownership plans that qualified as "eligible individual account plans" (EIAPs) under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1107(d)(3)(A). Plaintiffs filed an ERISA class action against Amgen, AML, and others after the value of Amgen common stock fell, alleging that defendants breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA. The court concluded that defendants were not entitled to a presumption of prudence under Quan v. Computer Sciences Corp., that plaintiffs have stated claims under ERISA in Counts II through VI, and that Amgen was a properly named fiduciary under the Amgen Plan. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Harris v. Amgen" on Justia Law

Davis sued Cintas, individually and on behalf of a class of female job applicants denied employment as entry-level sales representatives, alleging that Cintas’s hiring practices led to gender discrimination, in violation of Title VII, and caused Cintas to reject her application for employment twice. The district court denied Davis’s motion for class certification and granted summary judgment for Cintas. The Sixth Circuit affirmed both denial of class certification and the entry of summary judgment on her individual disparate-treatment claim arising in 2004 and her disparate-impact claim. The court reversed with respect to a disparate-treatment claim arising in 2003, noting that she was at least as qualified as the male candidates at that time. View "Davis v. Cintas Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, seeking to represent approximately 538 employees of Medline, appealed the district court's denial of class certification. The complaint asserted claims against Medline for violating California labor laws. The court concluded that the district court applied the wrong legal standard and abused its discretion when it denied class certification on the grounds that damages calculations would be individual. The district court also abused its discretion by finding that the class would be unmanageable despite the record's demonstration to the contrary. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded with directions to enter an order granting plaintiff's motion for class certification. View "Leyva v. Medline Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs receive subsidies from Michigan’s Child Development and Care Program for providing home childcare services for low-income families. Following creation of the Home Based Child Care Council, a union was established and authorized to bargain on their behalf, based on submission of 22,180 valid provider-signed authorization cards out of a possible 40,532 eligible providers. The union and the Council entered into a collective bargaining agreement and the state began deducting union dues and fees from the subsidy payments. Plaintiffs sought to file a class-action lawsuit for the return of the money, collected allegedly in violation of their First Amendment rights. The district court denied certification of plaintiffs’ proposed class (all home childcare providers in Michigan) based on conflict of interest: some members voted for union representation and others voted against representation. Plaintiffs attempted to cure by proposing a subclass of only providers who did not participate in any election related to union representation. The district court rejected the proposal, finding that it could not assume that all members of the subclass opposed representation and that, even if all members of the proposed subclass did oppose representation, their reasons for opposition were different enough to create conflict within the class. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Schlaud v. Snyder" on Justia Law