Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Hilltop hired Huffman and others to review the files of mortgage loans originated by PNC Bank to determine whether lawful procedures were followed during foreclosure and other proceedings. Until the end of their employment in January 2013, they regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, but were not compensated at the overtime rate because Hilltop classified them as independent contractors. Each employment relationship was governed by a now-expired contract, including an arbitration clause and a survival clause. The clauses listed in the survival clause correspond to ones detailing services essential to the job, the term of employment, compensation, termination, and confidentiality; it did not list the arbitration clause. The workers filed a purported class action. The district court denied Hilltop’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The Sixth Circuit reversed, rejecting an argument that omission of the arbitration clause from the survival clause constituted a “clear implication” that the parties intended the arbitration clause to expire with the agreement. Sixth Circuit precedent indicates that the parties must proceed in arbitration on an individual basis.View "Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., LLC" on Justia Law

Named plaintiffs, former FedEx drivers, represented two classes of plaintiffs comprising approximately 363 individuals who were full-time delivery drivers for FedEx in Oregon at any time between 1999 and 2009. Plaintiff class members worked for FedEx's two operating divisions, FedEx Ground and FedEx Home Delivery. FedEx contended its drivers were independent contractors under Oregon law. Plaintiffs contended they were employees. In a consolidated appeal, plaintiffs claimed that "FedEx improperly classified its drivers as independent contractors, thereby forcing them to incur business expenses and depriving them of benefits otherwise owed to employees" under Oregon law. The Ninth Circuit agreed with plaintiffs, and reversed the Multidistrict Litigation Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx Ground, its denial of plaintiff FedEx drivers' motion for partial summary judgment, and its certification of plaintiffs' classes insofar as they sought prospective relief. View "Slayman, et al v. FedEx Ground Package System" on Justia Law

The named plaintiffs represented a class comprising approximately 2300 individuals who were full-time delivery drivers for FedEx in California between 2000 and 2007. FedEx contended its drivers were independent contractors under California law. Plaintiffs contended they were employees. This appeal involved a class action originally filed in the California Superior Court in December 2005 on behalf of a class of California FedEx drivers, asserting claims for employment expenses and unpaid wages under the California Labor Code on the ground that FedEx had improperly classified the drivers as independent contractors. Plaintiffs also brought claims under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), which similarly turned on the drivers' employment status. FedEx removed to the Northern District of California based on diversity. Between 2003 and 2009, similar cases were filed against FedEx in approximately forty states. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated these FedEx cases for multidistrict litigation ("MDL") proceedings in the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana ("the MDL Court"). Plaintiffs moved for class certification. The MDL Court certified a class for plaintiffs' claims under California law. It declined to certify plaintiffs' proposed national FMLA class. Plaintiffs in all the MDL cases moved for partial summary judgment, seeking to establish their status as employees as a matter of law. In this case, FedEx cross-moved for summary judgment. The MDL Court denied nearly all of the MDL plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and granted nearly all of FedEx's motions, holding that plaintiffs were independent contractors as a matter of law in each state where employment status was governed by common-law agency principles. The MDL Court remanded this case to the district court to resolve the drivers' claims under the FMLA. Those claims were settled, and the district court entered final judgment. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging the MDL Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx on the employment status issue. FedEx conditionally cross-appealed, arguing that if we reverse the MDL Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx, we should also reverse the MDL Court's class certification decision. Upon review, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs were employees as a matter of law under California's right-to-control test. Accordingly, the Court reversed both the MDL Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx and its denial of plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to enter summary judgment for plaintiffs on the question of employment status. View "Alexander, et al v. FedEx Ground Package System" on Justia Law

The cases on appeal are among several similar actions brought by a single law firm alleging systemic underpayment in the healthcare industry in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, Pennsylvania law, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001,and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961. Nurses and other patient-care professionals, on behalf of a putative class, claimed that their employers maintained unlawful timekeeping and pay policies: under the “Meal Break Deduction Policy,” the timekeeping system automatically deducted 30 minutes of pay daily for meal breaks without ensuring that the employees actually received a break; under the “Unpaid Pre- and Post-Schedule Work Policy,” the employees were prohibited from recording time worked outside of their scheduled shifts; under the “Unpaid Training Policy,” employees were not paid for time spent at “compensable” training sessions. The district court dismissed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The overtime claim was factually inadequate: the plaintiffs “failed to allege a single specific instance in which a named Plaintiff worked overtime and was not compensated for this time.” View "Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp." on Justia Law

A group of employees filed class and collective actions against Tyson Foods, Inc., seeking unpaid wages for time spent on pre- and post-shift activities. After the employees obtained a sizeable verdict and fee award, Tyson unsuccessfully moved for judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, Tyson: (1) challenged the judgment and denial of the motion for judgment as a matter of law; and (2) argued the fee award was excessive. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded, after review, that plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of undercompensation and the district court acted within its discretion in setting the fee award. View "Garcia, et al v. Tyson Foods, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action suit against Home Service on behalf of customer service managers who were not reimbursed for expenses pertaining to the work-related use of their personal cell phones. The court held that when employees must use their personal cell phones for work-related calls, Labor Code section 2802 requires the employer to reimburse them; whether the employees have cell phone plans with unlimited or limited minutes, the reimbursement owed is a reasonable percentage of their cell phone bills; and, because the trial court relied on erroneous legal assumptions about the application of section 2802, the court reversed the order denying certification to the class. On remand, the trial court shall reconsider the motion for class certification in light of the court's interpretation of section 2802. View "Cochran v. Schwan's Home Service" on Justia Law

Defendant-Employer Tilly’s Inc. (and World of Jeans & Tops, Inc.) hired plaintiff-respondent Maria Rebolledo to work in its warehouse from July 6, 2000, to December 28, 2001. She was rehired on January 28, 2002, and terminated October 30, 2012. In December 2012 she filed a lawsuit on behalf of herself and a putative class of "similarly situated" persons (amended February 2013) alleging her Employer: (1) failed to provide meal periods; (2) failed to provide rest periods; (3) failed to pay wages of terminated or resigned employees; (4) knew and intentionally failed to comply with itemized wage statement provisions; and (5) violated the unfair competition law. Furthermore, plaintiff sought enforcement of Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. Upon review of the matter, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court's conclusion the parties' arbitration agreement expressly excluded statutory wage claims from the arbitration obligation. Therefore, the order was affirmed.View "Rebolledo v. Tilly's, Inc." on Justia Law

Former employees of RHI filed suit on behalf of themselves and others, alleging that RHI failed to pay overtime and improperly classified them as overtime-exempt employees in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201. Both had signed employment agreements that contained arbitration provisions: “[a]ny dispute or claim arising out of or relating to Employee’s employment, termination of employment or any provision of this Agreement” shall be submitted to arbitration. Neither agreement mentions classwide arbitration. RHI moved to compel arbitration on an individual basis. The district court granted the motion in part, compelling arbitration but holding that the propriety of individual versus classwide arbitration was for the arbitrator to decide. The court entered an order terminating the case. Rather than immediately appealing, RHI proceeded with arbitration until the arbitrator ruled that the employment agreements permitted classwide arbitration. The district court denied a motion to vacate the arbitrator’s partial award. The Third Circuit reversed. Because of the fundamental differences between classwide and individual arbitration, and the consequences of proceeding with one rather than the other, the availability of classwide arbitration is a substantive “question of arbitrability” to be decided by a court absent clear agreement otherwise.View "Opalinski v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

KeHE, a Naperville food distributor, assigns each of its “sales representatives” several stores of large chain retailers. The representatives are responsible for stocking shelves at their assigned stores and for reordering merchandise when a store is low on any KeHE products. In 2012, KeHE discharged several representatives as part of restructuring. Four of them sued, claiming that KeHE had failed to pay them overtime wages required by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, and seeking to certify a collective action. KeHE argued that many of the discharged employees had waived their right to participate in a collective action in their separation agreements, and that they are exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA as “outside sales employees.” The district court upheld the validity of the waivers and certified a collective action consisting only of employees who had not signed or had modified their agreements. The district court then granted summary judgment for KeHE, holding that all of the plaintiffs were outside sales employees. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, holding that the district court erred with respect to the outside-sales-exemption issue and erred in excluding from the collective action those who had signed the waivers. View "Killion v. KeHE Distrib., LLC" on Justia Law

Respondents, current or former employees of petitioner Wal-Mart, sought judgment against the company for injunctive and declaratory relief, punitive damages, and backpay, on behalf of themselves and a nationwide class of some 1.5 million female employees because of Wal-Mart's alleged discrimination against women in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1 et seq. At issue was whether the certification of the plaintiff class was consistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2). The Court held that certification of the plaintiff class was not consistent with Rule 23(a) where proof of commonality necessarily overlapped with respondents' merits contention that Wal-mart engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination and without some glue holding together the alleged reasons for the employment decisions, it would be impossible to say that examination of all the class members' claims would produce a common answer to the crucial discrimination question. The Court concluded that in a company Wal-Mart's size and geographical scope, it was unlikely that all managers would exercise their discretion in a common way without some common direction and respondents' attempt to show such direction by means of statistical and anecdotal evidence fell well short. The Court also held that respondents' backpay claims were improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(2) where claims for monetary relief could not be certified under the rule. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed.View "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, et al." on Justia Law