Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, seeking to represent approximately 538 employees of Medline, appealed the district court's denial of class certification. The complaint asserted claims against Medline for violating California labor laws. The court concluded that the district court applied the wrong legal standard and abused its discretion when it denied class certification on the grounds that damages calculations would be individual. The district court also abused its discretion by finding that the class would be unmanageable despite the record's demonstration to the contrary. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded with directions to enter an order granting plaintiff's motion for class certification. View "Leyva v. Medline Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs receive subsidies from Michigan’s Child Development and Care Program for providing home childcare services for low-income families. Following creation of the Home Based Child Care Council, a union was established and authorized to bargain on their behalf, based on submission of 22,180 valid provider-signed authorization cards out of a possible 40,532 eligible providers. The union and the Council entered into a collective bargaining agreement and the state began deducting union dues and fees from the subsidy payments. Plaintiffs sought to file a class-action lawsuit for the return of the money, collected allegedly in violation of their First Amendment rights. The district court denied certification of plaintiffs’ proposed class (all home childcare providers in Michigan) based on conflict of interest: some members voted for union representation and others voted against representation. Plaintiffs attempted to cure by proposing a subclass of only providers who did not participate in any election related to union representation. The district court rejected the proposal, finding that it could not assume that all members of the subclass opposed representation and that, even if all members of the proposed subclass did oppose representation, their reasons for opposition were different enough to create conflict within the class. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Schlaud v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) on behalf of herself and “other employees similarly situated,” 29 U. S. C. 216(b). She ignored an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. The district court, finding that no other individuals had joined her suit and that the Rule 68 offer fully satisfied her claim, dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Third Circuit reversed, reasoning that allowing defendants to “pick off” named plaintiffs before certification with calculated Rule 68 offers would frustrate the goals of collective actions. The Supreme Court reversed. Because plaintiff had no personal interest in representing putative, unnamed claimants, nor any other continuing interest that would preserve her suit from mootness, her suit was appropriately dismissed. The Court assumed, without deciding, that the offer mooted her individual claim. Plaintiff had not yet moved for “conditional certification” when her claim became moot, nor had the court anticipatorily ruled on any such request. The Court noted that a putative class acquires an independent legal status once it is certified under Rule 23, but, under the FLSA, “conditional certification” does not produce a class with an independent legal status, or join additional parties to the action. View "Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former employees of brokerage firms, filed four class actions challenging California's forced-patronage statute, section 450(a) of the California Labor Code. At issue was whether federal securities law preempted the enforcement of California's forced-patronage statute against brokerage houses that forbid their employees from opening outside trading accounts. The court affirmed the judgment and concluded that the district court correctly determined that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78o(g), and related self-regulatory organizations (SROs) rules preempted plaintiffs' forced-patronage suits. View "McDaniel, et al v. Wells Fargo Investments, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

Appellant, a former TWL employee, commenced a class action adversary proceeding within TWL's bankruptcy suit, alleging violations of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. 2101-2109. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order denying appellant's related motion for class certification and dismissed the adversary proceeding. Because the reasons for the bankruptcy court's order were unclear, the court vacated in toto the orders and remanded to the district court to remand to the bankruptcy court for reconsideration. The court expressed no view as to the outcome the bankruptcy court should reach on remand in reconsidering appellant's motion for reclassification and the Trustee's motion to dismiss the adversary proceeding. View "Teta v. TWL Corp., et al" on Justia Law

Former employees of AK Steel filed a class action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), including claims for a “whipsaw” calculation of their benefits from a pension plan in which they participated before terminating their employment. The employees were originally involved in a related class action that included identical claims against the same defendants, but were excluded from that litigation due to their execution of a severance agreement and release that each of them signed during the that litigation. The district court ruled in favor of the employees. The Sixth Circuit reversed an award of prejudgment interest for failure to consider case-specific factors, but otherwise affirmed denial of a motion to dismiss; class certification; and partial summary judgment on liability. The employees’s future pension claims were not released as a matter of law because the whipsaw claims had not accrued at the time of the execution of the severance agreements and because the scope of the contracts did not relate to future ERISA claims. View "Schumacher v. AK Steel Corp." on Justia Law

Goldman Sachs appealed from an order of the district court denying their motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's claims of gender discrimination. Plaintiff and others alleged that Goldman Sachs engaged in a continuing pattern and practice of discrimination based on sex against female employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law, Administrative Code of the City of New York 8-107 et seq. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the arbitration clause in her agreement must be invalidated because arbitration would preclude her from vindicating a statutory right. The court disagreed and held that the district court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration where plaintiff had no substantive statutory right to pursue a pattern-or-practice claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, on behalf of a purported class of similarly situated employees, appealed from the district court's dismissal of their claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, and the New York Labor Law (NYLL), NYLL 663(1). Plaintiffs alleged that CHS failed to compensate them adequately for time worked during meal breaks, before and after scheduled shifts, and during required training sessions. The court affirmed the dismissal of the FLSA and RICO claims for failure to state a claim. The court affirmed the dismissal of the NYLL overtime claims, which have the same deficiencies as the FLSA overtime claims. However, because the district court did not explain why plaintiffs' NYLL gap-time claims were dismissed with prejudice, the court vacated that aspect of the judgment and remanded for further consideration. View "Lundy v. Catholic Health System of Long Island Inc." on Justia Law

A class of about 1,600 Minnesota delivery drivers employed by Domino's Pizza alleged that, under Minnesota law, a fixed delivery charge that customers paid Domino's was a gratuity wrongfully withheld from them. The court held that the varied context of the pizza delivery transactions made it unreasonable for some customers to construe the delivery charge as a payment for personal services, thereby preventing one-stroke determination of a classwide question. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by certifying the class. Accordingly, the court reversed the class certification order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Luiken, et al v. Domino's Pizza, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Ronica Tabor and Dacia Gray worked as inside salespeople for Hilti, Inc and Hilti of North America, Inc. After being denied promotions to Account Managers (outside sales), they each filed individual claims for gender discrimination under Title VII and moved to certify a class of all female inside salespersons at Hilti who were denied similar promotions. The district court refused to certify the class and granted summary judgment in favor of Hilti on all claims. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to Tabor's claim for retaliation, and Gray's claim for failure to promote. The Court also affirmed the refusal to certify a class. However, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court with respect to Tabor's individual claims for failure to promote and disparate impact, and remanded Gray's individual disparate impact claim because the district court did not address that claim in its opinion. View "Tabor, et al v. Hilti, Inc., et al" on Justia Law