Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

In this putative class action, plaintiffs are a class of black steel workers who allege endemic racial discrimination at a South Carolina plant owned by Nucor. At issue was whether the workers have presented a common question of employment discrimination through evidence of racism in the workplace. In light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the district court on remand refused to certify the class. The court held that the district court has for a second time erred in refusing to certify the workers’ class, where (1) statistics indicate that promotions at Nucor depended in part on whether an individual was black or white; (2) substantial anecdotal evidence suggests discrimination in specific promotions decisions in multiple plant departments; and (3) there is also significant evidence that those promotions decisions were made in the context of a racially hostile work environment. The court concluded that the district court fundamentally misapprehended the reach of Wal-mart and its application to the workers' promotions class. Accordingly, the court vacated in part and remanded for recertification of the class. View "Brown v. Nucor Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action complaint alleging that Defendants violated Hawaii law by charging customers of certain hotels service charges without fully disclosing to customers that the charges were not entirely being distributed to non-managerial service employees. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s wage law claims and granted summary judgment for Defendants on the unfair methods of competition (UMOC) claim. Defendants appealed, and Plaintiff cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment as to the unpaid wages but vacated the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment for Defendants on the UMOC claim and remanded for further proceedings. Plaintiff then requested an award of attorneys’ fees and costs for the appeal and cross-appeal and an award of post judgment interest on the damages. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiff was entitled to attorneys’ fees for both the appeal and the cross-appeal, and Defendants were jointly and severally liable for the payment of Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs; and (2) post judgment interest was not appropriate under the circumstances of this case. View "Gurrobat v. HTH Corp." on Justia Law

Alleging illegal tip pooling Conners filed a collective action against her former employer (a restaurant) under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The employer then implemented a new arbitration policy that requires all employment-related disputes between current employees and the employer to be resolved though individual arbitration. The policy purports to bind all current employees who did not opt out; each employee received an opt-out form. Citing public policy, the district court declared the policy unenforceable insofar as it could prevent current employees from joining this collective action. On interlocutory appeal, the Eighth Circuit vacated, holding that former employees like Conners lack standing under Article III of the United States Constitution to challenge the arbitration agreement, which applied only to current employees. View "Conners v. Gusano's Chicago Style Pizzeria" on Justia Law

Eva Mies sought class action certification in order to sue her former employer, Sephora U.S.A., Inc. (Sephora), on behalf of employees who, like her, worked as "Specialists" in Sephora’s California retail stores. Mies claims Sephora misclassified Specialists as exempt from certain provisions of California labor law and, as a result, failed to pay overtime wages and failed to compensate them for missed meal periods. However, after crediting evidence that all Specialists did not engage in the same tasks to the same extent, the trial court denied class certification, concluding individualized issues, not common ones, would predominate the determination of liability. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court used proper legal criteria in assessing class certification and substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings. The Court also conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. View "Mies v. Sephora U.S.A." on Justia Law

Franco filed a purported class action as an employee of Athens Services, claiming Labor Code and wage-order violations. He also sued in a representative capacity under the Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code 2698) and alleged violation of state unfair competition law. (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200). Athens petitioned to compel arbitration based on Franco’s employment agreement, alleging that it was engaged in interstate commerce under the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. 1-16). The trial court agreed. The appeal court concluded that provisions requiring arbitration and waiving class actions were unenforceable. On remand, Athens informed the court that Franco’s actual employer was Arakelian. Franco amended the complaint to add Arakelian, which filed another petition to compel arbitration, arguing that authorities cited by the prior decision had been overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2010. The trial court denied the petition, citing the law of the case doctrine and finding that Arakelian waived its right to compel arbitration by failing to earlier identify itself as Franco’s true employer. The court of appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court vacated. The court of appeal reversed denial of the petition to compel arbitration, in light of the rule announced by the California Supreme Court in Iskanian. View "Franco v. Arakelian Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

Berera worked at Mesa, a health care organization, as a nurse practitioner, 2011-2013. After Berera’s employment ended, she allegedly discovered that the wages on her W-2 did not reflect the wages that Mesa owed her. Berera sued in state court, asserting a class of current and former employees whom Mesa “forced to pay [Mesa’s] share of payroll taxes and other taxes and withholdings,” that this “forced payment resulted in the employees receiving less money than they earned,” and that Mesa paid employees “less than the wages and overtime compensation to which the employees were entitled.” The complaint contained no additional substantive allegations, but recited an unpaid wages claim under section 337.385 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes and claims of conversion and negligence under Kentucky law. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA), 26 U.S.C. 3101–3128, which imposes a 7.65% tax on wages to fund Social Security and Medicare, requires parties seeking a refund to file a claim with the IRS before bringing a federal tax refund suit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the purported state-law claims are truly FICA claims. View "Berera v. Mesa Med. Grp., PLLC" on Justia Law

Three health care workers sued their hospital employer in this putative class and private attorney general enforcement action for alleged Labor Code violations and related claims. In this appeal, the workers argued that a hospital policy illegally let health care employees waive their second meal periods on shifts longer than 12 hours. A statute requires two meal periods for shifts longer than 12 hours. But an order of the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) authorized employees in the health care industry to waive one of those two required meal periods on shifts longer than 8. The principal issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on the validity of the IWC order. After review, the Court concluded the IWC order was partially invalid to the extent it authorized second meal break waivers on shifts longer than 12 hours. However, with one exception, the retroactive application of the Court's conclusion had to be litigated on remand. The Court also determined the court incorrectly granted summary judgment and denied class certification. View "Gerard v. Orange Coast Mem. Medical Center" on Justia Law

Before it was acquired by DirecTV, 180 Connect entered into an employment arbitration agreement with Marenco, which prohibited filing a class or collective action, or a representative or private attorney general action. After acquiring 180 Connect, DirecTV retained employees, including Marenco. Marenco later filed suit, alleging that DirecTV had issued debit cards in payment of wages to a putative class of employees. Plaintiffs who used their cards to withdraw cash at ATM machines were required to pay an activation fee and a cash withdrawal fee, resulting in DirecTV’s failure to pay plaintiffs’ full wages in violation of the Unfair Competition Law and Labor Code 212. DirecTV moved to compel arbitration of Marenco’s individual claims, and stay the class claims. Marenco argued that DirecTV lacked standing to enforce the agreement and that the agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable under California law. The U.S. Supreme Court then issued its 2011 decision, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts the California rule of unconscionability. The trial court ordered arbitration of Marenco’s individual claims, holding that DirecTV had standing; the class action waiver is not unconscionable; and prohibition of representative actions does not violate the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 157). The court of appeal affirmed. View "Marenco v. DirecTV, LLC" on Justia Law

Former ABM security guards filed a class action, alleging that ABM failed to provide rest periods required by California law in that it failed to relieve security guards of all duties during rest breaks, instead requiring its guards to remain on call during breaks. ABM admitted it requires its security guards to keep their radios and pagers on during rest breaks, to remain vigilant, and to respond when needs arise, such as when a tenant wishes to be escorted to the parking lot, a building manager must be notified of a mechanical problem, or an emergency situation occurs. The trial court certified a class and granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication, concluding an employer must relieve its employees of all duties during rest breaks, including the obligation to remain on call and that ABM was subject to approximately $90 million in statutory damages, interest, penalties, and attorney fees. The court of appeal reversed. Labor Code section 226.7 prescribes only that an employee not be required to work on a rest break, not that the employee be relieved of all duties, such as the duty to remain on call. Remaining on call does not itself constitute performing work. View "Augustus v. ABM Sec. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Solares filed an unfair competition (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200) class action on behalf of employees who are or were employed by PSAV, which provides audio-visual services to hotels within the Century Corridor Property Business Improvement District adjoining Los Angeles International Airport. They allege that PSAV collects from customers a separately designated “service charge,” “delivery charge,” facility charge,” “gratuity,” “administrative fee,” or other such charge that “customers might reasonably believe . . . were for the class member/employees’ services.” PSAV allegedly failed to pay the separately-designated charges it collects to its employees in violation of the Hotel Service Charge Reform Ordinance in the Los Angeles Municipal Code. The trial court denied a motion to dismiss the audio-visual workers’ suit. The court of appeal reversed. The ordinance applies only to those hotel workers who would have received a gratuity for their services but for the imposition of a service charge that hotel customers believed was in lieu of a gratuity. The complaint did not allege that Solares and the proposed class are within the class of hotel workers who traditionally relied on gratuities. View "Audio Visual Servs. Grp., Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law