Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
Dannenberg v. State
Plaintiffs filed this class action suit individually and on behalf of employees (and their dependent-beneficiaries) who began working for the State or its political subdivisions before July 1, 2003 and who had accrued or will accrue a right to post-retirement health benefits as a retiree a retiree’s dependent. Plaintiffs alleged that the State, the City and County of Honolulu, and the Counties of Kaua’i, Maui, and Hawai’i impaired Plaintiffs’ accrued retirement health benefits in violation of Haw. Const. art. XVI, 2. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that the State and Counties violated their statutory rights under Haw. Rev. Stat. 87 by not providing retirees and their dependents with dental and medical benefits that were substantially equal to those provided to active workers and their dependents. After a lengthy procedural history, the Supreme Court held that Plaintiffs’ accrued retirement health benefits have been diminished or impaired in violation of article XVI, section 2. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Dannenberg v. State" on Justia Law
Richardson v. Wells Fargo Bank
Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., by improperly classifying them as exempt employees and failing to pay appropriate overtime. Plaintiffs were also class members of a previously settled opt out class action in California that released FLSA claims (the Lofton settlement). The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that the FLSA does not create an exception to how California preclusion law would treat the enforcement of an opt out class action settlement, and the Lofton settlement was a final judgment for preclusion purposes. The court concluded, pursuant to Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, that plaintiffs’ FLSA claims in the instant appeal would be precluded by the Lofton settlement under California law; the FLSA does not create an implied exception to the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738; and the fact that FLSA claims can be released, and therefore precluded, by the settlement of an opt out class action in state court does not conflict with section 216(b)’s requirement that such claims only be asserted on an opt in basis. The court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to find a due process violation and rejected plaintiffs' claims that there was inadequate representation because of the improprieties committed by ILG and class counsel’s response, and the notice sent to class members was inadequate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Richardson v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law
Williams v. Jani-King of Philadelphia Inc
Jani-King, the world’s largest commercial cleaning franchisor, classifies its franchisees as independent contractors. Its cleaning contracts are between Jani-King and the customer; the franchisee is not a party, but may elect to provide or not provide services under a contract. Jani-King exercises a significant amount of control over how franchisees operate and controls billing and accounting. Two Jani-King franchisees assert that they are misclassified and should be treated as employees. On behalf of a class of Jani-King franchisees in the Philadelphia area (approximately 300 franchisees), they sought unpaid wages under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law (WPCL), 43 Pa. Stat. 260.1–260.12. The Third Circuit affirmed certification of the class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). The misclassification claim can be made on a class-wide basis through common evidence, primarily the franchise agreement and manuals. Under Pennsylvania law, no special treatment is accorded to the franchise relationship. A franchisee may be an employee or an independent contractor depending on the nature of the franchise system controls. View "Williams v. Jani-King of Philadelphia Inc" on Justia Law
AlixPartners, LLP v. Brewington
The Michigan office of Alix, an international company, administers payroll and benefits for U.S. employees and is directly involved in U.S. hiring. In 2013, Alix hired Brewington, a Texas resident, for its Dallas Corporate Services team. The employment agreement provides that it “will be construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Michigan” and states, “any dispute arising out of or in connection with any aspect of this Agreement and/or any termination of employment . . ., shall be exclusively subject to binding arbitration under the . . . American Arbitration Association . . . decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding as to both parties.” In 2014, Brewington was terminated. He filed a demand for arbitration, asserting claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, on behalf of himself and a purported nationwide class of current, former, and potential Alix employees. The Michigan district court ruled that Brewington was precluded from pursuing arbitration claims on behalf of any purported class. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that court’s refusal to dismiss, finding that Brewington had sufficient contacts with Michigan to establish personal jurisdiction, and upheld summary judgment in favor of Alix. An agreement must expressly include the possibility of classwide arbitration to indicate that the parties agreed to it. This clause is silent on the issue and is limited to claims concerning “this Agreement,” as opposed to other agreements. It refers to “both parties.” View "AlixPartners, LLP v. Brewington" on Justia Law
Young v. REMX
Plaintiff alleged that, after her employment terminated, defendants failed to pay all of her final wages. She filed a putative class action under Labor Code sections 201-203, also asserting a representative Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) claim seeking civil penalties on behalf of plaintiff and other aggrieved employees. Defendants submitted an arbitration agreement signed by plaintiff, stating any disputes would be submitted to arbitration and that “[a]ny such claims must be submitted on an individual basis only and I hereby waive the right to bring or join any type of collective or class claim in arbitration, in any court, or in any other forum.” Defendants conceded that the agreement cannot waive the representative PAGA claim. The trial court compelled arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claim, dismissed the class claims, bifurcated the representative PAGA claim, and stayed the PAGA claim pending the completion of arbitration. The court of appeal concluded the order is nonappealable; the order does not appear to constitute a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs. The putative class members/aggrieved employees under PAGA because their PAGA claims remain pending. View "Young v. REMX" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Maddox v. Village of Lincoln Heights
Steve Maddox and eight other named relators (collectively, Maddox) brought this original action in mandamus against the village of Lincoln Heights and several of the village’s officials (collectively, the village). Maddox alleged that several classes of people who work for or have worked for the village had not been provided employee benefits owed to them and requested a writ directing the village to provide the withheld benefits. The parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement consisting of money payments to class members. The Supreme Court referred the case to mediation, with instructions for the parties to attempt an out-of-court settlement without court approval, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to preside over this monetary settlement because no class had yet been certified and nothing prevented the parties from settling the case without the approval of the Court. View "State ex rel. Maddox v. Village of Lincoln Heights" on Justia Law
Morales v. 22nd Dist. Agricultural Assn.
This appeal addressed a collective action alleging nonpayment of overtime, as required by state law under Labor Code section 510 and federal law under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). Plaintiff Jose Luis Morales and 177 other similarly situated plaintiffs (collectively, appellants) sued their employer, the 22nd District Agricultural Association of the State of California (the DAA), alleging nonpayment of overtime. Appellants were seasonal employees of the DAA who assist with amusement and seasonal operations. Appellants contended that reversal of the judgment in favor of the DAA on their FLSA claim was required because the trial court: (1) improperly denied their nonsuit motion; (2) erred in instructing the jury; (3) provided an erroneous special verdict form; and (4) improperly excluded party witnesses from the courtroom. The Court of Appeal found that appellants did not meet their burden to demonstrate reversible error. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the trial court properly sustained the DAA's demurrer to appellants' section 510 claim, but erred in denying leave to amend. View "Morales v. 22nd Dist. Agricultural Assn." on Justia Law
Day v. Celadon Trucking Servs.
Plaintiffs, a class of former employees of Continental, filed suit against Celadon, alleging that Celadon violated the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, 29 U.S.C. 2102. The district court certified the class, granted partial summary judgment to the employees, and awarded damages. Viewing the Celadon–Continental transaction in light of a common-sense approach, the court agreed with the district court that the transaction was more than merely a sale of assets. Consequently, responsibility to provide notice passed from Continental to Celadon under the WARN Act where plaintiffs became employees of Celadon. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Celadon to bear the burden of establishing that certain members of the certified class should be excluded; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Celadon's motion to decertify the class; and the district court did not err in not adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation regarding class membership. In regard to the issue of damages, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by shifting the burden to Celadon after the employees made their initial showing. After thoroughly reviewing the evidentiary rulings of the district court in light of the burden-shifting framework it employed, the court held that the district court did not commit a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reduce Celadon's liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Day v. Celadon Trucking Servs." on Justia Law
Staniforth v. The Judges’ Retirement System
The "Olson I" opinion examined the extent to which the 1976 amendment to the then-existing Government Code section 68203 aimed at placing a limit on cost of living adjustments (COLA's) for the salaries payable to active jurists and (derivatively) also limiting the pensions payable to certain judicial pensioners, could constitutionally be applied to those active jurists and judicial pensioners. Since Olson I, numerous courts have addressed issues stemming from Olson I, including whether a constitutional amendment designed to supersede Olson I and deprive active jurists and certain judicial pensioners of the benefits provided by the uncapped COLA's was constitutional, and whether interest was due on the payments owed to active and retired judges under the judgment announced in Olson I. This case represented the latest progeny of Olson I. Petitioner Faye Staniforth (and others similarly situated) alleged, as its principal claim against respondent The Judges' Retirement System (JRS), that JRS had not adhered to its obligations to pensioners under their interpretation of Olson I and that, as a result, over three decades worth of pension payments had been underpaid to pensioners. The Olson I claims raised by pensioners sought to compel the JRS to adhere to pensioners' interpretation of Olson I and to recalculate the amount of judicial pensions owed to pensioners using the uncapped COLA's, and to pay arrearages and interest for the decades of underpaid pension payments. The Court of Appeal concluded, contrary to pensioners' Olson I claims, pensioners were not entitled under Olson I to perpetual uncapped COLA increases to their pensions. JRS demurred to an amended petition, arguing that all the stated claims, which sought recovery for payments to the retired jurists that allegedly should have been paid over two decades before the present action was filed, were barred by the statute of limitations under any possibly applicable statute. Petitioners appealed, but finding no error in the trial court's sustaining JRS' demurrer without leave to amend, and dismissal of the action, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Staniforth v. The Judges' Retirement System" on Justia Law
Marshall v. EyeCare Specialties, P.C.
After EyeCare Specialties, P.C. of Lincoln terminated the employment of Cindy Marshall, Marshall sued, alleging that EyeCare discriminated against her because of her skin condition, tremors, and perceived disability related to her past prescription drug abuse. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of EyeCare. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning whether EyeCare discriminated against Marshall because of her skin condition and tremors, both of which EyeCare perceived to substantially limit Marshall’s ability to work; and (2) Marshall failed to present evidence that EyeCare discriminated against her for having a perceived drug addiction that substantially limited one or more major life activities. View "Marshall v. EyeCare Specialties, P.C." on Justia Law