Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Darden operates restaurants throughout Illinois under brand names including Olive Garden and Red Lobster. The plaintiffs worked intermittently as hourly employees at Darden-owned restaurants from 2004-2012. After quitting, they brought a proposed class action alleging that Darden failed to pay them pro rata vacation pay upon separation in violation of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS 115/1-15. The district judge declined to certify their proposed class and granted Darden summary judgment on Clark’s individual claim. McMaster settled his claim with Darden, reserving the right to appeal the denial of class certification. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The proposed class definition, “All persons separated from hourly employment with [Darden] in Illinois between December 11, 2003, and the conclusion of this action[] who were subject to Darden’s Vacation Policy … and who did not receive all earned vacation pay benefits,” described an impermissible “fail safe” class, and their proposed alternative did not satisfy FRCP 23. The statute does not mandate paid time off. It merely prohibits the forfeiture of accrued earned vacation pay upon separation if the employee is otherwise eligible for paid vacation. Darden’s policy on paid vacation covered only full-time employees. Clark was ineligible because she worked part-time. View "McCaster v. Darden Restaurants, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Ross Stores, Inc. (Ross) appealed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff-respondent Martina Hernandez was employed at a Ross warehouse in Moreno Valley, and filed a single-count representative action under the California Private Attorney General Act (PAGA), alleging Ross had violated numerous Labor Code laws, and sought to recover PAGA civil penalties for the violations. Ross insisted that Hernandez had to first arbitrate her individual disputes showing she was an "aggrieved party" under PAGA and then the PAGA action could proceed in court. The trial court found, that the PAGA claim was a representative action brought on behalf of the state and did not include individual claims. As such, it denied the motion to compel arbitration because there were no individual claims or disputes between Ross and Hernandez that could be separately arbitrated. On appeal, Ross raised the issue of whether under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), an employer and employee had the preemptive right to agree to individually arbitrate discreet disputes underlying a PAGA claim while leaving the PAGA claim and PAGA remedies to be collectively litigated under "Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles LLC," (59 Cal.4th 348 (2014)). The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration. View "Hernandez v. Ross Stores" on Justia Law

In 2009, two groups of Pennsylvania hospital employees claimed they were not properly compensated for work performed during meal breaks. They sought to bring a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The actions were conditionally certified and “opt-in” notices were sent to potential plaintiffs. More than 3,000 individuals joined one collective action and more than 800 opted in to the other. The parties conducted collective action related discovery for nearly two years. Both judges subsequently decertified the collective actions, reasoning that the opt-in plaintiffs were not similarly situated to the named plaintiffs. Their job duties varied significantly; those duties were “highly relevant in terms of how, why and whether the employees were compensated properly for missed or interrupted meal breaks.” More than 300 different individuals supervised the plaintiffs and had individual authority to implement policies. The named plaintiffs successfully moved to voluntarily dismiss their claims with prejudice (FRCP 41(a)). The Third Circuit rejected an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The same law firm then filed new claims against the same defendants, with new named plaintiffs, which were dismissed based on issue preclusion. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that only plaintiffs who had accepted an offer of judgment had been dismissed with prejudice. When the other opt-in plaintiffs were dismissed without prejudice, they did not suffer an adverse judgment on the merits of any claim. View "Halle v. West Penn Allegheny Health System, Inc." on Justia Law

Tanguilig, a Bloomingdale’s employee, filed a representative action on behalf of herself and fellow employees pursuant to the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) (Lab. Code 2698), alleging several Labor Code violations by the company. The trial court denied a motion by Bloomingdale’s to compel arbitration of Tanguilig’s “individual PAGA claim” and stay or dismiss the remainder of the complaint. The court of appeal affirmed. Under California Supreme Court precedent and consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. 1), a PAGA representative claim is nonwaivable by a plaintiff-employee by means a predispute arbitration agreement with an employer. A PAGA claim (whether individual or representative) acts as a proxy for the state, with the state’s acquiescence, and seeks civil penalties largely payable to the state; such a plaintiff cannot be ordered to arbitration without the state’s consent. View "Tanguilig v. Bloomingdale's, Inc." on Justia Law

CGG Land (U.S.) Inc.’s employees (Employees) brought this collective action alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Employees were former hourly employees of CGG. CGG provided seismic-mapping services at remote locations throughout the United States. To reach the remote locations, CGG required employees to travel away from home and stay in hotels near remote job sites for four-to-eight-week intervals. Employees then returned home for about two-to-four week intervals before traveling again. Employees often worked more than forty hours per week while on location, and CGG paid them overtime based on Employees’ regular rates of pay. When CGG’s employees worked away from home, CGG provided them a $35 per diem for meals, including on days spent traveling to and from the remote locations. In determining Employees’ regular rates of pay, CGG didn’t include the daily $35 payments. Contesting this calculation method, Employees filed a collective action against CGG asserting that CGG violated the FLSA by calculating their overtime pay on undervalued regular rates of pay. After stipulating to material facts in the district court, the Parties each sought summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for CGG, agreeing with CGG that the $35 payments were exempt from the regular rates of pay under 29 U.S.C. 207(e)(2). On appeal, Employees argued that the district court erred in treating the $35 payments as exempt travel expenses under section 207(e)(2). Finding no reversible error in that determination, the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of CGG. View "Sharp v. CGG Land (U.S.), Inc." on Justia Law

Peter Metcalfe was employed briefly by the State in the early 1970s and contributed to the Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS). In 1981, Metcalfe took a refund of his PERS contributions. Under a statute in effect at the time, if Metcalfe later secured State employment and returned his refund to PERS with interest, he was entitled to reinstate at his prior PERS service tier and credit. But in 2005 the legislature repealed that statute, leaving a five-year grace period for regaining State employment and reinstating to a prior PERS status. The State then sent notice to former PERS members that “[d]efined benefit members who do not return to covered employment before July 1, 2010 will forfeit their defined benefit tier and all service associated with the refund.” In 2012 Metcalfe inquired about his PERS status. He was informed that even if he were to regain State employment, he could not reinstate to his prior PERS service tier and credit because under the new statute, his grace period for reinstatement ended in 2010. In June 2013 Metcalfe brought a putative class action lawsuit against the State, alleging that the 2005 legislation: (1) violated article XII, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution; (2) deprived a class of former employees of their vested interest in the contractual “benefit to be reinstated to state employment at the tier level they previously held”; and (3) effectively breached the class members’ employment contracts. Metcalfe sought damages, but he also asked for a seemingly mutually exclusive declaratory judgment that the State must comply with former AS 39.35.350. The class was never certified. The State moved to dismiss Metcalfe’s lawsuit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The superior court tentatively rejected the argument that Metcalfe failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, rejected the argument that Metcalfe’s claim was not ripe and that he lacked standing, but dismissed Metcalfe’s claim as time barred. Metcalfe appealed, and the State cross-appealed the superior court’s ruling that Metcalfe’s claim was ripe and argued that the superior court’s decision could be upheld on the ground that Metcalfe lacked standing to sue. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the contract damages claim on the alternative ground that no such claim existed; the Court reversed and remanded the declaratory and injunctive relief claim for further proceedings. View "Metcalfe v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this putative class action case, Stacey and Tyler Walker, appealed the trial court's order disqualifying their counsel, Hogue & Belong (the Firm), in this putative class action suit against their former employer, Apple, Inc. The trial court found automatic disqualification was required on the basis the Firm had a conflict of interest arising from its concurrent representation of the putative class in this case and the certified class in another wage-and-hour class action pending against Apple. Specifically, based on the parties' litigation strategies and evidence Apple submitted in support of its disqualification motion, the trial court concluded that to advance the interests of its clients in this case, the Firm would need to cross-examine a client in the Felczer class (the Walkers' store manager) in a manner adverse to that client. After review of plaintiffs' arguments on appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in finding the Firm represented the store manager and that a disqualifying conflict existed between her interests and the Walkers' interests. View "Walker v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

The underlying claim in this case, which had been appealed on three previous occasions, concerned an exclusion in the State’s health benefit insurance plan, which allowed the State to coordinate benefits in violation of Montana’s made whole laws. Jeanette Diaz, Leah Hoffman-Bernhardt, and others similarly situated (collectively, Diaz) filed suit alleging that third-party administrators and the State (collectively, Defendants) had violated employees’ made whole rights under Montana law. During the various appeals, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court certified and defined a class and that the district court correctly denied the State’s motion for summary judgment. In this, the fourth appeal, Diaz appealed a district court order determining the manner in which prejudgment interest on payments due to class members was to be calculated. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order declaring interest to begin thirty days following the Court’s decision in Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Montana v. Montana State Auditor. Remanded for the district court to correct the date to be applied for determining the calculation of prejudgment interest. View "Diaz v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed this class action suit individually and on behalf of employees (and their dependent-beneficiaries) who began working for the State or its political subdivisions before July 1, 2003 and who had accrued or will accrue a right to post-retirement health benefits as a retiree a retiree’s dependent. Plaintiffs alleged that the State, the City and County of Honolulu, and the Counties of Kaua’i, Maui, and Hawai’i impaired Plaintiffs’ accrued retirement health benefits in violation of Haw. Const. art. XVI, 2. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that the State and Counties violated their statutory rights under Haw. Rev. Stat. 87 by not providing retirees and their dependents with dental and medical benefits that were substantially equal to those provided to active workers and their dependents. After a lengthy procedural history, the Supreme Court held that Plaintiffs’ accrued retirement health benefits have been diminished or impaired in violation of article XVI, section 2. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Dannenberg v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., by improperly classifying them as exempt employees and failing to pay appropriate overtime. Plaintiffs were also class members of a previously settled opt out class action in California that released FLSA claims (the Lofton settlement). The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that the FLSA does not create an exception to how California preclusion law would treat the enforcement of an opt out class action settlement, and the Lofton settlement was a final judgment for preclusion purposes. The court concluded, pursuant to Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, that plaintiffs’ FLSA claims in the instant appeal would be precluded by the Lofton settlement under California law; the FLSA does not create an implied exception to the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738; and the fact that FLSA claims can be released, and therefore precluded, by the settlement of an opt out class action in state court does not conflict with section 216(b)’s requirement that such claims only be asserted on an opt in basis. The court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to find a due process violation and rejected plaintiffs' claims that there was inadequate representation because of the improprieties committed by ILG and class counsel’s response, and the notice sent to class members was inadequate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Richardson v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law