Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
by
This case is a class action involving commercial truck drivers who claimed they were not paid properly by Werner Enterprises, Inc., and Drivers Management, LLC. The drivers alleged that they were not adequately compensated for off-duty time spent on short rest breaks and time spent resting in their trucks’ sleeper-berths. The case has been appealed multiple times, with the court previously vacating a jury verdict in favor of the drivers because the district court improperly allowed the drivers to submit an expert report after the deadline. On remand, the district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The drivers appealed again, and the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case back to the district court to conduct an analysis regarding whether the expert report should be excluded as a discovery sanction and whether the district court should appoint an independent expert.On remand, the district court concluded that exclusion of the drivers’ expert report was the appropriate sanction for its late disclosure and that appointment of an independent expert was not appropriate. It then entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The drivers appealed this decision, asserting that the district court erred in its analysis. The defendants cross-appealed, asserting that the drivers’ notice of appeal was untimely, requiring dismissal of the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the defendants’ contention on cross-appeal and affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert report and denying the drivers’ motion for a new trial. The court also found that the district court did not err in declining to appoint an expert and in entering judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Petrone v. Werner Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

by
The plaintiff, Mary Rodgers-Rouzier, worked as a bartender on steamboats operated by American Queen. She alleged that she and her coworkers were wrongly denied overtime wages. Rodgers-Rouzier filed a suit as a collective action, and over one hundred of her coworkers joined her proposed collective action. Meanwhile, American Queen moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Rodgers-Rouzier had agreed to arbitration. The district court denied the motion, but American Queen moved again to dismiss based on the arbitration agreement, this time invoking Indiana state law. The district court granted this motion, over Rodgers-Rouzier’s objections.The district court had previously denied American Queen's motion to dismiss the case for improper venue because Rodgers-Rouzier had agreed to arbitration. However, American Queen then moved again to dismiss based on the arbitration agreement, this time invoking Indiana state law. The district court granted this motion, over Rodgers-Rouzier’s objections that American Queen had waived its argument and the court lacked authority to apply Indiana law in this context. The court further determined that all the workers who had filed consent forms were not parties to the action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court concluded that although American Queen’s arguments were not waived and the court had authority to enforce the arbitration agreement under Indiana law, Indiana law would hold American Queen to its bargain that its arbitration agreement was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Therefore, Rodgers-Rouzier’s case may continue in federal court. The court did not decide whether it may do so as a collective action and left that question for further litigation. View "Rodgers-Rouzier v. American Queen Steamboat Operating Company, LLC" on Justia Law

by
Joseph Work, a former employee of Intertek, filed a collective action against the company for unpaid overtime, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and relief for the collective class. Intertek objected to the judicial forum and requested arbitration. The dispute centered on whether the agreed-upon Arbitration Agreement provided for individual or class arbitration. Work sought class arbitration, while Intertek sought individual arbitration. Intertek filed a Motion to Compel Individual Arbitration, arguing that the Arbitration Agreement did not contain an express delegation clause and was silent on class arbitration.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas ruled that the issue of class arbitrability was delegated to the arbitrator. The court held that the Arbitration Agreement incorporated certain JAMS Rules by reference, which delegate questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator, including the question of class arbitrability. The district court granted Work’s motion to dismiss and denied Intertek’s motion to compel individual arbitration.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Intertek argued that consent to class arbitration was absent and that the language in the Arbitration Agreement was not clear. The court rejected both arguments, affirming the district court's decision. The court held that the Arbitration Agreement was not ambiguous and that it clearly incorporated the JAMS Rules by reference. The court concluded that the language in the Arbitration Agreement was "clear and unmistakable" in its incorporation of the JAMS Rules, which provide that the arbitrator decides the question of arbitrability. View "Work v. Intertek" on Justia Law

by
The case involves plaintiffs Christopher Maia and Sean Howarth, who were employed as laborers for defendant IEW Construction Group. The company required them to perform “pre-shift” and “post-shift” work, for which they were not paid. Both Maia and Howarth were laid off in November 2021. In April 2022, they filed a class action complaint alleging that IEW violated the Wage Payment Law (WPL) and the Wage and Hour Law (WHL).The trial judge held that Chapter 212, which amended the WPL and WHL, does not apply retroactively and thus dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for conduct that arose prior to Chapter 212’s effective date of August 6, 2019. The Appellate Division reversed this decision.The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted leave to appeal. The court held that Chapter 212 is to be applied prospectively to conduct that occurred on or after August 6, 2019, not retroactively to conduct that occurred before that date. The trial judge properly dismissed the portions of the complaint relying on Chapter 212 but arising from conduct prior to its effective date. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment, reinstated the trial judge’s order partially dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Maia v. IEW Construction Group" on Justia Law

by
The plaintiff, Ryan S., filed a class action lawsuit against UnitedHealth Group, Inc. and its subsidiaries (collectively, “UnitedHealthcare”) under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). He alleged that UnitedHealthcare applies a more stringent review process to benefits claims for outpatient, out-of-network mental health and substance use disorder (“MH/SUD”) treatment than to otherwise comparable medical/surgical treatment. Ryan S. asserted that by doing so, UnitedHealthcare violated the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (“Parity Act”), breached its fiduciary duty, and violated the terms of his plan.The district court granted UnitedHealthcare’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) based primarily on its conclusions that Ryan S. failed to allege that his claims had been “categorically” denied and insufficiently identified analogous medical/surgical claims that he had personally submitted and UnitedHealthcare had processed more favorably.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part the district court’s judgment. The panel concluded that Ryan S. adequately stated a claim for a violation of the Parity Act. The panel explained that an ERISA plan can violate the Parity Act in different ways, including by applying, as Ryan S. alleged here, a more stringent internal process to MH/SUD claims than to medical/surgical claims. The panel also concluded that Ryan S. alleged a breach of fiduciary duty. However, as Ryan S. failed to identify any specific plan terms that the alleged practices would violate, the panel affirmed the dismissal of his claims based on a violation of the terms of his plan. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ryan S. v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc." on Justia Law

by
The case involves an appeal by SaniSure, Inc., against a trial court's decision not to compel arbitration in a dispute with its former employee, Jasmin Vazquez. Vazquez initially worked for SaniSure from July 2019, and as part of her employment, she signed an agreement to resort to arbitration for any disputes that might arise from her employment. She eventually terminated this employment in May 2021. She returned to work for SaniSure four months later without signing any new arbitration agreement or discussing the application of the previous arbitration agreement to her new employment.Vazquez's second employment with SaniSure ended in July 2022. Later, she filed a class-action complaint alleging that SaniSure had failed to provide accurate wage statements during her second tenure. She also signaled her intent to add a derivative action under the Labor Code Private Attorney Generals Act (PAGA). SaniSure responded by submitting a “cure letter” claiming that its wage statements now comply with the Labor Code and requested that Vazquez submit her claims to binding arbitration, which Vazquez disputed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Six affirmed the trial court's denial of SaniSure’s motion to compel arbitration. The court found that SaniSure failed to show that Vazquez agreed to arbitrate claims arising from her second stint of employment. The court further concluded that there was no evidence of an implied agreement to arbitrate claims arising from the second employment period, as the agreement covering Vazquez’s first employment period terminated in May 2021. View "Vazquez v. SaniSure" on Justia Law

by
This case involves a wage dispute between an employee and his employer. The employee, George Huerta, filed a class action against his employer, CSI Electrical Contractors, seeking payment for unpaid hours worked. The case revolved around the interpretation of the Industrial Welfare Commission's Wage Order No. 16 and the term "hours worked."The Supreme Court of California was asked by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to answer three questions related to Wage Order No. 16. The first question was whether time spent waiting to exit a security gate on the employer's premises was compensable as "hours worked". The court concluded that it was, as the employer's mandated exit procedure, including vehicle inspection, signified a level of control over the employee.The second question was whether time spent driving between the security gate and employee parking lots while subject to employer-imposed rules was compensable. The court held that it could be compensable as "employer-mandated travel" if the security gate was the first location where the employee's presence was required for an employment-related reason other than accessing the worksite. However, this travel time was not considered "hours worked" as the employer's rules did not imply a requisite level of control.Lastly, the court was asked whether time spent on the employer's premises during an unpaid meal period, when workers were prohibited from leaving but not required to engage in employer-mandated activities, was compensable as "hours worked". The court held that it was, as the employer's prohibition on leaving the premises prevented the employee from engaging in personal activities. The employee could bring an action to enforce the wage order and recover unpaid wages for that time. View "Huerta v. CSI Electrical Contractors" on Justia Law

by
The plaintiff, Adan Ortiz, worked for two companies, GXO Logistics Supply Chain, Inc., and Randstad Inhouse Services, LLC, both of which were his former employers. Ortiz's role involved handling goods in a California warehouse facility operated by GXO. The goods, primarily Adidas products, were received from mostly international locations and stored at the warehouse for several days to a few weeks before being shipped to customers and retailers in various states.Ortiz filed a class action lawsuit against his former employers alleging various violations of California labor law. The defendants moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in Ortiz's employment contract. Ortiz opposed this on the grounds that the agreement could not be enforced under federal or state law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part the district court's order denying the appellants' motion to compel arbitration. It concluded that Ortiz belonged to a class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce and was therefore exempted from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The court reasoned that although Ortiz's duties were performed entirely within one state's borders, his role facilitated the continued travel of goods through an interstate supply chain, making him a necessary part of the flow of goods in interstate commerce. The court also rejected the argument that an employee must necessarily be employed by a transportation industry company to qualify for the transportation worker exemption. View "ORTIZ V. RANDSTAD INHOUSE SERVICES, LLC" on Justia Law

by
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed a case involving the Cenikor Foundation, a nonprofit drug rehabilitation center. The foundation had been sued by a group of its rehabilitation patients for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The patients contended that they were effectively employees of the foundation, as they were required to work as part of their treatment program without receiving monetary compensation. The foundation contested the lawsuit and appealed a district court's decision to certify the case as a collective action under the FLSA.The Court of Appeals found that the district court had applied the incorrect legal standard in determining whether the patients were employees under the FLSA. Specifically, the court should have applied a test to determine who was the primary beneficiary of the work relationship, rather than a test typically used to distinguish employees from independent contractors.The appellate court remanded the case back to the district court to apply this primary beneficiary test and to consider the foundation's defense that any benefits provided to the patients offset any requirement to pay them a wage. The court emphasized that the question of whether the foundation's patients were employees under the FLSA was a threshold issue that needed to be resolved before the case could proceed as a collective action. View "Klick v. Cenikor Foundation" on Justia Law

by
In this class action case, Nicole DeMarinis and Kelly Patire, current and former employees of Heritage Bank of Commerce, brought a case under the California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) against Heritage Bank for wage and hour and other Labor Code violations. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three affirmed the trial court’s decision, rejecting Heritage Bank’s argument to compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ individual PAGA claims based on a waiver in their arbitration agreement.In the agreement, the plaintiffs had waived their right to bring any claims against each other in any class or representative proceeding. The bank argued that the denial of arbitration was erroneous because the waiver provision was enforceable, pertaining only to plaintiffs’ nonindividual PAGA claims. The court, however, found that the provision violated public policy as it required plaintiffs to completely abandon their right to bring both individual and nonindividual PAGA claims in any forum.The court also found that the waiver provision's nonseverability clause and a "poison pill" provision, which stated that if the waiver provision is found unenforceable, then the entire arbitration agreement is null and void, precluded severance of the unenforceable nonindividual PAGA claims waiver. Consequently, the court concluded that the unenforceability of the waiver provision rendered the entire arbitration agreement null and void, thereby affirming the trial court's decision denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "DeMarinis v. Heritage Bank of Commerce" on Justia Law