Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Kileigh Carrington filed a complaint against her former employer, Starbucks Corporation, asserting a representative cause of action under the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA). In her suit, she claimed Starbucks failed to properly provide meal breaks or pay meal period premiums for certain employees in violation of Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512. In a bifurcated bench trial on plaintiff's action, the trial court determined Starbucks was liable for these violations and imposed penalties of $150,000, with 75 percent thereof payable to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) and 25 percent payable to Carrington and the employees she represented in the action. The trial court entered judgment in Carrington's favor. Starbucks appealed, arguing Carrington failed to prove she was an aggrieved employee and failed to prove a representative claim. After review, the Court of Appeal found no legal error and find that substantial evidence supported the judgment. View "Carrington v. Starbucks Corp." on Justia Law

The Illinois Department of Human Services pays personal home health care assistants to care for elderly and disabled persons. The assistants are public employees under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, which authorizes collective bargaining. The Union is their exclusive representative, required to represent all public employees, including non-members. Under the collective bargaining agreement, the Union collected limited "fair share" fees from workers who chose not to join, which were automatically deducted from the assistants' pay. Workers who objected to this arrangement sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of their claim; the Supreme Court reversed. On remand, the Objectors sought certification of a class, arguing that their proposed class of around 80,000 members was entitled to a refund of approximately $32 million. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a holding that class certification was inappropriate, stating that: the class definition was overly broad in light of evidence that a substantial number of class members did not object to the fee and could not have suffered an injury; named plaintiffs were not adequate representatives; individual questions regarding damages predominated over common ones; the class faced manageability issues; and a class action was not a superior method of resolving the issue. Following a second remand, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the Supreme Court’s 2018 “Janus” decision does not require a different result on whether the class-action device is proper for use in seeking refunds of fair-share fees. View "Riffey v. Rauner" on Justia Law

Deborah Barnhart, Brooke Balch, and Vickie Henderson, current and former officers of the Alabama Space Science Exhibit Commission ("the Commission") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for mandamus relief. The Commission sought to have the circuit court dismiss the claims asserted against them in the underlying class action or, in the alternative, to vacate the order certifying those claims for class-action treatment. The Commission is required by law to maintain records of its revenue and expenditures and to periodically make those records available for audit by the Department of Examiners of Public Accounts ("DEPA"). After an audit, DEPA determined the Commission had not complied with Alabama law (1) in its payment of annual longevity bonuses to Commission employees and (2) in the manner it compensated Commission employees for working on certain State holidays. The Commission disagreed with the results of the audit; none of the recommended changes were made, and as a result, several former Commission employees sued the Commission and the Commission officers, alleging that the plaintiffs, as well as other past and present Commission employees, had not received all the compensation to which they were entitled during their tenures as Commission employees. The Supreme Court determined the Commission did not establish the named plaintiffs’ retrospective relief and declaratory relief claims were barred by the doctrine of State immunity, and the trial court did not err by dismissing those claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. However, the individual-capacities claims were barred inasmuch as those claims were essentially claims against the State regardless of the manner in which they have been asserted, and the trial court accordingly erred by not dismissing those claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Further, the named plaintiffs met their burden for class certification, and the trial court did not exceed its discretion by certifying their retrospective-relief and declaratory-relief claims for class-action treatment. Accordingly, the trial court's order certifying this action for class treatment was reversed insofar as it certified the individual-capacities claims; in all other respects it was affirmed. View "Barnhart v. Ingalls" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were class representatives of current and former employees of defendant Pacific Bell Telephone Company who installed and repaired video and internet services in customers’ homes. They appealed a judgment in favor of defendant following cross-motions for summary judgment or summary judgment. Plaintiffs sought compensation for the time they spent traveling in an employer-provided vehicle--loaded with equipment and tools--between their homes and a customer’s residence (the worksite) under an optional and voluntary Home Dispatch Program. The trial court, like federal courts that have considered the question under California law, concluded the travel time was not compensable. The Court of Appeal agree and affirmed, finding: (1) the Home Dispatch Program was not compulsory; and (2) simply transporting tools and equipment during commute time was not compensable work where no effort or extra time is required to effectuate the transport. View "Hernandez v. Pacific Bell Telephone Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Rhonda Nesbitt was a former massage therapy student who attended a for-profit vocational school operated by Defendants-Appellees (“Steiner”).On behalf of a class of former students, Nesbitt brought suit claiming the students qualified as employees of Steiner under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and alleging Steiner violated the FLSA by failing to pay minimum wage. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Steiner, holding that the students were not employees of the schools under the FLSA. Finding no reversible error in the district court’s judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Nesbitt v. FCNH" on Justia Law

Au pairs and former au pairs filed a class action lawsuit against AuPairCare, Inc. (“APC”) and other au pair sponsoring companies alleging violations of antitrust laws, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), federal and state minimum wage laws, and other state laws. Eventually, the au pairs amended their complaint and added two former au pairs, Juliane Harning and Laura Mejia Jimenez, who were sponsored by APC. In response, APC filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the district court denied. The district court found the arbitration provision between the parties both procedurally and substantively unconscionable and declined to enforce it. Because the arbitration provision contained only one substantively unconscionable clause, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court abused its discretion by refusing to sever the offending clause and otherwise enforce the agreement to arbitrate. The Court therefore reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded for further proceedings. View "Beltran v. Interexchange, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jeff Gist worked as a driver for defendant Driver Resources, LLC. The other two defendants were related companies. In November 2013, plaintiff filed a class-action complaint against defendants, on behalf of himself and other similarly situated drivers. At issue was defendants’ compliance with Oregon’s wage and hour laws. In January 2014, defendants filed a petition to compel arbitration, on the basis of an agreement that plaintiff had signed with one defendant. Plaintiff responded to the petition by arguing that the agreement was unconscionable, and therefore that arbitration should not be compelled. The trial court granted defendants’ petition, requiring plaintiff to proceed to arbitration. Plaintiff made several attempts to obtain appellate review of the trial court’s order compelling arbitration. This case required the Oregon Supreme Court to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed plaintiff’s appeal of a judgment dismissing his complaint with prejudice on the grounds that the appeal was barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Steenson v. Robinson, 385 P2d 738 (1963). That decision set out the common-law rule that a party may not appeal from a voluntarily-requested judgment. The Court concluded the judgment was appealable and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. View "Gist v. Zoan Management, Inc." on Justia Law

The appeal presented to the Court of Appeal here was one in a certified wage and hour class action following a judgment after a bench trial in favor of defendants Certified Tire and Services Centers, Inc. (Certified Tire) and Barrett Business Services. Inc. (collectively, defendants). Plaintiffs contended Certified Tire violated the applicable minimum wage and rest period requirements by implementing a compensation program, which guaranteed its automotive technicians a specific hourly wage above the minimum wage for all hours worked during each pay period but also gave them the possibility of earning a higher hourly wage for all hours worked during each pay period based on certain productivity measures. The Court of Appeal concluded plaintiffs' arguments lacked merit, and accordingly affirmed the judgment. View "Certified Tire and Service Centers Wage and Hour Cases" on Justia Law

Matthew Ray, a former DISH Network L.L.C. employee who signed an arbitration agreement when he was employed, filed an action in the federal district court alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), Colorado’s Wage Claim Act, Colorado’s Minimum Wage Act, and a common law claim for breach of contract. Dish moved to dismiss, demanding that Ray arbitrate his claims pursuant to the Agreement. Ray dismissed the lawsuit and filed with the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), asserting the same four claims. In addition, and the focus of this case, Ray attempted to pursue his claims as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and a collective action under 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The arbitrator determined that the Arbitration Agreement between the two parties permitted classwide arbitration, and then stayed the arbitration to permit DISH to contest the issue in court. DISH filed a Petition to Vacate Clause Construction Arbitration Award, which the district court denied. After review, the Tenth Circuit determined the arbitrator in this case did not manifestly disregard Colorado law when he concluded that he was authorized to conduct class arbitration by the broad language of the Agreement in combination with the requirement that arbitration be conducted pursuant to the AAA’s Employment Dispute Rules. Accordingly, the district court correctly denied DISH’s petition to vacate the arbitration award. View "Dish Network v. Ray" on Justia Law

Class action is available to plaintiffs seeking recovery under the State’s prevailing-wage law, Ky. Rev. Stat. 337.505-550, and the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the underlying action for backpay and statutory damages under the prevailing-wage law as a class action.A group of plaintiffs, claiming for themselves and for other similarly situated, brought the underlying action to recover backpay and statutory damages as authorized by section 337.505-550, asserting that they were not paid prevailing wages, benefits, or overtime in connection with their employment as truck drivers. The trial court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to certify this action as a class action under Ky. R. Civ. P. 23. The court of appeals vacated the class-action certification order, concluding that Plaintiffs had failed to establish commonality, one of the prerequisites to support a class action. In a separate concurring opinion, the judge argued that section 337.550(2) does not permit class action suits at all. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) class-action lawsuits are allowed under section 337.550(2); and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when certifying the class in this case. View "Hensley v. Haynes Trucking, LLC" on Justia Law