Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

The underlying class action here was brought against Southern Financial Life Insurance Company, which sold credit life and disability insurance through lending institutions, by purchasers of Southern Financial's credit life and disability policies. During the discovery phase, the trial court entered an order compelling Southern Financial to produce certain loan information and documents regarding the putative class members and the insurance sold to them. Southern Financial did not comply with the order, arguing that the loan information was not in its "possession, custody or control" within the meaning of Ky. R. Civ. P. 34.01, but rather, the information was in the possession of the individual lenders. After applying principles of general agency law, the trial court overruled the objection. Southern Financial subsequently sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court's enforcement of the discovery order. The court of appeals declined to issue a writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Southern Financial was legally in control of the information it was compelled to disclose in the trial court's order, and therefore, the trial court committed no error.View "S. Fin. Life Ins. Co. v. Pike Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Michael Cullen sued State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company requesting class certification and a declaratory judgment that State Farm failed to disclose all benefits available to policyholders who made claims for damaged windshields. The trial court certified the class, concluding that Cullen and the class satisfied the requirements of Ohio R. Civ. P. 23. The court of appeals affirmed the order certifying the class but reversed the portion of the decision defining the class and remanded with instructions to the trial court to redefine it. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the declaratory relief at issue here was incidental to an individualized claim for monetary damages, Cullen failed to meet the requirement for certification set forth in Rule 23(B)(2); and (2) Cullen failed to prove that this action satisfied Rule 23(B)(3) because individual questions predominated over the questions common to the proposed class. Remanded.View "Cullen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit against Black Hills Federal Credit Union and CUNA Mutual Insurance Society for changing their credit disability insurance policy. The complaint alleged that Defendants wrongfully switched the credit disability insurance policies of 4,461 borrowers. Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, but the trial court denied the motion, finding that Plaintiffs did not meet the adequacy requirement or the predominance and superiority requirements of the class certification statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in its application of the class certification statutes to the facts in this case. Remanded for certification of the class.View "Thurman v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y" on Justia Law

A class of Plaintiffs brought suit against Insured, a hotel proprietor, alleging that Insured violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The class and Insured subsequently reached a settlement. The class then filed a garnishment action against Insurer. Insurer sought a declaratory judgment that its policy with Insured did not provide coverage because the policy did not cover damages awarded related to the TCPA. The trial found (1) Insurer owed Insured a duty to defend in the class actions because the class's claims were covered under the policy; and (2) Insurer had a duty to indemnify Insured for the full settlement plus interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court correctly determined that Insurer wrongly refused to defend Insured under its policy coverage; (2) Insurer was not entitled to a reassessment of the reasonableness of the settlement; and (3) policy limits did not bar Insurer's indemnification of the settlement.View "Columbia Cas. Co. v. HIAR Holding, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who carried health insurance through New West Health Services (New West), was injured in an automobile accident resulting in medical expenses totaling approximately $120,000. The tortfeasor's insurer paid approximately $100,000 of Plaintiff's medical bills. Plaintiff later filed a complaint against New West alleging individual and class claims, asserting that New West failed to pay approximately $100,000 of her medical expenses because the third party liability carrier had paid the majority of the bills. The district court certified the class complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by adopting the class definition proposed by Plaintiff and denying New West's motion to modify the class definition.View "Rolan v. New West Health Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were insured through the State group insurance plan administered by Defendants. Both Plaintiffs were injured in automobile accidents caused by tortfeasors whose insurers accepted liability. The third-party insurers paid Plaintiffs' medical providers, but in both cases, the State and Defendants allegedly exercised their rights of subrogation without confirming that Plaintiffs under the State plan had been made whole. Plaintiffs filed a class complaint seeking a declaratory ruling that Defendants' practices violated the State's made-whole laws. On remand, the district court defined the class to include only those insureds who had timely filed claims for covered benefits, thus excluding from the class all non-filing insureds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the incorporation of the filing limitation did not constitute an abuse of discretion. View "Diaz v. State" on Justia Law

Several insureds filed a class action against the predecessor of Washington National Insurance Corporation concerning insurance policies that provide for reimbursement of certain home health care expenses. The district court granted summary judgment for the insureds, concluding that various provisions in the policy, including a certificate schedule, demonstrated an ambiguity concerning whether an automatic increase applied only to the daily benefit or also applied to the lifetime maximum benefit amount and the per occurrence maximum benefit amount. Because there was ambiguity in the policy, the court of appeal certified questions of law to the Florida Supreme Court, which held (1) because the policy was ambiguous, it must be construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage without consideration of extrinsic evidence; and (2) when so construed, the policy's automatic benefit increase applies to the daily benefit, the lifetime maximum benefit, and the per occurrence maximum benefit.View "Washington Nat'l Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman" on Justia Law

State Farm filed a complaint for negligence against Appellant, alleging that Appellant was at fault in an automobile accident with State Farm's insured. Appellant counterclaimed, alleging that State Farm was unjustly enriched as a result of having engaged in the deceptive and unlawful business practice of causing collection-style letters to be mailed in an attempt to collect unadjudicated, potential subrogation claims as debts. Appellant's counterclaim identified two putative classes. State Farm filed a motion to strike the class allegations. Rather than granting the motion to strike class allegations, the circuit court denied class certification "for the reasons stated in State Farm's motion." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court acted without due consideration of the Court's foregoing case law on typicality, commonality, and predominance and therefore abused its discretion in prematurely denying class certification at the early pleading stage of this case. Remanded.View "Kersten v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and received medical treatment at Benefis Health System, Inc. Plaintiff had healthcare coverage as a TRICARE beneficiary and also had medical payments coverage through his insurance carrier, Kemper. Plaintiff's medical treatment costs totaled $2,073. Benefis accepted $662 from TRICARE as payment in full satisfaction of the bill pursuant to a preferred provider agreement (PPA) between Blue Cross Blue Shield and Benefis. Benefis subsequently received $1,866 from Kemper, upon which Benefis reimbursed TRICARE's payment in full. Plaintiff filed an individual and class action complaint, claiming that he was entitled to the additional $1,204 that Benefis received from Kemper over and above the TRICARE reimbursement rate. Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asking the district court to find Benefis breached its contract with TRICARE and that Benefis was liable for Plaintiff's damages. The district court converted the motion into a motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding (1) Plaintiff was not entitled to pocket the difference between the TRICARE reimbursement rate and the amount Benefis accepted from Kemper; and (2) Plaintiff failed to establish any damages that resulted from the alleged breach. View "Conway v. Benefis Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in these consolidated cases to resolve an issue of first impression: whether a member of a putative class was entitled to the suspension of prescription provided for in La. C.C.P. art. 596 when an independent, individual lawsuit is filed prior to a ruling on the class certification issue. The respective district courts in each of these cases sustained exceptions of prescription, dismissing plaintiffs' individual lawsuits filed prior to a resolution of the class certification issue in class action proceedings in which the plaintiffs were putative members. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissals, finding that the filing of an individual lawsuit by a member of a putative class prior to a ruling on the class certification issue operates as an "opt out" of the class action and a forfeiture of the suspension provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 596. After reviewing the relevant statutory provisions, the Supreme Court found that because plaintiffs were members of a class asserted in a class action petition, they were entitled to the benefits of the suspension of prescription provided under La. C.C.P. art. 596, notwithstanding that they also filed individual actions prior to a resolution of the class certification issue. As a result, the Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts sustaining exceptions of prescription to the petitions of the plaintiffs and remanded these matters to the respective district courts for further proceedings.View "Duckworth v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law