Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, a putative nationwide class of third-party payors and a putative nationwide class of individual patient-consumers who paid for prescriptions, sued pharmaceutical manufacturers alleging that they paid for oncology and hepatitis drugs that were ineffective or unsafe for the off-label uses for which they were prescribed and that defendants pursued illegal marketing campaigns to persuade physicians to prescribe the drugs for those uses. While physicians are not prohibited from prescribing drugs for off-label uses, manufacturers are generally prohibited by the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 301, from manufacturing, marketing, or selling for off-label use. Defendant had pled guilty to a criminal charge brought by the FDA and agreed to pay fine of $180 million and to pay $255 million to resolve civil claims that it defrauded Medicare, Medicaid, and the VA. The district court dismissed, for lack of standing, claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961, the New Jersey RICO statute, N.J.S. 2C:41-1, and other state statutory and common law causes of action. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that plaintiffs failed to establish a causal connection between the alleged misconduct and the alleged harm. View "In Re: Schering Plough Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are a dissident group, within a larger class of medical patient consumers in a case alleging fraud in overcharging for the medication Lupron. The patients, along with insurers and private health care providers, obtained a $150 million settlement agreement that was approved by the district court, of which $40 million was allocated to consumers. That agreement provided that if there were unclaimed monies from the $40 million consumer settlement pool after full recovery to consumer plaintiffs, all unclaimed funds would go into a cy pres fund to be distributed at the discretion of the trial judge. Dissident plaintiffs appealed distribution of the $11.4 million cy pres fund to the Dana Farber/Harvard Cancer Center and the Prostate Cancer Foundation for work on the treatment of the diseases for which Lupron is prescribed. They have already recovered more than 100% of their actual damages. The First Circuit affirmed. After expressing concern about distribution of such funds by judges and adding an audit requirement, the court noted the importance of avoiding windfalls for plaintiffs who have already been fully compensated. View "Rohn v. Dana Farber/Harvard Cancer Ctr." on Justia Law

Named plaintiffs sought to represent potential classes of hospital employees, some covered by collective bargaining agreements and others not, claiming that they were deprived of compensation for work performed during meal breaks, before and after shifts, and during training sessions. One case asserted only state law tort and regulatory claims; the other raised claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 206-207, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.1059(a)(1), 1104(a)(1). The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed in part. The state law claims were properly removed to federal court and were preempted because many were dependent on the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The federal law claims, dismissed for failure to identify specific employers, were remanded to permit amendment. View "Cavallaro v. UMass Mem'l Health Care,Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiffs filed a class action complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the District was violating the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq. Since 1993, a consent decree has governed how the District provides "early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services" under the Act. The District has now asked the district court to vacate that decree on two grounds: that an intervening Supreme Court decision has made clear that plaintiffs lack a private right of action to enforce the Medicaid Act, and that in any event, the District has come into compliance with the requirements of the Act. Because the court concluded that the district court's rejection of one of the District's two arguments did not constitute an order "refusing to dissolve [an] injunction[]" within the meaning 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1), the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Salazar, et al. v. DC, et al." on Justia Law

Main & Associates, Inc., d/b/a Southern Springs Healthcare Facility, filed an action in the Bullock Circuit Court, on behalf of itself and a putative class of Alabama nursing homes, against Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama (BCBS), asserting claims of breach of contract, intentional interference with business relations, negligence and/or wantonness, and unjust enrichment and seeking injunctive relief. BCBS removed the case to the the federal court, arguing among other things, that Southern Springs' claims arose under the Medicare Act and that the Medicare Act, as amended by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (the MMA) completely preempted Southern Springs' state-law claims. Southern Springs moved the federal court to remand the case to the circuit court, arguing that the federal court did not have jurisdiction over its claims. The federal court granted the motion and remanded the case to the Bullock Circuit Court. After remand, BCBS moved the circuit court for a judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Southern Springs had not exhausted its administrative remedies and that the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. The circuit court denied BCBS's motion, and BCBS petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss Southern Springs' claims. Upon review, the Court concluded that Southern Springs' claims were inextricably intertwined with claims for coverage and benefits under the Medicare Act and that they were subject to the Act's mandatory administrative procedures and limited judicial review. Southern Springs did not exhaust its administrative remedies, and the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over its claims. Therefore, the Court granted BCBS's petition and issue a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to dismiss the claims against BCBS. View "Main & Associates, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama" on Justia Law

In 2003, the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services and a certified class of Medicaid-eligible children reached a settlement agreement and proposed a consent decree that outlined the Department's obligations to provide dental services to Medicaid-enrolled children in accordance with federal law. The district court approved the Decree in 2004. Between 2007 and 2010, the district court denied four motions alleging that the Department was not in compliance. The First Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court's requirement that the Class to file a motion for contempt to enforce the Decree; denial of a 2010 motion for contempt; denial of a request for an evidentiary hearing in 2010; and holding the Class to a clear and convincing burden of proof on its 2010 motion to modify or extend the Decree. View "Hawkins v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. for the State of NH" on Justia Law

The Federal Trade Commission found that a merger between a health system and a hospital violated the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. Plaintiffs sought treble damages and certification of a class of patients and third-party payors who allegedly paid higher prices for care. Under FRCP 23(b)(3), a class may be certified only if questions of law and fact common to members predominate over questions affecting only individuals in the class. Plaintiffs proposed to rely on economic and statistical methods used by the FTC and defendant's economic experts to analyze antitrust impact. The "difference-in-differences" method estimates price increases resulting from exercise of market power rather than from other factors. The district court denied certification, concluding that the expert had not shown that his methodology could address impact on a class-wide basis. The Seventh Circuit granted interlocutory appeal, vacated, and remanded. Although plaintiffs' expert initially believed that the health system did increase prices uniformly across all services, he acknowledged that it might not have done so, and explained how his methodology could show impact to the class despite such complications. The degree of uniformity the court demanded is not required; "it is important not to let a quest for perfect evidence become the enemy of good evidence." View "Messner v. Northshore Univ. Healthsystem" on Justia Law

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana (BCBS) and New West Health Services (collectively TPAs) administered a self-funded employee healthcare benefit plan for the State's employees. Jeannette Diaz and Leah Hoffmann-Bernhardt (Plaintiffs), who were both injured in accidents, filed suit against the state, BCBS, and New West for allegedly violating their made-whole rights by failing to conduct a made-whole analysis before exercising subrogation rights. Plaintiffs moved for class certification seeking to include in the lawsuit individuals who had their benefits reduced under the State plan, as well as individuals who had their benefits reduced under policies independently issued and administered by the TPAs. The district court denied class certification and determined that Montana's made-whole laws did not apply to TPAs. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's finding that BCBS and New West, in their capacities as TPAs in the present case, were not subject to the made-whole laws under either the subrogation statutes or under a third-party beneficiary theory; and (2) reversed the district court denial of class certification, as Diaz and Hoffmann-Bernhardt demonstrated that the requirements of Mont. R. Civ. P. 23 were met. View "Diaz v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield" on Justia Law

The Taranto Group contracted with two outside vendors to send out advertising via facsimile transmissions on its behalf. It was later calculated that at least 5,000 transmissions were made in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). A doctor brought an action individually and as a class representative against the Taranto Group, seeking damages and injunction relief under the TCPA and tort damages for conversion. A professional corporation then sought to intervene as an additional class representative. The district court issued an order certifying the proposed class and, in an amended order, certified the order for interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's determination that class certification was appropriate in this case, holding, among other things, that the district court (1) correctly found the plaintiffs met their burden of demonstrating that they met the statutory requirements for class certification, (2) properly determined that a class action in this case was superior to individual small claims actions, and (3) properly concluded that a class action would avoid inconsistent adjudications.

Plaintiffs, representing a putative class of purchasers of contact lens solutions, appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that defendant violated California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et seq., and False Advertising Law (FAL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17500 et seq., by marketing Complete MoisturePlus as a product that cleaned and disinfected lenses. The district court ruled that plaintiffs lacked standing. Defendant argued that the ruling was not in error and that even if it was, the suit was properly dismissed because the class' claims were preempted by 21 U.S.C. 360k(a) of the Medical Devices Amendments of 1976 (MDA), 21 U.S.C. 360(c) et seq. The court held that the district court was incorrect to conclude that this class of plaintiffs lacked standing where they had demonstrated economic harm, but the court held that it could affirm the district court's summary judgment on any ground supported by the record. Therefore, the court held that the record demonstrated that the class' claims were preempted, so the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.